ASG Blog
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What is The Obama Administration afraid of? Send Petraeus to testify on Afghanistan
Published: November 19th, 2010
It’s been a year since President Obama ordered 30,000 additional troops into Afghanistan (on top of the 21,000 he had sent in the spring). This week, it was announced that troops will probably be in Afghanistan until at LEAST 2014, far later than the July 2011 timetable during which Obama had initially indicated a meaningful drawdown would begin.
Meanwhile this is a natural point to review and reflect on our strategy—the National Security Council is set to release its review of the strategy in December– and not surprisingly, the Administration is not keen on making General David Petraeus available to testify before Congress.
From Politico:
The pushback on bringing Petraeus back to Washington is part of an administration effort to down play the December review, sources told POLITICO. While officials point to initial signs of progress, the “surge” of forces just arrived there and officials believe next summer will be a far more logical inflection point to assess the strategy.
“There’s no success reportable from Afghanistan of sufficient gravitas or importance to warrant making a big deal of this review,” said one administration source.
So, what are David Petraeus (and the Administration) afraid of? What are we getting for nearly doubling our troops in a year? A quick summary:
- Thousands more killed and wounded US servicemembers,
- Over $100 billion spent
- Double digit percentage increases (in a bad way) in nearly all key areas of metrics and indicators
- An Afghan election more crooked than the last stolen election
- An increase in support for the Taliban
- A dramatic increase in the instability of previously stable north of the country
- A failure to deliver “government in a box to Marjah” or clear Kandahar City
- The revelation that key Karzai aides are on the Iranian payroll
- The near collapse of the Kabul bank and the disclosure of US intelligence verification of Pakistani support for the Taliban, etc
Robert Naiman of Foreign Policy magazine argues persuasively why it’s important to have Petraeus sit before Congress, even if the reason Republicans want to bring him back is to embarrass the President:Recall that the reason that there will be a December review is not because of some obscure, antiquated, rote bureaucratic procedure. The reason that there will be a December review is that the Administration promised one last year when it decided, against much internal and external opposition, to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. It was the administration that chose December. Presumably, at the time, they believed that by December they would be able to assess the strategy. The fact that they now say that there is nothing to report is in itself an admission that the strategy has failed.
Recent press reports have indicated that the administration intends to “publicly walk away from ” its promise to withdraw troops in July 2011, a promise that Vice President Biden and Speaker Pelosi understood as a “serious drawdown” involving “a whole lot of people“. The White House insists there is no change. Which is it? Rep. McKeon wants to know, and so do I. The administration is like a guy who with two girlfriends to whom he has made contradictory promises. It’s time for the two girlfriends to confront the administration together. You can urge Obama to keep his promise to withdraw troops in 2011 here.
As Naiman himself noted, there were a lot of complaints that we neglected to talk about the war at all in this election that just passed. And in fact, as a country, we are not talking about it at all, except for the rare times that a report is released or somebody testifies before Congress. Which gets us back to why Petraeus needs to testify.If we’re going to continue appropriating money to Afghanistan that is nearly seven times the annual Gross Domestic Product of the country ($100 billion spent over a $14 billion economy), shouldn’t we at least be having a conversation about what we’re getting for our money and lives?
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Afghan Update 11/17 – The Optimists in the Room
Published: November 18th, 2010
Edward Kenny
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerIs Afghanistan a Lost Cause? ASG Director Matt Hoh and Nir Rosen Debate Peter Bergen and Max Boot
Last week Afghanistan Study Group Director Matt Hoh and Nir Rosen debated Max Boot and Peter Bergen on the question: “Is Afghanistan a lost cause?” (NPR recently uploaded the debate onto their website). However, rather than being a neutral debate, the parameters of the discussion favored those supporting the war effort. As Max Boot contended in his opening statement, Matt Hoh and Nir Rosen had to demonstrate that the war could not possibly be won:
They have to convince you that it’s impossible for America and our allies
to prevail in Afghanistan, that there is no way we can achieve our objective, which
isn’t to create paradise on earth, but merely an Afghanistan that is free of terrorist
safe havens and that can secure and govern itself”Obviously the logically impossible burden of proving a negative is a much tougher requirement than simply saying the costs of the war outweigh any possible benefit. Additionally, Max Boot ignores that the U.S. can less expensively achieve its aims by pursuing a different strategy. In some ways, Matt Hoh and Nir Rosen are the optimists in this Afghan debate because they suggest there are alternatives to the surge; it’s the pro-COIN (counterinsurgency) group who believe that the war can only be won through increased military action, an assertion increasingly at odds with the facts in three significant ways.
Fuzzy Numbers: The Use and Misuse of Polling Data
During the debate, Max Boot and Peter Bergen argued copiously that polling data suggests Afghans support a NATO presence and are optimistic about the future. But these polls should be examined critically: first, as Mr. Rosen pointed out, polling data in Afghanistan is notoriously unreliable; second, a reliance on national polling misses the point. The insurgency is primarily in the Pashtun region, as Max Boot himself pointed out: “63% of the attacks happen in just three provinces.” We suspect that polling numbers in those three provinces would strongly contradict the national data.
Will a U.S. Withdrawal Strengthen al-Qaeda?
When Max Boot he asked whether a U.S. retreat from Afghanistan would strengthen al-Qaeda, he intended his question to be rhetorical; nonetheless his query deserves some serious consideration. Numerous reports suggest that al-Qaeda uses foreign occupation as a recruiting tool for its global jihad. Consequently, it is doubtful that unilateral withdraw would cause a loss of prestige for the U.S. and in turn embolden our adversaries. While a unilateral withdrawal would likely impact al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit, it may encourage state actors such as Iran to defy U.S. interests. To ensure that this outcome does not materialize, a settlement should be negotiated that saves face for all parties and attends to the regional aspects of the conflict. This gets back to a fundamental point: the U.S. can more easily achieve its strategic goals, with significantly less cost, through alternative strategies.
What Happened to Peter Bergen?
