ASG Blog
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Afghanistan Study Group News Recap November 2, 2010
Published: November 2nd, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerOn the eve of the midterm elections, few media outlets are focusing on the Afghan War even as major stories and analysis continue to develop:
Petraeus, the Afghan Review, and Public Support
Now that we have reached the month of November, there are an increasing number of stories on the President’s December Review of the war in Afghanistan. The National Review has two analyses by James Kitfield and Yochi Dreazen (links unavailable). According to these reports, General Petraeus is racing against time to produce enough progress in Afghanistan before the December review. The main evidence Petraeus will present in December is the increase in Taliban leaders killed and territory cleared and controlled by coalition forces. These metrics are flawed for a number of reasons. The Taliban have proven that they can recruit new commanders with ease and as I mentioned in the last post these new commanders tend to be younger and more radical. Likewise, territory controlled by the coalition is not an accurate measure of progress so long as the Taliban can flee to sanctuaries in Pakistan and the regime in Kabul remains too weak and unpopular to consolidate gains.
A third and crucial issue that Petraeus and the President must consider, is the eroding public support for the war here in the United States. Indeed, while there is great uncertainty regarding many aspects of the war, I can say with relative certainty that public support—currently at 37% —is not likely to improve. The pressure to pull out of Afghanistan is also affecting other NATO allies. The French Minister of war recently told the London Daily Telegraph that they would hand over Sorubi province to the Afghans in 2011, making France most likely the first NATO country to begin withdrawing next year. Other countries are likely to follow suit.
The question of public support is routinely ignored by analysts arguing over whether the president should impose a strict timetable for withdrawal, a question that will be at the center of the December Review. One side of the argument says that the withdrawal of U.S. troops will remove a crucial incentive for the insurgency to fight: the presence of foreign troops. On the other side, one argument for not imposing a strict timeline, suggested by Matt Waldman, is that our troop presence is perhaps the only card the U.S. has with which to negotiate a peace settlement. Unfortunately, this debate tends to overemphasize the importance of timetables, which are in many ways a function of public commitment to the cause. If, as expected, support for the war continues to erode, the public will demand that the troops come home. This is true regardless of what President Obama says or does. Given this constraint, Petraeus must offer the President an honest appraisal of the limitations of the Counter Insurgency strategy.
The Rational for War
Matt Hoh, Director of the Afghanistan Study Group, has argued that the war in Afghanistan is an ineffective and counterproductive way to confront global terrorism. Foreign Policy analyst James Traub, examining the pros and cons of the Afghan war strategy, largely agrees. Focusing on the Al Qaeda threat, Traub argues that the effects of the counter-insurgency campaign on Al Qaeda are at best uncertain and at worst counterproductive. Once the costs of the war are factored in—Traub includes broad factors in his analysis such as loss prestige—the cost-benefit analysis is weighted even more heavily against the war.
Reintegration versus Reconciliation
One of the real strategic debates on Afghanistan is whether the U.S. should promote reconciliation or reintegration. Currently, our strategy has been to promote reintegration of Taliban forces: We are encouraging mid-level commanders and indigenous Taliban forces to defect to NATO. Unlike a reconciliation process, the objective is not to achieve a broad based peace accord, but rather to further divide and weaken the insurgency.
On Saturday, the Wall Street Journal published a story on one such mid-level commander who was encouraged to defect. In the Northern town of Baghlan, Commander Sher was encouraged to abandon Hezb-islami and join the coalition. Within three months Sher was dead (most likely from an accidental U.S. airstrike) and his militia leaderless and in disarray. The failure of the Sher reintegration is twofold. Not only did the U.S. lose a local ally, the virtual destruction of Sher’s forces sends a powerful message to any other potential defectors. If this Wall Street Journal article is any indication, reintegration is not the answer to the U.S.’s problems and broad based process of reconciliation based on mutual concessions may be necessary.
Elsewhere from Afghanistan Study Group Members
Musharaff Zaidi says that the Obama’s visit to India is making Pakistan very nervous. He argues that security in South Asia will only occur if Pakistan and India can put aside their historic animosities:
“Transformational change in South Asia can only be achieved through the realization and pursuit of a natural alliance, much more organic and productive than the one India and the US pursue with each other. This is the natural alliance between Pakistan and India — two countries with shared language, culture, food, faith, and history.”
Stephen Walt and Juan Cole critique David Broder’s suggestion that Obama’s political and economic troubles could be solved with a military confrontation with Iran.
