ASG Blog
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Center for American Progress Policy Paper: A Powerful Compliment to Afghanistan Study Group
Published: December 9th, 2010
An impressive paper released last month by the Center for American Progress strongly advocates political inclusion, reconciliation, and diplomacy—the hallmarks of a more rational foreign policy in Afghanistan. Among the recommendations:
1. Create a political strategy with deadlines and benchmarks to create greater checks and balances…
2. Encourage inclusive reconciliation among fighting parties and unarmed actors.
3. Reduce the military footprint, realigning U.S. and NATO military strategy with core security interests.
These recommendations are strikingly similar to those presented by another group of foreign policy experts in a paper published in August.
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ASG Member Blogs Recap
Published: December 8th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerThere have been a number of blogs by Afghan Study Group Members since Thanksgiving on the Afghan imposter. Apologies for being slow to get these out.
Afghanistan Imposter Redux: Paul Pillar writes: “The case of the impostor Taliban negotiator might suggest that negotiations as a way to conclude the war in Afghanistan are unwise, untimely, unfeasible, or a joke. They are none of those.” Pillar goes on to note both the difficulties of negotiations, namely that the insurgency is “multi-dimensional” with “numerous players”. Lack of trust remains a critical issue, and possibly a rational for the “imposter gambit”:
The impostor who met with Hamid Karzai may have been a way for the Taliban—or Pakistan—to deal with distrust between parties in Afghanistan, and to see what would or would not happen to a negotiator who made it all the way to the presidential office in Kabul.
If the U.S. is going to get serious about ending this war (a big if, granted), it needs to think about confidence building measures of its own. Would be the U.S. be willing, for instance, to temporarily suspend military raids in advance of secret talks? These are questions worth pursuing.
Stephen Walt weighs in on the imposter controversy:
“So here’s Rule No. 1 for would-be Afghan nation-builders: If you can’t tell the Taliban from the imposters without a scorecard, maybe you shouldn’t be playing this game. “
As does Bernard Finel:
Call me a conspiracy nut if you wish, but reading this story, I was instantly suspicious that this was allowed to occur by people — ISI? Petraeus? — with an agenda to derail the possibility of the negotiated settlement. Turning the process into a farce is a nice, clean way of dismissing the option altogether.
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Wikileaks, The Deluge: Part I
Published: December 8th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerThere has been a raft of articles over the last few days on corruption in Afghanistan, the result of a series of secretly leaked diplomatic cables posted by wikileaks. The cables describe in detail the challenges facing U.S. diplomats as they try to find honest partners in the Afghan government. The New York Times reports, U.S. aid money seems to be directly contributing to the problem:
One Afghan official helpfully explained to diplomats the “four stages” at which his colleagues skimmed money from American development projects: “When contractors bid on a project, at application for building permits, during construction, and at the ribbon-cutting ceremony.”
The Afghanistan Study Group has long argued that working with “local leaders” to re-establish governance, a hallmark of the Counter Insurgency Strategy, becomes toublesome when the local leaders are so corrupt that their actions fuel the insurgency.
The other pernicious effect of U.S. money—it makes reconciliation more difficult. The International Crisis Group claims that as long as the Taliban are receiving aid there will be “no incentive to negotiate”. However, incentives are far more likely to affect the local leaders the U.S. is backing than the Taliban. A World Bank study notes, failed peace plans are
“Far more likely in cases where the organization is held together by profit-motives or force. This situation may confront the international community in Afghanistan, where local warlords cobbled together to defeat the Taliban, may attempt to reinforce their political and economic power and may resist plans for their incorporation and demobilization.”
The good news is that the U.S. can bring pro-Karzai warlords to the negotiating table by decreasing the flow of money and resources to them. Stephen Biddle from the Council on Foreign Relations has long advocated “contract reform” along similar lines. This change would be a substantial departure from the current Counter Insurgency Strategy, which relies on providing resources to local leaders in order to build capacity.
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New Afghan Polling Numbers
Published: December 7th, 2010
A recent USA Today poll documents a continued deterioration of support for the war. 39% now believe that it was a mistake to send in troops. At the start of the war, only 9% believed this. Slight majorities also believe that the war is going badly (54%) and support a timeline to withdraw (54%). Most significantly 68% are worried about the economic costs of the war. The poll also includes a graphic on fatalities which shows that a majority (55%) of the casualties have come under Obama’s watch—more powerful evidence that the surge has not worked as planned.