Another cause for concern in this debate was the disappointing performance of Peter Bergen, an otherwise brilliant scholar and journalist. He conflates the Pakistani Taliban with the Afghan Taliban throughout the discussion. As Bergen well knows, Pakistan has moved strongly against the Pakistani Taliban; however, they have simultaneously gone out of their way to support the Afghan Taliban—the very same groups fighting U.S. forces. As long as the Afghan Taliban has sanctuaries in Pakistan, the insurgency will not be defeated.
Later in the debate, Bergen calls today’s Taliban more radical and more aligned with al-Qaeda than the Taliban of the 1990s:
This is a Taliban that is more ideologically aligned with al-Qaeda. The reason
that we’re facing the big insurgency that we are is that they’ve adopted wholesale al-Qaeda’s
tactics from the Iraqi theater. Suicide attacks went up five times between 2005 and 2006,
IED attacks. These groups are much more closely aligned…This misstatement is worse than Bergen’s confusion over the Taliban. Here, he conflates ideology with tactics. Although the Taliban are using IED and suicide attacks, this is hardly evidence that the Taliban is in league with al-Qaeda. By this hasty standard, the Tamil Tigers—the world’s very first suicide bombers—are associated with al-Qaeda.
The main problem with Bergen’s argument (and others like him who try to sell the war on the grounds of counter-terrorism) is that it relies on layers of dubious assumptions, each one as unlikely as the last. Bergen assumes that the Taliban, absent the presence of U.S. troops, would be able to march into Kabul and win the war with ease. This defies historical precedents: after all, Najibullah lasted for three years after the Soviets left, and he was facing a far more popular and unified insurgency. Even with a troop drawdown, the U.S. would still be in a position to offer technical support and training to pro-western forces as a hedge against Taliban incursions.
Next, Bergen assumes that Mullah Omar, once in power, would invite al-Qaeda back to Afghanistan. This presumes that Omar’s decision-making is fundamentally irrational; after all, Omar has already suffered a massive defeat at the hands of the U.S. military. Recently, Mullah Omar has even given hints that the Quetta Shura would be willing to make concessions on the issue of international terrorism, evidence that Bergen rejects later in the debate for no apparent reason.
Additionally, Bergen assumes that al-Qaeda would choose to move out of Pakistan to a strategically inferior geographic location in Afghanistan—again the only plausible explanation here would be that al-Qaeda is somehow unconcerned about its own self-preservation as a terrorist organization.
Finally, Bergen assumes that al-Qaeda’s operational capability will improve if the organization is acting from Afghanistan instead of Pakistan. Since al-Qaeda recruits globally without regard to territorial boundaries, this is a hard argument to make.
In short, Bergen’s presupposes that nearly everyone in Afghanistan is “irrational” (except the U.S. of course!), an assumption that effectively rules out a negotiated settlement. This is an extreme position; one that even the Pentagon would not take.
Budget Games: What Role Does the War in Afghanistan Play?
While it was never expressly mentioned in the debate, the release of the Simpson-Bowles plan, makes this a good time to review the costs of the war. The Afghanistan Study Group has long touted the excessive costs of the war, including the $119 billion budgeted for next year, in order to underscore that the current strategy is unsustainable. Those favoring counterinsurgency point out that the cost of the war is only 1% of GDP. While the war is only a small fraction of GDP, it is and will be a significant part of the deficit.
To illustrate, we can make an educated estimate based on a recent New York Times info-graphic. According to the diagram, the current projected budget shortfall is 418 billion in 2015 and will rise to 1345 billion in 2030. If the U.S. reduced it’s presence to 60,000 troops by 2013, the deficit savings would equal 51 billion dollars in 2015, and over 149 billion in 2030. In effect, the war accounts for over 10% of the shortfall over both the short and long term. More importantly, the Afghan War is arguably the most popular way to significantly reduce the budget deficit. Compared to tax increases and cuts in benefits, ending the war is actually quite popular, and consequently more likely to be politically feasible.
Giving these staggering numbers, winding down the war should be an integral part of any serious plan to decrease the deficit. Therefore, we are disappointed that Bowles-Simpson did not address this crucial issue. As Afghanistan Study Group member Gordan Adams put it: missing from the plan was “a different view on how the U.S. engages the world and the missions we give the armed forces.” Obviously, cutting back in Afghanistan is a useful place to start.
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U.S. Doomed to Repeat History
Published: November 18th, 2010
In a few weeks the US will mark its 110th month of combat operations in Afghanistan; the same length of time as the Soviet Union’s military presence in that country. Since the media is focused on the planned announcement of a U.S. and NATO commitment to sustained combat operations in Afghanistan until 2014, maybe it would be helpful to review the senior leadership of the Soviet Communist Party internal memorandums to party members regarding the Soviet Union’s withdraw from Afghanistan.
If we simply replace the words Soviet Union, Karmal and ruble with United States, Karzai and dollar, then update the casualty numbers and fiscal costs, this document just doesn’t only remain intact, but could be read aloud today by the Obama Administration.
CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988
The decision was made in the conditions when there was a lot of uncertainty in the balance of forces within the Afghan society. [Our] picture of the real social and economic situation in the country was also insufficiently clear. We do not want to say it, but we should: at that time, we did not even have a correct assessment of the unique geographical features of that hard-to-enter country. That found its reflection in the operations of our troops against small highly mobile units, where very little could be accomplished with the help of modern military technology.
In addition, [we] completely disregarded the most important national and historical factors, above all the fact that the appearance of armed foreigners in Afghanistan was always met with arms in the hands [of the population]. This is how it was in the past, and this is how it happened when our troops entered [Afghanistan], even though they came there with honest and noble goals.
Babrak Karmal became head of the Afghan government at the time. His first steps in that capacity gave grounds to hope that he would be able to solve the problems facing his country. However, nothing new had emerged in his policy, which could have changed the attitude of the significant portion of the Afghan population to the new regime to the better. Moreover, the intensity of the internal Afghan conflict continued to grow, and our military presence was associated with forceful imposition of customs alien to the national characteristics and feelings of the Afghan people, which did not take into account the multiple forms of economic life, and other characteristics, such tribal and religious ones.