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Afghanistan Study Group: Week in Review
Published: October 29th, 2010
Iran and Hamid Karzai:
Afghanistan Study Group Member Stephen Walt argues in a blog post that the reaction to the Iran money scandal is overblown. It is only natural that Iran would want to influence one of its neighboring countries with financial aid. On Afghan side, why shouldn’t Karzai accept money from Iran? As Walt points out, when you are in the business of buying off warlords, “cash on hand is a pretty useful asset.” Lastly Walt points out what a trifling sum of money is being sent to Karzai. “$1 million a year is really chump change,” he writes. Compared to $119 billion the U.S. plans to spend in Afghanistan next year, $1 million really is a minuscule quantity of money.
Steve Clemons on the News Hour Tuesday makes a similar argument, saying it would be “naïve to think that Karzai in Afghanistan wouldn’t be finding ways to cut deals with all of their neighbors.” Clemons, a member of the Afghanistan Study Group debated co-guest Ali Jalali on the U.S. approach towards the Karzai regime. Clemons argued that policymakers should be open to the possibility of other leaders in Afghanistan and not be so committed to Karzai. He went on to argue for institutions-building approach, centered on injecting civil society into the political system. In contrast, Jalali said that Karzai-bashing is counter-productive, especially as there is no potential alternative leader to take his place. Both views have merit. Over the short term, Karzai is the president of Afghanistan. Replacing him would just create greater instability; however the lack of legitimacy is a serious issue. If Afghanistan cannot develop more inclusive political institutions, the U.S.-Karzai partnership is bound fail.
David Cortright on Afghan Women
Afghanistan Study Group member, David Cortright has just co-authored a major new study on women in Afghanistan. The report illustrates the fragile political environment in which Afghan women find themselves. On the one hand, there have been undeniable gains for women across Afghanistan, since the overthrow of the Taliban. From representation in parliament, where women are now guaranteed 25% of the seats in the Wolesa Jirga (lower parliament) and 17% of the seats in the Meshrano Jirga (upper parliament), to the right to vote—women made up 44% and 38% of the vote in 2005 and 2008 elections respectively—the political situation for women is unambiguously better than it was under Taliban rule. Furthermore, women have made social gains. They now have improved access to education and health services—37% of primary and secondary school enrollees are now girls—which was nonexistent for women under the Taliban rule.
The picture for women is not totally rosy, however. As the insurgency has intensified, women have seen an erosion of the gains made since the toppling of the Taliban regime. Violence against women has increased, female members of parliament are now under constant threat of assassination, and schools for girls have been pressured to close. Economic hardship has led many Afghan families to force arranged marriages on their daughters. In Kabul, laws protecting women have been uneven. A recent law legalizing marital rape epitomizes the challenges that feminist Jirga members face against widespread societal opposition. There are also reports from Human Rights Watch that prostitution and human trafficking of women are on the rise. It is hard to attribute the erosion of women’s rights completely to the re-emergence of the Taliban or the expansion of the war. As Paul Pillar points out, there is also a cultural factor to the treatment of women, independent from the resurgent Taliban or the increased insecurity.
Women find themselves between a rock and a hard place. While the fighting continues, their rights are likely to continue eroding. On the other hand, there is widespread unease about negotiating with the Taliban. Fatima Gailani, the president of Red Crescent asks rhetorically: “what will we have to sacrifice with reconciliation?” Cortright argues that the reconciliation process should go forward, but that the inclusion of women is essential to protecting their rights. He calls for a sustained international troop presence to provide security as U.S. forces are drawdown. Lastly, he pushes for greater emphasis on development, promoting what Nicholas Kristof has called the Dr. Greg approach after Three Cups of Tea author Greg Mortenson, whose schools dot the Af-Pak countryside. Kristof has argued that development should emphasize working within local social structures so that locals feel ownership of the development projects.
There is no guarantee that Cortright’s recommendations will work, but they are the best hope to protect the fragile status of women in Afghanistan.
Scott Atran on Negotiations with the Taliban
Scott Atran from France’s National Center for Scientific Research has produced an excellent Op-Ed on the prospects of reconciliation with the Taliban. The Op-Ed comes on the heels of several contradictory news reports describing the state of the war. The pentagon has been touting progress in Kandahar, where once contested regions are seeing increased security for the first time in years. Taking a wider view, it appears that members of the military and intelligence community have concluded that the campaigns have not broken the back of the insurgency; the Taliban is proving far more resilient than some military planners had once thought.