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International Crisis Group Offers Not So Rosy Picture of Progress in Afghanistan
Published: December 7th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerThe International Crisis Group (ICG) released a policy paper in November. The introduction provides a sobering assessment of the war in Afghanistan, which is contrary to the rosy reports of progress the administration is favoring.
“While success is being measured in numbers of insurgents killed or captured,
there is little proof that the operations have disrupted the insurgency’s
momentum or increased stability. The storyline does not match facts on the ground.”What are the “facts on the ground”? ICG describes in some detail the increased violence, the inadequacy of Afghan Security Forces, and the graft and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government in Kabul. The problem, suggests the ICG, is that the U.S. policy is wrong headed:
“The exit strategy sounds fairly simple: try to pound the Taliban, build support by protecting
civilians, lure disillusioned Taliban over to the government, expand access to basic services and create
resilient security forces. The problem is that none of this is working.”Up to this point the ICG report seems to echo many of the points the Afghanistan Study Group has made. Further along it blames bureaucrats and timelines for what is going wrong in Afghanistan:
“Chains of command for both decision making and the monitoring of
outcomes have been unclear, in part due to a proliferation of ambassador-level
diplomats, war czars, special envoys and generals.”The ICG believes that too many people are involved in the decision-making. While this could indeed be a problem, evidence for such a claim is missing. The paragraph goes on to say:
“Whatever policy there was has been undercut by President Obama’s
call for a July 2011 drawdown, which erased any belief on the ground
that there was a commitment to stay the course”This oft-repeated argument against timetables presumes that absent a clearly defined exit strategy, the Afghan government would assume that U.S. commitment is open-ended. In other words, that the U.S. can perpetually dupe Karzai into believing we have his back. The reality, of course, is that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan was never open-ended, a fact which is recognized by U.S. and Afghan policymakers alike. The question is not whether or not to utilize timelines. The question is whether the U.S. plans for an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan or a chaotic one. In this case, the former is clearly the better alternative.
This ICG paper is that it is much better at diagnosing the problems in Afghanistan, than offering real solutions. In particular, the paper is quick to discount the prospects of a negotiated settlement, resting it’s argument on dubious assumptions.
1. “Talks with the Taliban have been going on for years at every possible level. These negotiations have failed because the Taliban believed that they were winning militarily”
The Taliban were certainly not winning between 2001 and 2006. Even as the insurgency has grown, the likelihood that the Taliban could march on Kabul and retake the government the way they did in the 1990s has remained remote. The Taliban are still reviled by most Afghans and their powerbase remains confined in the south. Negotiations have failed for a far simpler reason. The U.S.—the proverbial elephant in the room—has steadfastly refused to cooperate.
2. “Deal-making even in the shape of reintegration, let alone reconciliation, will not address the many problems that Afghan citizens face…rule of law will be undermined, warlordism encouraged and momentum on security sector reform reversed”
The Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force has a different view of reconciliation writing:
“The national reconciliation process offers a potential opening for
constitutional reform. Insurgent leaders have explicitly rejected the
present constitution and are unlikely to re-enter national politics without
certain amendments. The two political initiatives reform and
reconciliation—should therefore be managed in tandem”The ICG has it completely backwards. In the present environment, rule of law is undermined and warlordism encouraged. It is only through the process of reconciliation that many necessary reforms are likely to take place. A functioning peace process is the best tool potential reformers have.
3. “If deals are made, particularly at the local level, they are likely to be temporary at best, mirroring the appeasement deals made by the Pakistani military…
This argument merely underscores the necessity of a broad based reconciliation effort that addresses the key grievances of the insurgency. Nothing else will work.
4. Only when access to sanctuaries and resources are cut off will there be an incentive for the Taliban leadership to accept a negotiated process.
Parties engaged in combat will have an incentive to enter negotiations if the cost of the conflict exceeds the payoff from a settlement. While the presence of resources and sanctuaries undoubtedly affects this cost-benefit analysis, their presence does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to peace. If it were, Karzai, who receives billions of dollars of “resources” from the U.S. would also refuse to negotiate.
Two factors suggest that political settlement is actually quite promising. First, the war is in a bloody stalemate with increasing costs in both blood and treasure for both sides. Neither the U.S. nor the Taliban has a clear path to victory. Second, the U.S. shares several strategic goals with the insurgency: a reduction of the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan and an increase in the “rule of law”[1]. The potential benefits from negotiated settlement could be quite high and the prospects of such a peace settlement may be much higher than most analysts expect.