One has to admit that essentially we put our bets on the military solution, on suppressing the counterrevolution with force. We did not even fully use the existing opportunities for neutralization of the hostile attitudes of the local population towards us. We have to assess critically some aspects of functioning of our adviser apparatus in Afghanistan as well. It did many things to provide assistance in strengthening the PDPA and the people’s regime. However, often our people, acting out of their best intentions, tried to transplant the approached we are accustomed to onto the Afghan soil, encouraged the Afghans to copy our ways. All this did not help our cause, it bred the feelings of dependency on the part of the Afghan leaders in regard to the Soviet Union both in the sphere of military operations and in the economic sphere.
Meanwhile the war in Afghanistan continued, and our troops were getting engaged in extensive combat actions. The situation developed, which made any way out more and more difficult as the time passed. Combat action is combat action. Our losses in dead and wounded—and the CC CPSU believes it has no right to hide this—were growing, and becoming more and more heavy. Altogether, by the beginning of May 1988, we lost 13,310 people [dead] in Afghanistan; 35,478 Soviet officers and soldiers were wounded, many of whom became disabled; 301 people are missing in action. There is a reason that people say that each person is a unique world, and when a person dies, that world disappears forever. The loss of every person is very hard and irreparable, it is hard and sacred if one died carrying out one’s duty.
The Afghan losses, naturally, were much heavier [than ours], including the losses among the civilian population.
One should not disregard the economic factor either. If the enemy in Afghanistan received weapons and ammunition for hundreds of millions and later even billions of dollars, the Soviet-Afghan side also had to shoulder adequate expenditures. The war in Afghanistan costs us 5 billion rubles a year.
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
May 10, 1988[Source: Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, Appendix 8, Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya]
This, and other, illuminating and illustrative documents on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, can be found at The National Security Archives located at George Washington University a extremely valuable resource for those who are serious in understanding why the world is the way it is today.
Matthew Hoh
Director, Afghanistan Study Group -
“Sigh”, There Goes Another Trillion Dollars
Published: November 16th, 2010
2014 is now the critical date for Afghanistan
The major news over the weekend was that the U.S. will present a blueprint for transitioning security to the Afghan National Army at the NATO summit in Lisbon with the hopes of ending combat operations in 2014.
First the obvious question: Is this a major shift from President Obama’s stated goal of beginning withdrawal in July 2011? The answer here is uncertain. The president will almost certainly make some token withdrawals next summer, but the administration has long maintained that the speed of withdrawal should be conditions based. In many respects, the new deadline for ending combat operations represents a harder deadline, than the July 1st withdrawal date which will likely be largely symbolic; however in the past, advisors close to the president had suggested that 2013 was the key date for ending combat operations, so on that front the news report is a step in wrong direction. Furthermore it remains to be seen whether 2014 is a “hard date” or to borrow a phrase from Mr. Obama’s predecessor, more of an “aspirational time horizon.”
Characteristically, the new 2014 deadline has set off a flurry of anxious writing throughout the Internet: Is the president backing out of his previous commitment to withdraw? Is he backing out of the COIN strategy before it has a chance to succeed? Much of this worry is misplaced. As Afghanistan Study Group Member Stephen Walt points out, the emphasis on timelines has always obscured the larger point: the current strategy is failing and a fundamental rethinking is necessary. Indeed, if the new timeline has any significance, it is that it will force President Obama to rethink the current strategy.
Afghanistan is almost as unimportant as education, CBS poll Suggests
Last week CBS released a post election poll on priorities for the next congress. Unsurprisingly, fixing the economy and jobs were overwhelmingly the top priority with 56% of those polled saying that congress should focus on this area. By contrast only two percent of the survey said the war in Iraq and Afghanistan should be a priority. On the bright side (I guess?), education, taxes and immigration fared equally badly.
There are a number of possible explanations for these results. First, as long as the economy remains depressed, Americans will focus their attention on jobs at the expense of all else. Second, the administration has favored continuity with the Bush administration on Afghanistan, so most Americans rightly feel they don’t have any real choice on the war. Third, the poll results may signal a loss of confidence in congress; especially since polls consistently show the public is dissatisfied with the way the war is going.
None of these factors is immutable. The economy may well recover; if the war continues to go badly, alternatives to the current strategy will be viewed increasingly with interest, and voter patience with an ineffectual congress is unlikely to last. All of this suggests that the politically pragmatic approach would be to carefully wind down the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan before the public remembers how dissatisfied it is with the war.
Karzai and Pakistan: Frenemies?
A news report and op-ed published recently, underscore the difficulty the U.S. faces in working with partners, all of which have their own agendas. The Washington Post reported yesterday that the relationship between Karzai and Petraeus has reached new lows after Karzai told the Washington Post he wanted a reduction in special operations in Southern Afghanistan. Karzai had angered Petraeus previously over the blocking of some high profile corruption cases, including one involving a close Karzai aid.
The real story here is not whether Karzai is justified in criticizing the night raids—he is. The real story is that the U.S. does not have a partner in Kabul. The counter-insurgency strategy is predicated on the notion that governance can be re-established in areas where the fighting is taking place. Without political allies in Kabul it is not clear that the U.S. can credibly establish an effective government, especially since many local provincial leaders are close to Karzai. A better option would be to redouble efforts at reconciliation and reform. Reconcile with key leaders in the insurgency so that a modicum of security can be achieved, and reform the constitution to decentralize power away from Kabul. As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, these efforts should be undertaken in tandem and can mutually reinforce each other.
