ASG Blog
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Richard Charles Albert Holbrooke (April 24, 1941 – December 13, 2010)
Published: December 15th, 2010
Long time diplomat and current Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke passed away on December 13th from an aortic aneurism. Holbrooke will be remembered for securing the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnia-Serb conflict. If anyone could have brokered a similar peace deal between the Karzai government and the Taliban, Holbrooke was the guy.
In trying to make sense of the effects Holbrooke’s passing has had on Afghan policy, just review the New Yorker article by George Packer written this past September.
Holbrooke entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and his first post was in Vietnam. For those young Foreign Service officials who cut their teeth in Vietnam—my father was one of them—Holbrooke cast a heavy shadow. But it was the Vietnam War, which would cast a shadow over Holbrooke’s career. He and close colleagues—a group which included Anthony Lake, Leslie Gelb, and Les Aspin—were all sharply critical of the Vietnam War and doubted that a surge in troops would solve the fundamental problems of U.S. policy in South East Asia.
In many ways, Holbrooke’s career came full circle. Like Afghanistan, Vietnam was a messy conflict in the developing world that required diplomats to work with a corrupt and undemocratic political system. Holbrooke was one of the men selected to take part in the Paris peace talks in 1968, and so he understood the importance of reaching an equitable agreement, which resolved the conflict for all parties in Afghanistan. The Paris negotiations also taught him how devastating the consequences could be when governments fail to take advantage of diplomatic openings.
In 2008 Holbrooke described Afghanistan as “Vietnam circa 1965”. This was the year that Lyndon Johnson decided to increase the U.S. military presence in Vietnam; the first counter-insurgency “surge” in U.S. history. Just as Johnson relied heavily on the advice of military personnel who believed in a military solution, Obama seemed to do the same. In Afghanistan, Holbrooke recognized that the war would not be won with force of arms, but with tools of diplomacy: foreign aid, regional cooperation, and mutual concessions. He described the three things that could lose the war for the Americans: sanctuaries for terrorists, civilian casualties, and corruption. Following the corruption marred presidential elections in 2009, Holbrooke compared the situation to “the political chaos in South Vietnam that followed the 1963 overthrow of President Diem”.
He understood instinctively that Pakistan was the key to solving the Afghan war; and he recognized that addressing grievances dating back to the India-Pakistan partition was an absolute necessity. In a PBS interview Holbrooke discussed the state of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, and emphasized the prospects and challenges of working with Pakistan. He viewed the complex history between the two countries as delicate and filled with potential hazards. Wikileaks provided further evidence that Holbrooke was working hard, not simply to engage the Afghans and Pakistanis, but to begin to address India-Packistan relationship at the heart of Pakistan’s foreign policy towards extremist groups.
Holbrooke believed the problems of governance in Afghanistan were crucial to a successful U.S. military strategy. He was often critical of the Karzai regime, sometimes at the expense of diplomatic relations. Following the infamous “Rolling Stones” article for which General McChristal was fired, Holbrooke appeared at his weakest. As a man who had seemingly burned too many bridges and who could not even secure face-time with Karzai.
In the last four months however, Holbrooke fortunes had seemed to have reversed. His relationship with General Petraeus, was by all accounts very strong. His criticisms of the Karzai government increasingly gained more credibility. Indeed, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry began to voice similar doubts about the corruption-riddled government in cables released by Wikileaks and reports from Bob Woodward new book.
Open questions remain about the man even after his death. In Vietnam, he came in time to see the folly of the war and reportedly called senior people in the Johnson administration “delusional”. Had he reached the same conclusion about Afghanistan? In Vietnam, Holbrooke recognized that time was not on the U.S.’s side. He wrote, Hanoi hopes that for us it will be the mounting dissension, impatience, and frustration caused by a protracted war without fronts or other visible signs of success. Substitute Hanoi for the Taliban, and you get a pretty accurate picture of the insurgents’ tactics. During the Vietnam War, Holbrooke came to believe that a negotiated settlement was the only way to end the war and protect U.S. interests. He may have reached the same conclusion in Afghanistan
Holbrooke leaves us with these questions but his final words spoken to his Pakistani doctor suggest that ending the war in Afghanistan was never far from his mind. According to sources he asked his doctor to “stop this war in Afghanistan”. This comment may or may not have been delivered in jest, but it demonstrates his desire to end the Afghanistan War.