Even if you believe that resources and sanctuaries are an insurmountable obstacle, the report offers no solution on how to deal with this the root of the problem: Pakistan. The Pakistanis view India as an existential threat to their country and see Afghanistan as a useful buffer. There is absolutely nothing the U.S. can do to change this strategic calculation. Holding out hope that the Pakistanis will see the error of their ways, as the report seems to suggest, is no way to conduct foreign policy.
The report also hints—it doesn’t say this directly—that Karzai must be removed from power for U.S. policy to succeed. Even though The Afghanistan Study Group has been as critical of the Afghan government we believe deposing Karzai is a dangerous suggestion. For all of his faults, Karzai remains the most popular politician in Afghanistan. Forcing Karzai out would only inflame sections of Afghanistan that currently support the US. Furthermore the Afghan governance problem is rooted in the country’s institutions. Shuffling the leadership does nothing to address the underlying problems.
[1] As Matt Waldman points out, the Taliban’s vision of “Rule of Law” does not correspond completely to the U.S.’s vision, but there is significant overlap.
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Afghanistan Update 11-29-10: Department of Defense Releases Eye-Opening Report on “Progress” in Afghanistan
Published: December 1st, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
Part of me dreaded reading the Pentagon’s latest progress report on Afghanistan. After all, wouldn’t the DoD just play up the some of the security gains that have been reported over the last month while ignoring the seemingly insurmountable challenges that remain? The report, which—perhaps not coincidentally—was released the day before Thanksgiving, was surprisingly realistic about the problems facing coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Is the DoD Overly Optimistic about Afghan Security Forces?
In terms of progress, the report is mostly optimistic about building the Afghan Security Forces, which reportedly will be ready to take over security for Afghanistan by 2014. The report notes that the Afghan National Army is on pace to reach its goal of 171,600 personnel by next autumn and describes several policies in place to improve quality from literacy campaigns to mentoring programs between Afghan and U.S. commanders. While no one can doubt the progress that has been made, DoD may be a trifle optimistic about touting the development of Afghan Security Forces. Until the army proves itself competent in the field of battle, the metrics reported in this report are meaningless. Indeed, if the campaign in Marjah taught us anything, it is that Afghan capacity building is a long way off.
DoD admits the Security Situation is not Improving
If the Department of Defense is somewhat optimistic about the Afghan Army, they are decidedly more realistic in describing the deteriorating security condition in Afghanistan. According to the report “the insurgency retains momentum in certain areas” and “the regional and domestic factors which impede effective COIN operations remain unchanged…” On Pakistani sanctuaries the report writes:
“The porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan continues to allow insurgent groups in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province to conduct cross-border operations in the Pashtun-dominated areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. Pakistan’s domestic extremist threat and the recent flood reduce the potential for more aggressive or effective COIN efforts over the next three months”
What’s surprising here, is both that the DoD is acknowledging that COIN will not be as effective with groups operating with impunity from Pakistan, but also that the report offers no solutions to deal with this problem. They hope that as the waters from the summer’s flood recede, Pakistan will undergo a change of heart. This outcome does not seem likely.
The report is also candid about the insurgency’s strengths:
“The insurgency has a number of strengths, the most significant strength and main effort being the speed and decisiveness of their information operations and media campaign. Organizationally, the insurgency’s capabilities and operational reach have been qualitatively and geographically expanding, as evidenced by a greater frequency and wider dispersion of insurgent-initiated attacks…the insurgent’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) continue to evolve in sophistication. In addition, the insurgency continues to inhibit the expansion of a legitimate Afghan Government through effective shadow governance process that provides dispute resolution, rule of law, and other traditional services in a number of areas”
For months, the Afghanistan Study Group has argued that the war is going badly by virtually every possible metric. This passage—from the Department of Defense no less—seems to strongly support this view. This passage is remarkably comprehensive covering the insurgency’s popular support, military tactics and ability to provide governance. In all three areas the insurgency is gaining strength.
The report also lists the insurgency’s weakness, in a passage which is again instructive.
“The insurgency also has a number of weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The insurgency is comprised of multiple, locally-based tribal networks which at times can make execution difficult…the Taliban is not a popular movement. It is dependent on marginalized and threatened segments of the Pashtun population and is over-reliant on external support. Despite the presence of shadow governors, the insurgency still cannot deliver sustainable development or administer governance beyond the crudest dispensation of justice.”