Our second “partner” Pakistan has the ability to derail any peace process and must have a clear role in the negotiations. As Michael O’Hanlon notes in a recent op-ed, Pakistan’s goal is to install an anti-Hindu government in Afghanistan, a move which is clearly counter to U.S. interests. As far as Pakistan is concerned, Karzai and the Northern Alliance simply will not do. O’Hanlon’s plan is to dangle goodies such as free trade and nuclear technology for Pakistan in exchange for real cooperation in the counter-insurgency effort:
“The key point is this: Pakistan should be told that these deals will only be possible if the United States and its allies prevail in Afghanistan”
O’Hanlon does not elaborate on whether Pakistan is capable of ensuring coalition victory, or even what victory entails. (Does it require the complete dismantling of the Taliban?)
However, a modified version of the O’Hanlon approach could work. The reconciliation effort is the best hope for a resolution to the war in Afghanistan, but this effort will not succeed without the cooperation of Pakistan. The Obama administration should make clear to Islamabad that signing off on a reasonable peace deal will lead to U.S. cooperation in other areas such as energy policy and trade. Only through smart regional diplomacy can a peace deal between Karzai and the Taliban be made to last.
Last week I offered a first look at the Council Foreign Relations paper on U.S. Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today I look at the dissenting views in the appendix:
One group of foreign policy experts including David Barno, John Negroponte and John Keane among others argues in effect that any policy prescription calling for a troop withdrawal would “preemptively tie the president’s hands.” They argue for a comprehensive review in July prior to making any major decisions. It is true that some variables “cannot be foreseen nine months in advance,” but this fact should not preclude the administration from making withdraw plans. Indeed, if Obama were to take Barno et al’s suggestion to its logical conclusion, the administration would have to daily adapt its strategy to conditions on the ground—not a very efficient model for decision-making, and one that precludes the type grand strategic thinking necessary to protect long-term U.S. interests.
Robert Grenier and Joseph Collins both promote capacity building for the Afghan National Army despite coming from opposite directions. Collins feels that more expansive Counter-Insurgency strategy should be tried first before the “light footprint” tactics are attempted. Grenier believes that the current U.S. strategy “cannot succeed” and argues to immediately pursue the “light footprint” strategy. Both, however, argue that the training and development of the Afghan security forces is a critical factor for U.S. withdrawal. Grenier goes a step further, calling on the U.S. to work with “local militia leaders” to counter Taliban influence.
One of the weaknesses of the CFR document is that it doesn’t offer much help on how to successfully implement an alternative to COIN strategy. Training and mentorship programs—a key recommendation from the Afghanistan Study Group—are one important element to ensuring that the doomsday scenario presented in CFR[i] does not materialize. Another factor, which is disappointingly not discussed in the dissenting views, is a reconciliation effort with key members of the insurgency. After all, the greatest insurance against civil conflict is a power-sharing agreement acceptable to all sides.
[i] CFR says a light footprint could lead to increased terrorism, civil war, and even military confrontation between India and Pakistan. -
11/12/2010 Afghanistan Update: No Games in December, Let’s Have a Real Review
Published: November 15th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerAfghanistan Update 11/12/10: Council on Foreign Relations Releases Af-Pak Review
The Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) has just published a policy paper on U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 70 page report documents the challenges the U.S faces in the region; it puts the Afghan war in a regional context and provides recommendations for policymakers going forward. This is an important document that contributes to a needed and necessary debate on the US strategy in Afghanistan. However, as with most major strategy reviews, the paper has both strengths and weaknesses.
On the plus side, the paper is very forthright about the challenges facing the U.S. in Afghanistan. In particular the report cites the rising violence, the lack of popular support for the Afghan government, and weak political institutions as major road blocks to a successful military strategy. Although CFR endorses the Obama approach, it is a “qualified endorsement”. Most significantly, the report recommends a real December Strategic Review.
“If [ the] review shows that progress is not being made, the United States should move quickly to recalibrate its military presence in Afghanistan.”
This brings up an important weakness in the paper. It asks the question “has there been progress in Afghanistan?”; but it does not really answer it. Given the evidence presented through news sources, several of the metrics presented in this paper to gage progress have seen deterioration. There has been little progress in “building local security and civilian capabilities” even in areas where the military offensive has garnered some positive results. Although areas of Kandahar have seen some security gains, the insurgency remains as potent as ever. The report acknowledges that 2010 will be the most violent year of the war. Meanwhile the government remains as corrupt as ever. The lone bright spot seems to be the training of the Afghan National Army, but Afghanistan won’t be able to take over security from NATO forces until 2014 according to NATO’s civilian commander.
Based on this evidence, you would think the CFR would spend more time discussing feasible alternatives to the current strategy. Instead, their portrayal of the alternative “light footprint” strategy is incredibly pessimistic. The paper claims (p.58) that a light footprint would empower global terrorist networks, lead to a destabilizing civil war, and possibly escalate into a full-scale nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. There are problems with the assumptions the paper makes; but if you do make these assumptions, it is hard to then argue for a “recalibration” of strategy in the next section.
Perhaps the most disappointing section of the paper is on U.S. strategic objectives. In one of my previous posts I said there was a growing consensus that al Qaeda does not pose a security risk to Afghanistan. Put simply, al Qaeda is unlikely to leave its relatively safe sanctuaries in Pakistan. This argument has been made by experts such as Afghanistan Study Group Member Paul Pillar and Counter-Insurgency strategist David Kilcullen. The Council on Foreign Relations is behind on this issue, arguing
“The United States needs to stop Afghanistan from once again becoming a sanctuary for these groups…if the Taliban consolidates its position in large portions of Afghanistan, it could create new space for these dangerous groups to plan attacks against the United States”
There is a lot here that is manifestly wrong. First, terrorists already have a sanctuary in Pakistan so it is hard to see how a Taliban victory would affect the operations of the group. More worrisome, this passage shows a fundamental lack of understanding on how these terrorist groups operate. They recruit members globally. The idea is not to gain territorial “space”, but rather to connect various radical groups to a common cause. Forcing al Qaeda off of a piece of territory does nothing. The U.S forced al Qaeda out of Sudan in the 1990s, but guess what, the group still had “space” to “plan attacks” on 9-11.