Part of the problem, argues Atran, is that the Pentagon is operating under the false premise that escalating the war will force the Taliban to the negotiating table. This premise is incorrect for a number of reasons. Firstly, the U.S. is operating in a strategically weak position. The insurgents know they can outlast the foreign occupation—timeline or no timeline, the Taliban recognize that public support for the war in the U.S. has its limitations. As time passes the U.S.’s bargaining position is therefore almost certainly going to weaken. Secondly, the success of recent operations in killing Taliban commanders may paradoxically make negotiations more difficult. As Matt Waldman and Jenna Jordan have also demonstrated, moderate midlevel commanders are being killed and replaced by more radical younger insurgents, and the willingness of the Taliban to compromise has continued to diminish. Related to this argument, the ability of Taliban commanders to control the insurgency has also eroded over time, as Atran’s anecdote about the murder of a Taliban cleric makes clear. Atran argues that reconciliation holds greater promise for two reasons. Firstly the insurgents have indicated they may be willing to take a hard stance against Al Qaeda. In fact, as Washington Times correspondent and Afghanistan Study Group Member Arnaud de Borschgrave reports, there is a long history of animosity between Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar dating back to before 9-11. The second reason to be optimistic, argues Atran, is that tribal linkages, particularly between the Haqqani network and Karzai’s Popolzai Clan can be exploited to jumpstart the talks. In comparison to a military strategy built on faulty premises and with no hope of success, there seems to be great promise in potential peace talks, but the U.S. has to change course.
Elsewhere on the Blogosphere from Afghanistan Study Group Members
- Juan Cole attends a scathing critique of the Karzai government and U.S.’s military policy.
- Paul Pillar discusses the growing threat of home grown terrorists.
- Mosharraf Zaidi is terribly disappointed that Pakistan has failed to make institutional reforms following the terrible flooding this past summer.
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger -
Afghanistan News Recap
Published: October 27th, 2010
Iran in Afghanistan
Today’s New York Times has a front page story on Iran’s increasingly cozy relationship with the Karzai government. The U.S. should not be surprised that Iran is trying to influence the Afghan government with financial support. Iran has a 582 mile border with Afghanistan, close to a million Afghan refugees living within its borders, sees an enormous percentage of the Afghan drug trade traffic through its land, and population and is traditionally protective of the minority Shia Hazara population. In a press conference, Karzai pointed out that U.S. contributions dwarf those given by Iran or other nations. Furthermore, there is no indication that Karzai ever pledged to refuse Iranian aid. This news development, however, does indicate troubling continual erosion in the relationship between Karzai and the U.S. If Karzai actually believes his regime could survive “without the West’s help”, he might be tempted to exclude the U.S. in peace negotiations. This potential development should greatly concern policymakers.
Afghanistan Study Group Member Juan Cole has an interesting take on the Iran story arguing that the scandal demonstrates that Iran and the U.S are “de facto Allies in Afghanistan”. He goes on to say that the Iranians have a long history of animosity towards the Taliban:
“The Iranians hate the Taliban and it is mutual. The two almost went to war in with one another in 1998 over the killing of Iranian diplomats at Mazar. Iran backed the Northern Alliance in its dark days when al Qaeda had it bottled up in the North East and Karzai is still backed by Northern Alliance War Lords”.
Karzai’s heated rhetoric may simply reflect political posturing related to a ban on private security contractors. These security firms have gotten a lot of negative attention due to the killing of civilians. However, they also play an important role in providing security for development projects all over Afghanistan. Simply put, without security contractors, much of the U.S. supported construction and development cannot take place. Karzai may try to extract U.S. concessions before agreeing to postpone the ban.
Afghanistan Study Group Member Bernard Finel thinks the benefits of security contractors are overblown. In demanding a ban on security personnel, Karzai is demonstrating leadership “for the first time in a decade,” writes Finel; furthermore development projects are “long-run and minor”, essentially a “trivial” issue in comparison to more important questions surrounding Afghan legitimacy. By demanding that the U.S. remove contractors, Karzai is reclaiming sovereignty. Finel concludes that a successful COIN strategy cannot be dependent on mercenary forces:
“A development-centric COIN approach supported with 500,000 well-trained American troops is one thing. A development-centric COIN approach sustained by a hodge-podge of bribes, private militias, and mercenaries is quite another.”