The first thing that struck me reading this paragraph is that many of the so-called “weaknesses” of the insurgency apply equally (if not more so) to the Afghan government. Does Karzai’s government utilize “locally-based tribal networks”? Check. Is Karzai “over-reliant on external support”? Check. Has the Afghan government proven itself incapable of administering governance? Check. The fact that the insurgency has capitalized on the “marginalized and threatened” segments of the population is, if anything, a strength of the insurgency. These are people who have been fundamentally excluded from the political process leaving them little recourse to seek redress other than by taking up arms—they are the exact profile of the proto-typical guerilla. Anyone comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the insurgency presented in this DoD paper should be very concerned about the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan.
Governance is Abysmal in Afghanistan
If the security picture in Afghanistan looks bleak, the governance report is downright horrifying. The Afghan public’s confidence that the government can deliver “reliable formal governance” fell by seven percent in the latest public opinion poll and less than half of all Afghanis said they could “trust the Afghan Government to settle a legal dispute.” Furthermore, the Afghan government has “abandoned plans to develop the promised national policy on relations between the formal justice system and dispute resolution councils…” This is a critical step to establishing rule of law in the provinces, where the majority of the fighting is taking place.
Efforts to combat corruption have also faltered, as Karzai has intervened at times to release political supporters accused of corruption. Even the much-lauded anti-corruption law was watered down considerably prior to passage.
Here its useful to remind readers that establishing governance is a key component of the Counter-Insurgency Doctrine. In General McChrystal’s April, 2009 strategic review, governance comprises almost as much attention as military tactics. Petraeus himself has said that re-establishing governance in the Pashtun South is a critical part of the COIN doctrine. The fact that almost one year after the president began the “surge”, governance remains as bad as ever is a strong indication that the strategy is not working.
Missing Graphs
Some analysts have questioned whether this progress report measures up to previous ones, including a progress report issued in April. Yes, this report is shorter by about 50 pages, but this discrepancy comes from a fifty-page appendix on training the Afghan National Army. Many of the complaints are not justified.
If there is one area where this report disappoints, it is the dearth of quality maps and graphs. The previous April report had an entire section on local perceptions of government, including maps depicting government support by district. The report also illustrated how the public’s views towards government had changed. The latest progress report eliminates some of the best graphs, and the data that is presented is done so on an ad-hoc base. One likely interpretation is that the data presented an overly negative picture of conditions on the ground, and so the Pentagon ordered aspects removed. If this is the case, the Defense Department has failed its mission to keep the President and Congress informed on the progress in the war.
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11/29/10 Afghanistan Study Group Update
Published: November 29th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerWhat Went Down In Lisbon?
The President has just returned home from a relatively successful trip to Lisbon for the the NATO summit. For Afghanistan junkies there are really two take-home messages.
1. Obama still has strong support for his Afghanistan strategy from European leaders.
2. Differences between the administration and Karzai are sharpening.
One of Obama’s main goals was to shore up support among NATO member countries for a sustained commitment in Afghanistan. Inside Europe there have been rumblings about NATO commitments decreasing in Afghanistan. The French were hoping to transfer from Sarobi District next year. In England, where support for the war is at 32%, the defense minister has called for a speedy drawdown.
Perhaps in an effort to gain support from these NATO allies, President Obama set a date of 2014 to end major combat activities. Although the President’s statements are fuzzy enough to allow flexibility and most news reports acknowledge that there will still be a large troop presence in Afghanistan in three years, 2014 nonetheless represents the closest thing to an established end date to the war. All in all, the new deadline was a small price to pay in order to achieve support among crucial NATO allies.
In Latest Dispute with Washington, Karzai has the Right Idea
The Lisbon conference also highlighted the growing public feud between Washington DC and Kabul. At Lisbon, Obama responded sharply to Karzai for his recent comments criticizing U.S. special operations and night raids. Karzai had also banned private security contractors, which are often hired to protect development projects. On the surface, Obama is entirely justified in his critique:
“He’s got to understand that I’ve got a bunch of young men and women… who are in a foreign country being shot at and having to traverse terrain filled with IEDs, and they need to protect themselves. So if we’re setting things up where they’re just sitting ducks for the Taliban, that’s not an acceptable answer either.”