A serious strategic objective discussed at length in the paper, is preventing civil war in Pakistan:
“Turmoil in Afghanistan—possibly even a bloody civil war—could produce a refugee crisis, draw in regional competitors, and destabilize Pakistan and the region”.
This is purportedly a description of “what could happen” if the Taliban gain a stronghold, although it seems to describe the war environment today. The real question is whether regional stability is enhanced by large NATO forces in Afghanistan or hindered by it. Most evidence suggests the latter as foreign occupying forces and drone strikes fuel radicalism in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Ensuring that Afghanistan does not devolve into a bloody civil war is, however, a legitimate concern. The Afghanistan Study Group argues that a “fast track” peace and reconciliation process is the key to avoiding civil conflict. This is one area where the CFR report makes two interesting and useful arguments. Firstly they argue for a more broad-based peace council:
The present Karzai led reconciliation process is insufficiently representative of the wide spectrum of Afghan interests. It is raising fears among many of these groups and spurring concerns throughout the region, particularly India. The process requires greater U.S. guidance and regional consensus building”
This blog has long argued for a more inclusive reconciliation process. For example, participation of women in the Peace Jirga to ensure safeguarding of women’s rights. With that said, there is a danger of having too broad a peace council. With too many opposing interests a peace deal may be harder to reach. In general this recommendation makes sense.
Secondly they argue that reconciliation and constitutional reform should go hand in hand.
“The national reconciliation process also offers a potential opening for constitutional reform. Insurgent leaders have explicitly rejected the present constitution and are unlikely to reenter Afghan politics without certain amendments. The two political initiatives—reform and reconciliation—should therefore be managed in tandem”
This is an excellent point. Oftentimes when experts discuss the reconciliation process they worry that the insurgents will change the constitution in ways that will undermine human rights. This is a very real worry. Opening up the Afghan constitution for debate is also a potential opportunity to change parts of the constitution, which undermine governance in the provinces. For instance the constitution allows Karzai to appoint provincial governors; a rule which makes zero sense in a society with such stark regional, ethnic and sectarian divides. The Peace Jirga may decide that eliminating some of these poorly thought out rules would be a step towards peace with the Taliban.
In conclusion, it is impossible to cover this entire CFR paper—I would love to discuss some of the interesting ideas on Pakistan—in a single blog post. The Council on Foreign Relations has produced a useful paper. If President Obama focuses on the good suggestions such as taking the December Review seriously and thinking about ways to implement reconciliation more effectively, the CFR will have done great service.
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ASG Newsletter – Afghanistan in 2014?
Published: November 10th, 2010
Next month the Obama Administration will review the US strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan outlined by President Obama last December.
Today’s report from McClatchy supposes that the President and his administration will begin distancing themselves from the exit strategy he advanced last fall. If the administration decides to continue the current strategy through 2014, it would directly contradict President Obama’s own directive, which states that there should be an “accelerated transition to Afghan authorities beginning in July 2011” (“President Obama’s Final Orders for Afghanistan Pakistan Strategy, Or Terms Sheet”, Obama’s Wars, Woodward 2010). This rumored report would be contrary to the Administration’s repeated pronouncements that no changes will be made to regional strategy in the near term. The President, at the end of September, even wrote to Congressional leaders in order to reinforce his December 2009 position.
In addition, this month the Department of Defense is scheduled to release its bi-annual Report “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” I expect this report will show negative trends across key areas in a manner consistent with the results of the last several years regarding our efforts in Afghanistan. Moreover, I anticipate that the Administration will dismiss such trends, arguing that our surge forces have only just arrived, the right form of leadership has only been in place for a few months, and the current strategy has not had enough time to take effect. I also believe the Administration to burnish these arguments and others in order to extend continue our militarized effort in Afghanistan. In making these claims, however, the Administration will be ignoring the recent poll from the Asia Foundation that claims “Eighty three percent of respondents support the government’s attempts to address the security situation through negotiation and reconciliation with armed anti-government elements”, as well as other likeminded analysis.
It is imperative that we challenge the Administration about their rationales for continuing the current strategy; they must not be allowed to receive a pass on this review. In addition to the current survey data, our challenge is based on several factors including the Administration’s policies lack of demonstrable effect on al-Qaeda, the $119 billion the US will spend in Afghanistan this fiscal year, and the nearly 450 American service members killed since the President’s address at West Point last year. Given these arguments, it is my contention that
,the Administration must perform a responsible and thorough review of America’s war strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.Despite the conflicting rumors and reports, it is important to focus on General Petraeus’ December review, and, consistent with these goals, the Afghanistan Study Group will, over the next couple of months, increase its media and outreach efforts to increase and broaden the debate concerning our Afghanistan policy. These media efforts will push for an alternative strategy which will provide real results and benefits: not only for the US, but also
Matthew Hoh
Director, Afghanistan Study Group -
Suffering From a Case of Afghan Withdrawal
Published: November 10th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerNancy Youssef from McClatchy News has just produced a real head-scratcher of an article writing that the administration is walking back from its commitments to begin withdrawing troops in July 2011. Some of the highlights from the McClatchy Piece:
The new policy will be on display next week during a conference of NATO countries in Lisbon, Portugal, where the administration hopes to introduce a timeline that calls for the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan by 2014, the year when Afghan President Hamid Karzai once said Afghan troops could provide their own security
The original plan, as I understand it, was to begin a phased withdrawal starting in July 2011—with the pace of the withdrawal to be “conditions based.” From this paragraph it is not clear whether the administration is proposing a complete withdrawal by 2014, a move which would actually impose a tighter timeline on the administration. If I were being charitable to the Obama administration, I would argue it is attempting a two-step: With one hand they are delaying drawdown next summer, with the other hand, presenting a more detailed plan for a complete withdrawal. If this is indeed the strategy, it is a risky one. By their own admission, conditions in Afghanistan are “unlikely to allow a speedy withdrawal.” The U.S. cannot afford to continue waffling on its commitments, lest it lose what little credibility it has with Afghan people. Reneging on the July deadline will also likely have adverse political effects given that war is already very unpopular.