Is the War Going Well?
There is a real disconnect between the press releases from the Pentagon and those coming from Afghanistan and Pakistan. General Petraeus is promoting recent military successes in the Kandahar offensive. Thanks to increased operations by both U.S. special operations and Afghan allies, vast stretches of the province have seen increased security, but is the tide really turning? The same day the Washington Post published Petreaus’s remarks, the paper also published a story on Af-Pak relations casting doubt on the general’s statements:
“In interviews, [Pakistani] military and intelligence officers said they were skeptical of assertion by U.S. military leaders that coalition forces have turned the corner…calling that narrative a ‘desperate ’attempt to convince the American public that there is progress in the war”
Taliban officials similarly say that the “peace talks” are mostly hype. As Michael Semple from the Carr center suggests, the presence of backchannels with the Taliban and the Haqqani Network have been used to communicate with the enemy for years and are standard operating procedures for Afghanistan.
So the question remains: Whose version of the war should we believe? Harvard professor and Afghanistan Study Group Member Stephen Walt does an excellent job explaining why we should be skeptical of Pentagon press releases. Firstly, he argues that it is in U.S. interests to play up positive developments in the war in order to encourage insurgents to defect. In other words these reports could be a psychological operation aimed at the insurgency. Secondly, even if the gains in Kandahar are real, the Taliban can still regroup in their Pakistani sanctuary (with Pakistani support). There is very little evidence to suggest that the current gains are permanent, but there is ample historical precedent to suggest that the recent gains are only temporary.
“The Taliban Will Never Negotiate as Long as They Think They are Winning”
Robert Naiman questions a piece of conventional wisdom on potential negotiations with the Taliban. The conventional wisdom says that the Taliban will never compromise as long as they have the upper hand in the conflict. Naiman points out that in any conflict, one side almost always seems to have the upper hand. This view seems to preclude negotiated settlements from ever successfully ending conflicts—a view contradicted by numerous historical examples. The real problem, suggests Naiman, is not that that the Taliban refuses to negotiate in the current environment, but rather that while they are winning, the Taliban makes harsh demands such as the removal of all U.S. troops. In other words, a more accurate statement would read “the U.S. will never negotiate as long as they are losing the war.”
One caveat should be added to Naiman’s persuasive argument. In order for meaningful negotiations to take place, both sides must recognize that military victory is not imminent. If the U.S. believes they are on the cusp of breaking the insurgency’s back, there is no incentive for the U.S. to negotiate. Likewise, if the Taliban feel they can hold out for two months, then march on Kabul, they will not enter negotiations in good faith. Simply put, if both sides believe that the costs of continuing the war, outweigh the benefits of continued fighting, there will be an incentive to negotiate regardless of which side has the upper hand. In Afghanistan, after over three decade of war, including nine years of US involvement, neither side has a clear path to victory. That is ample incentive for both sides to sit down and talk.
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A New Way Forward: Reconciliation and Women’s Rights in Afghanistan
Published: October 26th, 2010
I had the pleasure last week of being interviewed alongside noted author and human rights advocate Ann Jones. The conversation focused on reports of negotiations (real or otherwise) in Afghanistan and quickly moved into a discussion on the centrality and importance of women’s rights in any negotiated settlement of the Afghan conflict.
In the south and the east of the country (and, unfortunately, increasingly over the last two years in parts of northern and western Afghanistan) the most pressing concern to women and their families is the daily and constant violence. Achieving a settlement that addresses and resolves the political causes of the fighting is, of course, the priority for southern and eastern Afghanistan. A woman’s primary concern right now is the very real and current possibility of her family being killed by an errant missile or roadside bomb, as opposed to any promises of future cultural, educational, or economic advancement.
In the northern, western and urban parts of Afghanistan, it is commonly believed that gains have been realized for women since the fall of the barbaric and excessive Taliban regime in 2001. So, any negotiated settlement in Afghanistan would seemingly need to see protections of such gains as a priority. However, it is not that simple, since the notion of such gains has limits. This is because the role of women in all parts of Afghan society, not only in the conservative south, cannot be divorced from generations upon generations of misogynist traditions anchored by cultural and religious roots. In contrast to popular narrative in the United States, none of the sides in the multi-dimensional and multi-layered Afghan conflict are champions of women’s rights. This is a point highlighted by Kabul resident, Anita Sreedhar, in her recent essay “Dinner Plans in Kabul”:
“Like all local women in the neighborhood, I can’t leave the house alone. People outside of Afghanistan are shocked to hear this – “but the Taliban have left, no?” Yes indeed, but the Taliban did not make these rules. Many of these rules were actually enforced and created during the time before the Taliban by warlords who, bloated with arms and cash from Pakistan and the US (in order to defeat the Russians), fractured the country.