However, Karzai’s main beef with Obama is on the current U.S. strategy; it is not on the tactical level. A recent column by Ahmed Rashid highlights the essence of the dispute:
“In a suggestion that alarms and infuriates western officials, [Karzai] says there is a political alternative to Nato—to depend more on regional countries, especially Iran and Pakistan, to end the war and find a settlement with the Taliban”
Both Iran and Pakistan are moving to maximize their bargaining positions in the event of a settlement. This explains Iran’s recent surge in support for elements in the Taliban, when in the past Iran had always supported the Taliban’s enemies the Northern Alliance. It also explains why Pakistan is reluctant to free Taliban leaders prematurely. The main obstacle to a negotiated settlement continues to be the Americans themselves, for as long as the U.S. clings to the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Doctrine, there is no incentive for the critical players—the Quetta Shura, the ISI, the Haqqani Network, and Iran—to come to the table and negotiate. Instead of embracing Karzai’s attempts at diplomacy, the U.S. criticizes his efforts to end the conflict. This is what should “alarm” and “infuriate” anyone who favors a sensible policy in Afghanistan.
START and Afghanistan
In Lisbon, Obama also had success gaining the support of NATO members for a strategic arms treaty with Russia. The main reason to sign a nuclear deal with Russia is that it will foster greater cooperation between the two countries on other issues. Last year, Russia stepped up big for the U.S. when it agreed to establish economic sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council. Further, Russia has also been playing a bigger role in Afghanistan. Last month they even conducted a joint drug raid—the first military operation for Russia in Afghanistan since the Russian army retreated in 1989. If the START Treaty facilitates greater cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan, this could assist with a U.S. drawdown, a factor which the anti-war libertarians should consider in deciding whether to back the treaty.
The Refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Two interesting articles appeared in the Washington Post on the refugee problem in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the articles focused on the same theme—locals who have been forced from their homes because of war—they highlighted two different problems.
The article on Afghan refugees focused on a group of Pashtuns from Helmand province who have moved to Kabul as a result of the war. In many cases these refugees favored neither the U.S. nor the Taliban, but were nonetheless caught in the middle of the fighting. As one Afghan put it:
“If we grew our beards, the Americans arrested us. If we shaved the Taliban gave us a hard time,” he said. “What are we supposed to do, shave half our beard?”
In a country where kinship and family ties are very important, the Taliban had one crucial advantage; they were local. As one refugee illustrated:
“Who are the Taliban? They are our brothers, our cousins, our relatives. The problem is the Americans”
The U.S. strategy, which is based on winning the hearts and minds of local Afghans, needs to confront this reality. Afghans caught in the middle of a conflict will surely back their family and tribesmen over a foreign force from a distant land.
The second article looked at a policy to repopulate regions of South Waziristan that have been cleared of insurgents. So far the program, which pays refugees $300 to move back to Waziristan, has garnered only mixed results. A major problem continues to be a lack of governance and an inability to consolidate military gains. As a White House report noted:
“Congress noted that an absence of government authority has resulted “in short lived military gains that allow militants to regroup in these areas”
As a result, the resettlement program has been “repeatedly postponed” with many prospective families voicing concern over a “Taliban resurgence”. Many of the same lessons the Pakistanis are learning in Waziristan are also true in Afghanistan. The military success in Kandahar is terrific, but without a return to governance, these gains will almost certainly be temporary.
Budget Issues
Last post, discussed the importance of the wars in Afghanistan with respect to the long-range fiscal outlook of the United States. Several Afghanistan Study Group Members, as well as other foreign policy experts, signed a letter address to Deficit Reduction Commission Co-Chairs Bowles and Simpson arguing along similar lines. The letter emphasizes the source of the U.S.’s power is our massive and dynamic economy. Unless the U.S. moves away from ill-advised military adventurism, the necessary military cuts will not be made and American power will erode.
“ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the limits of military power. Avoiding these types of operations globally would allow us to roll back the recent increase in the size of our Army and Marine Corps.”
Afghan Confidence Game
This blog and the members of the Afghanistan Study Group advocate a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Afghanistan in the way that saves face and protects U.S. interests, while bringing stability to Afghanistan and the region. There are many challenges to a policy of negotiation: How much power should Karzai cede to Islamic militants? What roles should Pakistan and Iran play? One unanticipated obstacle, however, was figuring out whom to talk to. After all in a policy of reconciliation, talks must take place with high-level political leaders in the Quetta Shura and Haqqani Networks. Surely you would think that the U.S. has the intelligence capabilities to identify the leaders of the Taliban. Well, think again. Last Tuesday’s Washington Post has a story that can only be described as a monumental intelligence screw-up. Apparently some “lowly shopkeeper” claiming to be Akthar Mohammad Mansour, the second ranking Taliban leader in Quetta Shura, was flown to Kabul and possibly managed to con NATO out of “large sums of money”. For months the Taliban has denied reports floating around the western press that they were engaged in negotiations. Now the Taliban’s denials seem more credible.