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National Intelligence Estimate Critical of Pakistan Role in Afghan War
Published: December 15th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerFor weeks there have been hints that the intelligence community (IC) and the Department of Defense (DoD) are at odds over the state of the war in Afghanistan, with DoD painting more optimistic picture[1] of the war in Afghanistan.
Two new National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Afghanistan and Pakistan provide further evidence of this division. According to the Associated Press, these estimates paint a bleak picture on American prospects in Afghanistan and “could complicate the Obama administration’s plan to claim next week that the war is turning a corner.”
The strongest language in both reports relates to Pakistan and the issues surrounding sanctuaries. The report says,
“the war cannot be won unless Pakistan is willing to obliterate terrorist safe havens in its lawless tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The new report on Pakistan concludes that the Pakistani government and military ‘are not willing to do that,’ says one U.S. official briefed on the analysis.”
If this article is to be believed, the intelligence community has basically said that the war cannot be won unless Pakistan stops supporting the Taliban. But we already know this.
[1] To be fair, the DoD status review did not shy away from the many challenges facing coalition forces.
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Open Letter to Obama Calls for Negotiated Settlement in Afghanistan
Published: December 15th, 2010
Twenty-three Afghan scholars and specialists with decades of Afghanistan policy experience have published an open letter to President Obama calling for a negotiated settlement to end the war. The signers include some familiar names, Ahmed Rashid, Matt Waldman, Nir Rosen, Scott Atran, and Afghan Study Group Member Anatol Lieven just to name a few.
The letter suggests the urgent need for negotiations and that the U.S. must play a vital role in them in order to ensure U.S. interests and “vulnerable populations” are protected. The letter also suggests that the 2014 deadline set by Obama is unrealistic without a change in strategy:
The 2014 deadline to put the Afghan national army in command of security is not realistic. Considering the quick disappearance of the state structure at a district level, it is difficult to envision a strong army standing alone without any other state institutions around. Like it or not, the Taliban are a long-term part of the Afghan political landscape, and we need to try and negotiate with them in order to reach a diplomatic settlement.
Focusing solely on timelines at the expense of other aspects of strategy is misguided. Having a timeline to get out of Afghanistan is both useless and unrealistic without a clear plan on how to reach this objective. Indeed, a timeline without a course correction may do more harm than good by encouraging the insurgency.
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Wikileaks Part III: Karzi as a Leader
Published: December 15th, 2010
The cable leaked from Wikileaks have shown us how frayed the relationship between our top diplomat and the president of Afghanistan really is. Eikenberry’s portrayal of Karzai is brutal. In one cable from last July he describes Karzai as insecure and incompetent:
“His inability to grasp the most rudimentary principles of state-building and his deep seated insecurity as a leader combine to make any admission of fault unlikely, in turn confounding our best efforts to find in Karzai a responsible partner.”
Other cables describe the Karzai’s release of drug runners and the his paranoia. The ambassador clearly views Karzai as an obstacle to the success of the surge, and he is not alone. Even ministers close to Karzai have voiced concern. As Karen DeYoung reports in the Washington Post[1]:
When Eikenberry visited the next day with Finance Minister Umar Zakhilwal, the minister, “apparently echoing Daudzai . . . went on to speak candidly about Karzai, saying that he was an ‘extremely weak man’ who did not listen to facts but was instead easily swayed by anyone who came to him to report even the most bizarre stories of plots against him. Whenever this happened, Karzai would immediately judge the person to be loyal and would reward him.[i]“
As much praise as Eikenberry deserves, it’s hard to see how these revelations have not irreparably harmed the relationship between the two men. These comments come after the ambassador was quoted by Bob Woodward as saying manic-depressant Karzai is “on his meds, off his meds”.
More troubling than the U.S. Afghan connection is the increasingly frayed relationship that Karzai shares with his ministers. Being called “extremely weak” by your Finance Minister is bad news. Afghan Study Group Member Juan Cole asks,
“How likely is it that Afghanistan National Army officers and troops are going to risk their lives for someone who is paranoid, erratic and corrupt?”