After the Taliban were defeated, those same warlords were brought back into power by the US. The Karzai government resumes must read like a list charges at an international tribunal. The human rights’ violations are endless. And it is thanks to them (and not the Taliban) that I have to live in a capital city shuttered by extreme conservatism.”
A negotiated settlement is needed to end the Afghan conflict, not just to stop the mindless and pathological infighting between several generations of Afghans, or to guarantee the disassociation of Afghan militias from political and religious groups with trans-national terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, but also to enable structural and institutional assurances of progress for future generations of Afghans, most especially women. David Cortright, an Afghanistan Study Group member and the Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, has co-authored a report entitled, “Afghan Women Speak”. The report, to be presented to the United Nations Forum on Security and Human Rights in Afghanistan on October 28th, provides recommendations for a way forward for reconciliation and women’s rights in Afghanistan.
As the Afghan war continues to worsen and prospects for a better future appear hopeless to many Afghans, it is proposals like David’s, as well as the Afghanistan Study Group, that should be at the forefront of discussions in Washington and Kabul.
Matthew P. Hoh
Director, Afghanistan Study Group -
Three Baffling News Developments from Afghanistan
Published: October 22nd, 2010
If you think you understand Afghanistan, try to make a coherent narrative out of the following three news stories reported this week:
1. The New York Times reports that the U.S. flew Taliban elites to Kabul in order to meet with the Karzai administration, but this same article states that Taliban leader Mullah Omar is being cut out of negotiations because of his ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. Furthermore the article suggests that ISI has penchant for eliminating Taliban members who seek conciliation with Kabul.
2. The Asia Times reports that Pakistan has released Taliban Second in Command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. Baradar was captured by Pakistani forces in January. Initially the capture was hailed as a great victory for coalition forces, until the New York Times pointed out that Baradar was lead negotiator in secret peace talks with Karzai. By capturing the Taliban’s number two, Pakistan effectively stalled the peace talks. Now, Baradar is free again.
3. The New York Times reports that that the NATO campaign in Kandahar is successfully ousting forces from the region. The same article notes that insurgents have retreated into—you guessed it!—Pakistan’s tribal regions. Meanwhile in the think tank world, Oxfam’s Head of Policy in Afghanistan, Matt Waldman, has recently produced a paper on the prospects of negotiation. In a conference at the United States Institute for Peace on Thursday, Mr. Waldman stated that one of the Sine Qua Non’s of a successful counterinsurgency is there be no sanctuary to which the insurgency can escape.
The administration seems to be moving into a new phase in the war against Afghanistan, but troubling signs persist. If the goal is to marginalize and defeat the Taliban, it is entirely appropriate to try dividing the insurgency. There may well be members of broader Taliban alliance that the U.S. should not negotiate with due to their extremism. But to refuse to meet the most critical player in the Quetta Shura because of ISI connections seems outrageous. Does the Pentagon really believe that ignoring the ISI will solve the problem? What game is Pakistan playing anyway? Is the release of Baradar a signal that Pakistan wants to be engaged in peace talks? Are they just trying to snub NATO? My own hunch is that there are two sets of negotiations occurring in Afghanistan. One set of talks, supported by the U.S., is limited to some keys members of Taliban who the NATO coalition believes will break from the insurgency. The goal here is less reconciliation and more reintegration. The second set of negotiations long pursued by Karzai aims at a broad based agreement with Taliban and possibly a political settlement ending the conflict.
Although both strategies emphasize dialogue and diplomacy, they diverge in some critical areas. Firstly the U.S. strategy wants to sideline Pakistan, which it views as the main destabilizing force in Afghanistan. The Karzai strategy looks at Pakistan more pragmatically. They may be part of the problem now, but they will almost certainly have to be part of the solution as well. The U.S. strategy believes a military solution is still possible. True, no pentagon official is going to say they can completely eliminate the insurgency, but they do believe that the insurgency can be marginalized so that it no longer poses a serious security threat to the country. The Karzai strategy sees recent military gains as temporary, especially as long as the Taliban has a sanctuary in Pakistan. While the U.S. strategy believes it can weaken the Taliban before entering negotiations, the Karzai strategy questions this logic. “Can coalition forces gain the upper hand militarily in the next eight months,” they ask? If the Taliban is in a weak position, might the insurgents have more incentive to keep fighting in the hopes of reversing their fortunes?—a point which Georgetown Professor Paul Pillar makes. The U.S. already has a July deadline to begin withdrawing troops. The insurgency knows it can outlast U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Isn’t the best solution to achieve as comprehensive a political settlement as is possible?