This story obviously paints a very troubling picture of the U.S.’s intelligence apparatus in Afghanistan. As Jeremy Scahil points out, how can anyone trust the Pentagon’s assurances that civilians aren’t being killed in the secret drone attacks and night raids after reading this?
The Taliban impostor incident also calls into question scores of deadly night raids that have resulted in the deaths of innocent Afghans. Several survivors of night raids recently told The Nation that they believed they were victims of bad intelligence provided by other Afghans for money or to settle personal grudges.
When it comes to night raids and drone attacks the stakes are much higher. As Afghanistan Study Group Director Matt Hoh illustrates, the death of one civilian can lead to ten more insurgents.
“We might get that one guy we’re looking for or we might kill a bunch of innocent people and now make ten more Taliban out of them.”
Since we can’t seem to differentiate between the Taliban and the locals, this observation should cast doubt on the current war strategy, which presumably relies on solid intelligence. Guess we can thank the intelligence community for giving us yet another reason to rethink Afghanistan.
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Oversight Fail: It is Easier to Issue Claims of Progress than to Conduct Oversight
Published: November 24th, 2010
When we launched the Afghanistan Study Group project and presented our first report in September, I read the following quote from one of America’s commanding generals in Afghanistan:
“What we’re doing is moving to a more classic counterinsurgency strategy here in Afghanistan…That’s a fairly significant change in terms of our tactical approach out there on the ground.” The approach, he said, will give soldiers “great depth of knowledge, understanding, and much better intelligence access to the local people in those areas by owning, as it were, those chunks of territory.”
I then asked the audience who said it. Of course the replies I received were Generals Petreaus and McChrystal. Amused astonishment summarized the reaction I received when I informed the audience it was Lieutenant General David Barno in February 2004.
Nearly seven years later, Congressman Mike Pence (R-Indiana) has returned from a two-day trip to our military headquarters in Kabul and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Like many other pro-war supporters, particularly politicians who gain the most by waving the bloody shirt, Representative Pence repeats claims of progress that are not backed by any evidence or facts.
Anyone who reads the newspaper regularly will acknowledge we have not made progress in Afghanistan over the last year (or for that matter the past five). After $104 billion spent in fiscal year 2010, nearly a full year after President Obama ordered 30,000 more US troops to Afghanistan (on top of the 21,000 he ordered in March 2009 and in addition to the significant annual increases in NATO and US forces since 2005) we have achieved the following:
- double-digit percentage increases (in a negative manner) in nearly all key areas of metrics and indicators, including a 58% increase in American combat deaths;
- an Afghan election more crooked than 2009′s stolen election;
- an increase in support for the Taliban;
- a dramatic increase in the instability of the previously, relatively, stable north of the country;
- a failure to deliver “government in a box” to Marjah or clear Kandahar City;
- the revelation that key aides of President Karzai are on the Iranian payroll;
- the near collapse of the Kabul bank;
- US intelligence verification of Pakistani support for the Taliban;
- disclosures of a massive increase in Coalition night raids and air strikes resulting in weekly tallies of dead Taliban that are somehow not matched by reports of decreases in Taliban operations, but rather by a nearly 60% increase in Taliban attacks; etc.
Further, glaring confusion between our senior leaders and in the execution of our policy complicates and corrupts our strategic thoughts and plans. Turn the television on over the last year and you cannot hear one senior Administration official make a statement on our Afghan policy without being contradicted by another senior Administration official on another television channel. Watch the military campaign proceed over the past twelve months and see a shift from a counter-insurgency strategy focused on protecting the population, to a strategy focusing on conducting special operations raids, to one now relying more and more on airstrikes and firepower to include for the first time in nine years the introduction of American main battle tanks into the conflict (not exactly keeping faith to the spirit of placing the population first).
What we are doing in Afghanistan is not working. There is no reason to believe our leadership, civilian and uniformed, has a clear path to end the conflict, stabilize Afghanistan, get our troops home, and defeat al-Qaeda. Yet somehow claims of progress, not backed by any demonstrable facts or tempered with any degree of sincerity, such as the assurances Congressman Pence provides, continue to be proclaimed with enthusiasm and a veneer of honesty by leaders throughout this country.