One factor that could improve conditions in Afghanistan and facilitate a speedier withdrawal would be an effort to reconcile Pakistani backed insurgents with the Karzai government. Here again is the McClatchy piece:
Another official said the administration also realized in contacts with Pakistani officials that the Pakistanis had concluded wrongly that July 2011 would mark the beginning of the end of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. That perception, one Pentagon adviser said, has convinced Pakistan’s military — which is key to preventing Taliban sympathizers from infiltrating Afghanistan — to continue to press for a political settlement instead of military action.
Pakistan thought that just because Obama ordered troops to begin withdrawing, military operations would soon end.
It might be useful here to go over the rationale for setting a date to begin withdrawal. The three reasons to set a timeline are:
1. To signal to both the Afghan public and the U.S. public that U.S. does not have an open-ended commitment to Afghanistan. Ideally this will promote public support in the U.S. for the war while diluting one of the strongest rationale for war: that Afghans are fighting a foreign occupation.
2. To pressure the Afghan government into providing security to the Afghan people.
3. To pressure Karzai into reaching a political settlement with the insurgents
Point three is arguably the most important, especially since the development of a capable Afghan security force is, according to Robert Gates, several years away. If the U.S. is perceived to have an open-ended commitment with Karzai, what incentive is there to negotiate? This is literally the whole point about using timelines to leverage the Afghan government. Now, we hear from Pentagon officials that timelines are no good because Pakistan might try to push for a political settlement. As Robert Naiman from Just Foreign Policy puts it:
What is striking about this is that the Pentagon is explicitly saying that from the Pentagon’s point of view, a political settlement must be prevented and therefore the timetable to begin withdrawal is bad because it was pushing forward prospects for a political settlement.
It’s not shocking that Pentagon officials think this; it’s shocking that they say it openly. It imitates Robert Mankoff ‘s recent New Yorker cartoon in which a general says:
“Well, I’m an optimist – I still think peace can be avoided.”
Naiman also takes down the “blame the Republicans” argument presented in the McClatchy article. Yes, the republican takeover of congress was a setback for those in favor of ending the war, but the new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee was quoted by Reuters as saying he would leave the July deadline in place:
Reuters: But the actual deadline itself, you’re not going to press for that to be changed? McKeon: No. I think that’s installed.
This makes sense intuitively. Changing a timetable that has been set by the president makes the U.S. look either weak or untrustworthy. Either way, such a move will not help the war effort.
The question of setting a public timeline is complicated and intelligent people can disagree. One drawback to having an open commitment to withdraw is that it disincentivizes negotiation for the insurgents who can “wait it out.” Furthermore, having a troop presence in Afghanistan is one of the few cards the U.S. holds; some analysts have argued that we should try to exact some concessions from the Taliban before agreeing to drawdown.
On the flip side, the U.S. is operating under several constraints, from budgetary costs to low public opinion, which are unlikely to permit a long-term troop presence. The insurgents are presumably well aware of these constraints, so by declaring a timeline the U.S. is perhaps not giving up too much.
Both views on timelines miss a broader point however: the military strategy aimed at securing population centers and bringing governance to the provinces is flawed. The government is hopelessly corrupt, U.S. forces are seen as foreign invaders, and the Taliban can recruit at will from the Pashtun belt and escape into Pakistani sanctuaries in the event of military setbacks. Continuing with the current strategy does not solve core national security issues such as al Qaeda (who are not in Afghanistan) and Pakistani stability (which, if anything, has worsened as a result of the Afghan war). If ever there was a time for a fundamental rethinking of a war strategy, now is that time.
Perhaps the most troubling passage in the McClatchy article is this one:
What a year ago had been touted as an extensive December review of the strategy now also will be less expansive and will offer no major changes in strategy…”
The president needs to rethink the Afghan strategy and pursue a real peace process; he must take advantage of the December Review and at the very least, get the Pentagon on the same page.
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News Recap: Highlights from Middle East Institute’s 64th Annual Conference
Published: November 5th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerYesterday was the 64th annual Middle East Institute conference entitled Rethinking the Middle East in Transition. The conference included panels on non-state armed actors and Af-Pak security.
al Qaeda Consensus — Pakistani Nukes may now be the U.S. Security Issue at Stake in Afghanistan
One positive outcome from the Middle East Institute Conference was a consensus that the al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan is largely imagined. Kilcullen said it was unlikely that al Qaeda would leave its relatively safe sanctuaries in Pakistan, even if the Taliban were to emerge victorious. Pillar argued that geographic-centric approach to fighting terrorism is misguided as the terrorist can always flee Pakistan toward Yemen, Somalia or a dozen other countries. Biddle’s critique of Pillar emphasized the nuclear threat in Pakistan as the main rational for U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, not al Qaeda. Clearly the importance of the global terrorism network has greatly diminished as a reason for war.
Pakistan, however, remains the sticking point between those in favor of expanding the war, and those who want to pull out. For those who believe in Pakistani connection, two questions must be answered. Where is the compelling evidence that Pakistan is more stable today than it was prior to the U.S. invasion? Most of the evidence suggests the opposite. Our drone attacks are creating civil unrest in border regions; our military offensives in Afghanistan are pushing Taliban members across the border into Pakistan. Secondly, if U.S. “victory” is so critical to Pakistani security, why is it that Pakistani security forces are actively aiding the Afghan Taliban? Unless you believe that the ISI is somehow irrational, this explanation does not add up.