Recent news articles seem to raise more questions than they answer. The fact that dialogue is now being used as an instrument in U.S foreign policy is definitely a good sign. My worry is that we are negotiating based on a number of bad assumptions: that the Taliban is in a continually weakening position and that bogyman Pakistan can be sidelined. If these assumptions turn out to be false, negotiations may well fail.
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Cautious optimism for productive negotiations in Afghanistan
Published: October 20th, 2010
Today’s reports by the New York Times and the Associated Press provide a few reasons for cautious optimism that US policy may be shifting towards a more sensible and productive direction in Afghanistan*. Reports that the US is no longer targeting for killing or capture insurgent leaders who are trying to negotiate prove that it is only now that the US has become serious in advancing the reconciliation process. Despite previous disingenuous statements about the need for a political settlement the US appears to be abandoning mistaken rhetoric about the need to drive the enemy to the negotiating table (nothing dampens the mood for negotiations more than a hellfire missile through a windshield as negotiators return from talks). Additionally, General Petreaus’ request this past summer that the Haqqani Network be placed on the US government’s global terrorist group black list, thereby disallowing any possibilities for negotiations, have been disregarded. This is a positive step that keeps open the possibility for a settlement between the Afghan government and a major part of the Afghan insurgency.
Starting in September, there were indications that the Obama Administration might be amending its previous commitment to a security and development focused approach to the insurgency. Since President Obama took office 21 months ago, US policy in Afghanistan has reflected a mistaken premise that the insurgency is a monolithic organization capable of being defeated by a mixture of massive security and development efforts thus driving a wedge between the Afghan population and the insurgents. The reality is much more complex. The insurgency is composed of multiple groups with many disparate and local political grievances. Often, security and development efforts enacted by civilians, and foreign and occupying soldiers, are meant to distance the population from the insurgency. Instead these efforts inadvertently exacerbate existing local grievances and drive the population to the insurgency for support and protection.
This is very similar to US actions in Iraq from 2003-2006. In Iraq the US’ actions to protect the population from the Sunni insurgency failed to address the nature of the insurgent movement (again portraying the insurgency as monolithic), and ignored the legitimate grievances of local communities and the political exclusion of the Sunni leadership at both local and national levels. In 2006, prior to General Petreaus’ “Surge”, at a time when Marine Corps Intelligence proclaimed the province to be lost, the US adjusted its policy towards talks and reconciliation with the Sunni insurgency that resulted in the Anbar Awakening. The Awakening brought formerly excluded Sunni leadership into the governing process, distanced the Sunni population from al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, and delivered an extremely significant reduction in violence that, tenuously, still holds. (Please see Mark Perry’s book, “Talking to Terrorists”, to understand how obstinacy and a commitment to rhetoric at senior levels in the US government delayed this process for two years, a delay that cost thousands of lives.)
There are many, many differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, so, it is difficult, and dangerous, to draw direct parallels. However, in this case, understanding the complex nature of the insurgency and its objectives in Iraq led to stabilization. The same holds true for Afghanistan. Reports of US involvement with efforts to reconcile elements of the insurgency with the Karzai government provide hope, albeit cautious hope, that a more sensible and rational US policy is taking hold.
*Talks leading to a settlement of the conflict are a primary focus of the Afghanistan Study Group’s recommendations.
Matthew Hoh, Director
Afghanistan Study Group -
Claims of progress in Afghanistan non-substantive
Published: October 19th, 2010
Last week the Washington Post and the Washington Times published near identical articles claiming progress in the war in Afghanistan. Upon inspection these claims are seen to be non-substantive, specious, and fail to provide a reason to continue with our current strategy in Afghanistan. Most importantly, the articles fail to make the argument why and to what end the US should continue to spend over $100 billion a year in Afghanistan and commit 100,000 troops to the battle.