Below you will find quotes since 2004 from the commanding generals of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Note how familiar the words are. Particularly the assertions of new strategies, the promising arrival of new troops, the continual need for Afghans to step up and how conditions on the ground necessarily must get worse before things get better, as if there is some proven curing period that we must just be patient with.
Remember our men and women in Afghanistan and their families here at home this Thanksgiving. For our troops, their families and for the integrity of this Nation, challenge Congressman Pence and other politicians on their claims of progress in Afghanistan that are unmatched in reality. Maybe then, on behalf of our troops and our Nation’s interest, our politicians will follow their Constitutional duty to provide oversight over our generals and civilian officials. Maybe then, they will start asking tough questions and holding our senior leaders accountable, rather than just parroting commonly recited assertions of progress.
But Lt. Gen. David Barno said the future was against them and predicted the near-total collapse of the Taliban within a year. “As these terrorist capabilities grow more and more limited, the hard-core fanatics will grow more and more desperate to try and do something to change the course of events in Afghanistan,” Barno told a news conference… Barno noted that a number of senior insurgents have already abandoned the fight and said more would follow.”
Lieutenant General David Barno, USA Today, April 17, 2005
The British-led NATO force taking over from the American troops in the south “has well-equipped, well-led and fully prepared forces to operate in this challenging environment and deal with any threats,” he added…. General Eikenberry is hoping to turn things around this year with new and better local leaders. “Now we see a lot of those conditions changing,” he said, in an interview in the cockpit of the C130 military plane on the way to Uruzgan. Replacing the governor, and police and intelligence chiefs, should allow for reform and better governance, he said.”
Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, The New York Times, May 3, 2006
“We should and can win in Afghanistan but we need to put more military effort into the country – the Afghan Army is developing pretty well but needs another year to grow and train to the point that it can confidently take over primacy – including that all important Reserve force that we Nato commanders first asked for 18 months ago. And our civilian partners must improve the speed and scale of their reconstruction and development effort, sufficient to keep pace with the peoples’ expectations; and President Karzai must accelerate the speed with which he roots out corrupt and inefficient administrators. Finally, we must all do our best to bring Pakistan and Afghanistan together. Currently they are passing in the night and the climate is not good. I am very much a glass half full merchant but we must apply ourselves more energetically for one more year in order to win.”
General David Richards (UK), The Guardian, January 22, 2007
“My successor will find an insurgency here in Afghanistan, but it is not spreading, contrary to what some people say. Our enemies are not as strong as the NATO alliance in combination with its Afghan brothers. He will find some progress in security, some good work in the army, but unfortunately not so much progress in the police force. Governance remains a big problem in Afghanistan. Here we have to see more work by the Afghans…”
General Dan McNeil, Der Spiegel, March 21, 2008
“Of the new reinforcements, General McKiernan said, “What this allows us to do is change the dynamics of the security situation, predominantly in southern Afghanistan, where we are, at best, stalemated, and we need additional, persistent security presence in areas that we’re not at today.” He added, “I have to tell you that 2009 is going to be a tough year.”
General David McKiernan, The New York Times, February 18, 2009
“I think we made significant progress in setting conditions in 2009 . . . and that we’ll make real progress in 2010.” Asked why he thought the situation had improved, McChrystal said he could not point to specific measurements, but rather a general sense that security was better in some areas and that the mood among Afghan leaders was more optimistic.”
General Stanley McChrystal, The Washington Post, February 5, 2010
Matthew Hoh
Director, Afghanistan Study Group -
The Taliban Imposter: Another Sign of Trouble in Afghanistan
Published: November 23rd, 2010
It’s been a rough few weeks with the War in Afghanistan. Last week, it was revealed that we’re likely to be in Afghanistan until at least 2014. This week began with the news that almost 120 candidates in the September elections were disqualified for suspicion of fraud. And just today: the main Taliban “negotiator” with whom we’ve been talking for months about ending the war was revealed to be an imposter.
ASG member Juan Cole wrote a great piece about the imposter issue today:
“The announcement by the New York Times that one of the supposedly prominent Taliban with whom the Karzai government has been negotiating turns out to be an impostor is only the latest depressing indication that the whole Afghanistan boondoggle is shot through with flimflammery. The US gave a man claiming to be Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, Mullah Omar’s number two, “a lot of money” to engage in talks. He also was flown to Kabul to consult with President Hamid Karzai at the presidential palace (Karzai, terrified of looking like a laughingstock, denied the meeting).” Click here for the full the story.