Cynicism for Reconciliation in Afghanistan
It was discouraging to hear two leading experts on insurgency naysay the prospects for reconciliation. Mitchell Reiss argued that several critical factors are absent in Afghanistan for peace talks to hold much promise. The U.S. lacks a clear partner for peace among the insurgents[1]. Furthermore the Taliban believe they can win and therefore have no incentive to come forward and negotiate. David KilCullen basically agreed with Reiss’s analysis. Despite acknowledging reports that 90% to 95% of the Taliban are “reconcilable”, Kilcullen argued that negotiations were unlikely to work as long as the Taliban have the upper hand. He also argued that the combination of military action and diplomacy could create a “virtuous cycle” whereby radical insurgents are isolated with military strikes creating more space for moderates to reconcile and further isolating the radicals.
Reiss’s and Kilcullen’s analysis suffers from logical inconsistencies pointed out by Afghanistan Study Group Member Paul Pillar: If both sides pledge to only negotiate from a position of strength, the net result is no negotiations ever. Fighting an insurgency is a zero-sum game: one side’s strength is another side’s weakness. There is really only one requirement for negotiations to go forward: both sides must recognize that the costs of war exceed any potential benefits[2]. This is a far lower barrier and one that, after thirty years of warfare, has been long surpassed for most Afghans.
Reiss’s other metric does have some merit, but likewise should not block the U.S. from aggressively pursuing a peace deal. Although it is true that a genuine partner for peace in Afghanistan is certainly a critical factor, this is something that the U.S. won’t know until it sits down and begins to negotiate with top level Taliban leaders—you are certainly not going to find an Afghan Gerry Adams by killing off one quarter of the Taliban’s military commanders and trying to buy off the rest.
On the subject of killing off insurgents, Kilcullen’s “virtuous cycle” sounds great in theory, but the facts suggest a far different situation. Evidence from Afghanistan shows that we are in an “un-virtuous cycle”. As the war expands and the more moderate Taliban commanders are killed, younger more radical Pashtuns are promoted and the Quetta Shura’s ability to control the insurgency diminishes. Our continued military operations are hindering any prospect for a negotiated settlement, and the situation is likely to get worse not better as the fighting continues.
[1] In fact, as Reiss pointed out, it is unclear whether even Mullah Omar has the capability of implementing a cease fire. When I brought this same question up with Hekmatyar’s U.S. representative Daoud Abedi, he said that the Taliban could effectively end the insurgency “tomorrow”.[2] It is not clear the Taliban could march in and take Kabul next year even if the U.S. were to cut and run. The absence of a quick and easy victory for either side suggests that there are incentives for both sides to enter negotiations.
U.S. Policy Supports Pyramid Scheme
No one at yesterday’s conference gave a more impassioned description of the governance problem facing U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan than Stephen Biddle from the Council on Foreign Relations. Biddle began his discussion by pointing out that General McChrystal’s COIN strategy places an unusually large emphasis on creating good governance. Biddle went on to describe the U.S.’s focus on building government-capacity as misguided. The local leaders are predatory having developed large networks aimed at extracting resources from Afghans, and U.S. policy makes matters worse by financially supporting a virtual pyramid scheme. The problem, as Biddle sees it, is not simply a lack of capability. Local leaders have malign intentions. Those who find themselves outside the patronage network lose everything: their land is stolen and they have no place to seek redress: the courts and political leaders are all in the predatory network and NATO is bankrolling it.
Anyone listening to Biddle would conclude that Counter Insurgency has zero prospects for success. But Biddle, despite his rhetoric, does not see the governance problem for what it is: a major and perhaps fatal impediment to our war strategy. Biddle’s recommendations are prosaic: since the root of the problem is that these local Afghan leaders are being empowered, the U.S. should stop sending them money.
There are at least two problems with Biddle’s recommendation. Firstly, as he himself admitted at the beginning of his talk, promoting governance is a critical—perhaps the critical—factor in a counter insurgency strategy. How can you promote governance while simultaneously refusing to work with local leaders? There is a fundamental contradiction here. Secondly, these local leaders have supporters and armed militias. If the U.S. money well runs dry, these networks will likely go to the Taliban. As numerous news stories have discussed, warlords control strategic areas of the countryside and often provide safe passage and assistance to NATO forces. For example, if the U.S. stops working with Commander Ruhullah, who is going to guarantee safe passage for convoys between Kabul and Kandahar. The factors lead me and others to conclude that a fundamental rethinking of the war is necessary.
More on the Election Significance
One likely outcome of Tuesday’s election that I forgot to mention in Wednesday’s recap is that congressional gridlock may force President Obama to devote more time to foreign affairs. Paul Pillar hopes that if he does, President Obama will rework the Afghan policy.
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Afghanistan Study Group News Recap November 4, 2010
Published: November 4th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerMore Evidence that the War is Going Badly
Two stories this week exemplify some of the major obstacles the U.S. faces against the growing insurgency. The New York Times on Monday ran a story on “reverse” reintegration: A police force in Khogeyani abruptly switched sides to the Taliban:
“KABUL, Afghanistan — for months, American and Afghan officials have been promoting a plan to persuade masses of rank-and-file Taliban fighters to change sides and join the government. The tactic, known as “reintegration,” is one of the big hopes for turning the tide in the war. But the Taliban, it appears, have reintegration plans of their own. On Monday morning, they claimed to have put them into effect.
In Khogeyani, a volatile area southwest of the capital, the entire police force on duty Monday morning appears to have defected to the Taliban side. A spokesman for the Taliban said the movement’s fighters made contact with the Khogeyani’s police force, cut a deal, and then sacked and burned the station. As many as 19 officers vanished, as did their guns, trucks, uniforms and food.”
Last post, I argued that two metrics that the Pentagon uses, territory controlled by ISAF and number of insurgents killed, may not give a very accurate picture of the state of the war since fallen insurgents are easily replaced and territory ceded temporarily to the coalition will not pressure the Taliban so long as there are sanctuaries in Pakistan. One metric which should be used to judge success or failure of the strategy is the level of local cooperation with coalition forces. If the police force in Khgeyani is any indication, this critical metric is not looking so good.