The first claim, that reintegration efforts are working, is untrue. According to the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Committee during the first six months of the reintegration program launched last April, only 100 members of the Taliban switched sides. One hundred is an insignificant number for an organization estimated at over 30,000 members. In the words of a senior Afghan government official, the reintegration program is “almost dead.”
The second claim, that the Taliban are losing momentum, is equally lacking in fact. If the build up of US and NATO forces, a five-fold increase since 2005, including an increase alone of US forces of 50,000 in 18 months, were having a serious effect on the Taliban, then there should be a corresponding decrease in the Taliban’s effectiveness. However, the inverse is true, as proven by the consistent increase in casualties, IEDs, assassinations, etc., and the increased support for the Taliban by the southern Afghan population over the previous five years.
Claims of progress by US commanders in both Eastern and Southern Afghanistan continue to be proven untrue over time, with Marjah in Helmand Province being the most recent high profile example, cited by supporters of the current strategy, as an area where progress is being made. Over seven months after the largest operation of the nine year war was conducted in Marjah by over 15,000 US and Afghan troops, only 400 residents of a population of over 50,000 voted in last month’s parliamentary elections, over eight in ten residents view the Taliban as their government. Fire-fights and IED attacks are still daily occurrences.
When claims of progress go unmet, it is the lives of thousands of American and Afghan families that are forever changed with no benefit provided to either nation. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda, an enemy worth fighting, goes unscathed as its presence in Afghanistan is trivial. Thus, our operations in Afghanistan are inconsequential in keeping America safe from an attack by al-Qaeda.
The debate on America’s policy in Afghanistan must continue and it should not be dictated by misleading and overly optimistic reports. Debate must be based upon current conditions on the ground, as well as accurate trends, so that we have a policy that reflects the United Stated true national interests.
Matthew Hoh, Director
Afghanistan Study Group -
United States must be a part of peace negotiations in Afghanistan.
Published: October 12th, 2010
Last week saw several reports, including in the Washington Post and the Guardian, claiming renewed or invigorated contacts between the Karzai administration and the Taliban. This has been reported on several occasions throughout the US’ nine year involvement in the Afghan war, most recently in 2008 and 2009, and is the necessary first step in ending the conflict and bringing stability not just to Afghanistan, but to the region. Unfortunately, the Obama administration has been largely consistent in its dismissal of such efforts over the last two years, keeping constant with the Bush Administration’s insistence on a military solution to the conflict. The refusal by the Obama administration to take a more active and leading role in negotiations, by reciting the same mantra as the Bush Administration, of only talking to the Taliban only after they have laid down their arms and accepted the Afghan constitution (in essence surrendering)*, continues to obstruct any chances of a successful political resolution to the conflict.
The US with 100,000 troops, plus 50,000 coalition troops and a near equal number of contractors, is obviously the gorilla in the room militarily. However, when you consider the US is spending over $100 billion annually in Afghanistan, a country with a GDP of only $14 billion, the US position must be understood not just for its strength, but for its power brokering and king making abilities, due to the sheer and obscene volume of dollars it pumps into Afghanistan. By ignoring this reality the United States is serving no purpose but to prolong the conflict as it stands on the sidelines with its arms crossed, arguing, as it has for years, that talks are, at best, exaggerated and, at worst, defeatist.
The US’ rhetoric towards a political solution to the war in Afghanistan is not backed up by its actions. While American generals, diplomats and politicians state the war must end with a settlement achieved through political means, the actuality is that very little US diplomatic efforts have occurred, while tens of thousands of troops have been added to the war effort. Without the US clearly demonstrating any honest interest in talks with the Taliban the chances of a negotiated settlement are slim.
The US must lead negotiations. As long as the US props up and enrichens the Karzai regime, there will not be a sincere willingness on the part of the Karzai government to truly work towards a reasonable settlement with its opposition. If the US is not in the room during negotiations and is instead increasing its troop and financial commitment to the Karzai government, the population that supports the insurgency will continue to view the American and western presence as a self-serving occupation with no interest in leaving. With regards to the notion that the enemy will wait us out if we indicate a desire to negotiate, the Guardian article referenced above, as well as this report from last year, indicate the reverse is true for elements of the insurgency’s leadership. Finally, as long as the United States does not lead regional nations to the negotiation table, by acting as a broker and administrator, Afghanistan’s neighbors will continue to act towards their own self interest to the point of sabotaging talks; as Pakistan did last year when it arrested Mullah Omar’s number two man who was then beginning talks with the Karzai government.