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11/22/2010 Afghan Update – How Do You Solve a Problem Like Insurgency?
Published: November 22nd, 2010
Edward Kenny
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerReconciliation and the Importance of Governance
In the NPR debate described in the last post, Max Boot echoed a common theme among proponents of Counter- Insurgency (COIN) on the question of governance. He argued that an insurgency is by its very nature a symptom of failed governance. Failed governance cannot therefore be a reason to abandon a Counter-Insurgency strategy. However, re-establishing legitimate governance is the key to any successful counter-insurgency campaign. Those of us who support change in strategy argue that the conditions for re-establishing rule of law in the Pashtun Belt are absent; institutions do not exist at either the national or local level to address core grievances[1].
A recent paper by journalist Anand Gopal highlights this governance program, but makes a slight variation on the traditional lines of debate. Gopal argues that the failure to reconcile various tribal differences sharpened the problem of governance for Afghans in Kandahar Province. The Taliban, reports Gopal, were willing to accept Karzai as the legitimate leader in early 2002 in return for some basic assurances that they would be left alone. What happened?
“Karzai and other government officials ignored the overtures—largely due
to pressures from the U.S and the Northern Alliance, the Taliban’s erstwhile enemy”Meanwhile the governor of Kandahar, Gul Agha Sherzai adopted a hard-line against former Taliban officials. Many ex-Taliban were tortured and killed; all ex-Taliban faced harassment from the local government.
Certain tribes were also favored under Sherzai’s rule; the Popolzai (Karzai tribe) and the Barakzai (Sherzai’s tribe), were overrepresented in the government whereas the Panjpai ,who made up over a quarter of the population in Kandahar, were largely excluded. The decision to exclude former Taliban, reminiscent of the de-Baathification in Iraq, set the stage for increased hostility and a Taliban resurgence.
[1] This contrasts strongly with Iraq whose Sunni Militias had broad legitimacy in Anbar Province.
What Does Political Exclusion Mean?
Political exclusion in Afghanistan is about far more than having a voice in government. As Stephen Biddle has noted, those “outside the government network” are likely to lose their lands and livelihoods to corrupt officials. In his report Gopal expands on this theme:
“Under such conditions, police corruption and predation became endemic… In one
well known incident in Panjwayi, a police officer demanded goods from a shopkeeper
in the district center. When the shopkeeper refused, the policeman shot and
killed him and absconded with the goods.”In such an environment, it is no wonder that local Pashtuns joined the insurgency. For many, the Taliban’s Islamic courts are the only place to get a fair hearing. This point in many respects echoes Matt Waldman’s work on the prospects of reconciliation. Like Waldman, Gopal argues that Rule of Law is one of the main motivations for the insurgency:
Many Taliban did not take up arms simply as an exercise of the principle of jihad
or the expulsion of foreigners…but rather because it was the only viable
alternative for individuals and groups left without a place in the world.Gopal’s paper is a useful reminder that reconciliation and institution-building go hand in hand. Establishing governance without reconciling with insurgents is simply empowering those at the center of the corruption and exacerbating local grievances, a strategy which is clearly doomed to fail.
McKeon on the December Review
One frustrating development over the last week has been news that the December Strategic Review will not be a comprehensive assessment of strategy. The press has reported that the president is sweeping this review under the table and will not fundamentally reassess the strategy until July 2011. Whatever your views on the war, this position is unacceptable. Indeed the principle recommendation from last week’s bipartisan CFR report is to make a serious war assessment next month.
The public has a right to know whether any of Obama’s vaunted fifty metrics have seen progress. Even those who support the current strategy would like to see the Pentagon make the case that the war can still be won, despite the ambiguous news reports coming out of Afghanistan. Those of us on the other side of the debate would like to question military leaders on corruption in the Karzai administration, the increased in fatalities among coalition forces, and the expansion of the insurgency into regions which were previously peaceful. Getting military commanders to testify should be one area where Republicans and Democrats can stand in agreement.
Fortunately, there are signs that this dynamic is already happening. Buck McKeon, the next chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has said he wants Petraeus to testify: (Via Robert Naiman /Politico)
“During the December review, the American people deserve to hear from the
new commander on the ground,” McKeon told an audience Monday at a conference
hosted by the Foreign Policy Initiative.”Good for Mr. McKeon! The Pentagon has said that Petraeus is “too busy” to stand before congress, so it will likely take prodding from Republicans in Congress to get the general to testify.