A major part of winning the hearts and minds in Afghanistan—ensuring that local groups do not support or defect to the Taliban—is establishing good governance. For this reason, today’s report in the Washington Post is very disheartening. Karen DeYoung and Joshua Partlow call the Afghan governance of Kandahar “ineffectual” and “incapable of functioning”. Most of the governance in Kandahar has been run by the U.S. and coalition forces. This situation poses two problems. Firstly, as U.S. forces begin to pull out, there could be a significant erosion of public services; secondly the visible role of the United States in providing basic governance may well support the myth that the U.S. wants to permanently govern the country. Both of these factors will likely lead to increased strength for the insurgency.
These two stories demonstrate two fatal flaws in the counter insurgency strategy: no local support and no local governance.
What do the Midterms Mean for Afghanistan?
The effect of Tuesday’s Democratic drubbing on the Afghanistan War and U.S. foreign policy remains hard to predict. As many people have pointed out, the economy and not the war in Afghanistan was the major issue of this mid-term election. The new Republican members have no obvious unified position on Afghanistan. Some, such as Rand Paul may even find themselves allying with the antiwar progressives.
Republicans generally have been more willing to support President Obama’s expansion of war. During the war appropriations fight earlier this year, only 12 republicans opposed the bill compared to 102 democrats. Although some of the more strident anti-war democrats were voted out of office, such as Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold, many of the democratic congressmen skeptical about the war will return to congress. Out of the seventeen progressive democratic congressmen that signed a strong antiwar letter during the appropriations process one, Alan Grayson, lost their election.
The predominant evidence at this point suggests that the election will have a minor impact on Afghanistan and foreign policy. Stephen Walt argues that congress has very little control over U.S. foreign policy. Neither party has shown the stomach to withhold defense spending, the one area where congress can influence foreign policy. Yes, left wing democrats and the occasional libertarian will continue to oppose the war, blue dogs—now fewer in number—and republicans—now greater in number—will continue to support the war. But the main driver of policy will be results on the ground and public opinion. If the war continues to go badly and if U.S. support continues to erode, two increasingly likely outcomes; positions among the moderate members of congress may well shift. By then, these midterm elections will have faded in memory.
Last Weeks’s Terror Plot and Afghanistan
There have been several excellent posts from members of the Afghanistan Study Group on last week’s terror plot.
Paul Pillar discusses the how thwarted terrorist attacks are “scored” in Washington and asks why the Christmas Day Bomber was portrayed as a great failure, whereas the package bombers a great success for the Obama administration. In a previous post on the same subject Pillar suggests that the U.S.’s focus on Al Qaeda members in the Af-Pak region is misguided. The next attack against the U.S. is as likely to be homegrown individuals with unknown ties to al Qaeda using basic technology (the Ted Kaczinski Model), as it is to be an elaborate plot orchestrated from Waziristan a la 9-11.
Stephen Walt largely agrees with Pillar’s analysis. He argues that the attempted terrorist attack is yet another piece of evidence against the notion that the war in Afghanistan is an effective way to fight al Qaeda. He concludes that solid police work and intelligence gathering, not war, is perhaps the best defense against global terrorism.
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Foreign Policy is Ultimately the Reflection of Domestic Politics
Published: November 3rd, 2010
By the time this is posted and emailed to the Afghanistan Study Group list (and thank you to those who have subscribed), the polls for America’s 2010 mid-term elections will have closed. This year’s mid-term elections bore many similarities to our nation’s last mid-term in 2006: record levels of campaign spending, anger and disappointment at the President translated into popular sentiment against the incumbent party (and incumbents in general), conversation and debate between campaigns possessing the maturity and intellectual rigor of kids yelling at each other on the playground, etc. However, the lack of debate on the war in Afghanistan, 6 of 10 Americans think is now a lost cause, which is scheduled for review by a divided and conflicted Administration, is striking. All the more striking because the war in Iraq was a significant reason, if not the reason, for many voters to push the Democrats into control of Congress in 2006.
The Democrats’ win in 2006 provided the political incentive to force President Bush to adjust US strategy in Iraq. This included the resignation of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the adoption of recommendations from the Iraq Study Group, which included a focused troop surge for a limited duration (18 months, same time frame as President Obama instructed last December for the surge in Afghanistan), and the acceptance of a roadmap to transition Iraq to Iraqi control within a given timeframe. I have little doubt, in reality close to none, that had the 2006 mid-term campaign (starting in earnest in the fall of 2005) not had such a focus on Iraq, had the US voters not handed President Bush’s party a decisive loss in 2006, four years later we would still have American troops engaged in combat in the Euphrates and Tigris River Valleys of Iraq.
Of course, there are many factors why less than 1 in 10 Americans identified Afghanistan as being of primary concern in this year’s elections. Contrast the very real and personal effects of a depressed American economy to a war waged by a continually deployed professional military force that only 10 million Americans have any personal connection to, or contrast the circumstances for our initial involvement in Afghanistan as opposed to the false and unproven premises for our invasion of Iraq and I think you understand some of the reasons why voters were angry in 2006 and disinterested in 2010.
I’ve been told to expect both increased media and congressional attention to Afghanistan in the months ahead, particularly during next month’s White House review and in the springtime as we near President Obama’s supposed July 2011 date to transition to Afghan responsibility for the war and begin a withdrawal of US forces. However, and unless the exit polling proves me wrong, a significant portion of voters will have voted today without taking into consideration the 100,000 US troops fighting in Afghanistan, including the thousands that have been killed and wounded this year, or the $119 billion the US is planning to spend in FY 2011 in Afghanistan, a country with a GDP of $14 billion. The unfortunate reality is that neither our troops nor our money seriously effect al-Qaeda, the stated reason behind our continued involvement in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, whose most recent attack consisted of a lady Fed-Exing two bombs hidden in printer cartridges from Yemen. This is a fact that was not an important part of this year’s public debate and referendum. So, if the exit polls show in the next day or two that apathy among voters towards the war in Afghanistan held true, don’t expect the Administration to feel much compulsion to change a failed strategy as President Bush was forced to do in 2006
Matthew P. Hoh
Director, Afghanistan Study Group