The US is the gorilla in the room militarily, financially and politically. Statements that the Afghans must ultimately resolve their differences on their own have a considerable degree of truth to them, but until the US owns up to its position and responsibilities in Afghanistan, and leads efforts towards reconciliation the reality will remain that the current count of thousands dead and wounded and hundreds of billions of dollars spent will be an annual cost to the US with little, if no, benefit to Americans or Afghans.
*The Afghanistan Study Group believes denunciation of al-Qaeda and other trans-national terror groups to be a requirement for talks.
Matthew Hoh, Director
Afghanistan Study Group -
Closure of supply route highlights inconsistency in U.S. Afghanistan and Pakistan policies
Published: October 5th, 2010
The high profile closure of the overland supply routes into Afghanistan by Pakistan’s interior ministry highlight the inconsistency and counter-productive nature of the United States’ Afghanistan and Pakistan policies. Pursuing a counter-insurgency policy in Afghanistan without regards to larger and broader strategic concerns, particularly those related to regional diplomacy, has resulted, over the last nine years, in an Afghan policy that finds 100,000 American troops entangled in another country’s civil war with little to no effect on al-Qaeda’s world wide operations. Meanwhile our actions in Afghanistan, to include the cross border strikes into Pakistan which fed the Pakistani public uproar that led to the supply route closures, have served not to stabilize Pakistan, but to rather to destabilize it, as well as engender Pakistani mistrust of and anger towards the US.
When looking at the United States’ two vital interests in that region of the world, al-Qaeda and the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, this last week’s episode puts into further question the logic and rationale behind our current strategy in Afghanistan. Our current efforts, focused on tactical level efforts at killing mid-level Taliban who pose no unique threat to the United States, are continuing to have a deleterious effect on an already fragile relationship with the government, military and people of Pakistan, whose political stability and safeguarding of nuclear weapons are of strategic national interest to the United States.
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THOUGHTS ON OBAMA’S WARS
Published: September 28th, 2010
Monday and Tuesday’s front page stories in the Washington Post further detail the frustrated decision making process that went into last December’s order by President Obama to increase US forces in Afghanistan by an additional 30,000 (on top of the 21,000 additional troops that were sent by the President to Afghanistan in the spring of 2009, which itself was a successor to a 2.5 fold increase in US and NATO troops from 2005-8). Most importantly, we learn from excerpts of Bob Woodward’s recently released book, Obama’s Wars, that despite his direction and guidance to his staff, the President was provided with only one fully prepared option by his military advisers and, in frustration, ultimately decided upon his own course of action for troop increases and a time-line in Afghanistan.
This revelation, that the President was not offered a thorough and complete accounting of available options and courses of action for Afghanistan, comes barely a week after both the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal published indications from the Obama Administration that the review of the war by General David Petreaus, scheduled for this December, would not offer substantial debate or prompt effective change in the US’ current Afghan strategy.
The need for debate and change is clear. US and NATO troop presence has increased five fold since 2005 in support of the counter-insurgency campaign; whose failings and counterproductive nature the President himself is shown to grasp, as summarized by Woodward and highlighted in Tuesday’s Washington Post:
“ ‘What about the 25,000 U.S. troops in eastern Afghanistan?’ the president asked. They had been there for years. ‘Where are they on the clear, hold, build and transfer model?
They are still holding, sir.
Any of them close to transferring?
Not a single one, sir. ‘
The model had become: clear, hold, hold, hold, hold and hold.”
The conflict in Afghanistan has only worsened when the cost of the war to American taxpayers continues to grow and is expected to reach $119 billion in 2011. With each year casualties rise, the size of the Taliban grows, and support for the Karzai government diminishes. The strategy is dubious, has suspect effects on al-Qaeda’s worldwide operations, and a potentially destabilizing influence on Pakistan’s nuclear armed government. The Afghanistan Study Group firmly believes that it is in the best interests of the United States to have an open and public debate on our role and operations in Afghanistan. We believe our Commander in Chief should be provided with the full range of options and courses of action available to the United States in Afghanistan and the region.
If this December’s review is nothing more than a repeat of last year’s incomplete decision making process, which amounted to nothing more than a rubber stamping the current strategy, while stubbornly resisting the existence of other options, then the United States and her interests, in particular our service members fighting and dying everyday in Afghanistan, will be done a great and harmful disservice by our Nation’s leaders, both uniformed and civilian.