Let’s take that a step further. The probability that Karzai could be removed from power in some sort of coup has significantly increased. It needs to be stated that this would be a terrible development for the United States—no matter what your opinion is of the current strategy. Karzai remains the most popular politician in Afghanistan. A replacement president would therefore almost certainly be less popular and illegitimate, thus making the necessary institutional reforms all the more difficult. If the new government is viewed as fragile or weak, this would undercut the Taliban’s incentives to negotiate. Why make a deal with a government that will be out of power in a few months and therefore unable to keep their end of the deal? If Karzai’s hold on power is weaker than previously thought, this dynamic could already be at work. It is all the more imperative that the U.S. aggressively pursues reconciliation before Karzai’s position erodes any further. Time is running out.
[1] See Feb 26, 2010 Cable Kabul Embassy
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The Polls: More Interesting Numbers
Published: December 14th, 2010
The Washington Post has published a public opinion poll taken in Afghanistan that shows mixed progress for coalition troops. On the plus side security gains in Kandahar and Helmund Province have sunk in the public’s perception. 67% of those surveyed in Helmand Province say security is “good”. In the rest of the Afghanistan the picture is not so good:
Afghans are more pessimistic about the direction of their country, less confident in the ability of the United States and its allies to provide security and more willing to negotiate with the Taliban than they were a year ago.
The U.S. is facing a problem common in counter-insurgency campaigns. Even as the military successfully secures areas in the heart of Taliban country, the insurgents re-emerge elsewhere in the country.
The most perplexing poll numbers come from Kandahar where, despite the improvements in security, support for the Taliban has increased to 45%. These same respondents indicated that the Taliban had a strong presence in their village.
More promising poll numbers say that 75% believe the U.S. should begin negotiating with the Taliban and a similar percentage wants the U.S. to begin withdrawing next summer or sooner.
Finally, Karzai is “the most popular politician in Afghanistan”; over 60% of Aghans polled believe that Karzai is doing a good or excellent job.
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Wikileaks Part II: Eikenberry
Published: December 14th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerRecently, Wikileaks has shed some light onto Ambassador Eikenberry’s role as impartial judge of the current U.S. strategy. Eikenberry demonstrates surprising independence and strong judgment in several of the leaked cables. In a cable from last June, the ambassador captures the crux of the governance problem in Afghanistan asking, “What does it take to break out of the cycle of ‘clear and clear again’ to achieve sustained success in an area of persistent insurgency?”
Even Eikenberry recognizes that the current strategy, which does not address the eroded governmental institutions, will only achieve temporary security gains. His description of the lack of governance in Alasay is sad, but not surprising to anyone who has followed the Afghanistan War over the years:
Unfortunately, the GIRoA’s own corroded governance casts a shadow over Alasay and the rest of Southern Kapisa. If the provincial level justice system lacks integrity, in Alasay it barely exists at all…The provincial governor has been to Alasay only once since March. His agenda is to assiduously favor his HIG political associates there, and it did not take long for allegations of corruption to surface. It is not clear what effect the presidential and provincial council elections on August 20 will have on these issues of legitimacy in Southern Kapisa.
Eikenberry concludes by writing that governance, not military success, will be the key to success in Afghanistan.
No matter how effective military performance may be, the insurgents will readily fill any vacuums of governance, and without political competence, lasting COIN success in Alasay will remain one more operation away.
This cable and others like it show a sophisticated understanding of the problem in Afghanistan by our top diplomat there. The Obama administration clearly has the knowledge it needs to adequately assess the Afghan strategy. What’s missing is a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis comparing the time, money and lives needed to establish governance to the potential national security risks should the U.S. opt for a different strategy.
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Center for American Progress Policy Paper Part III: A Unified Strategic Vision
Published: December 14th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerThe Center for American Progress (CAP) paper illustrates that among progressives there is broad agreement on how to adjust our Afghan policy. We all agree on the need promote government reforms, reconciliation with the Taliban, regional diplomacy and a reduced U.S. footprint. However, in presenting these recommendations there is often no unified strategic vision.
Let’s begin by stating the obvious: A negotiated settlement is the key to a U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan. Every other policy needs to work toward this goal. Thus increasing the likelihood that the Taliban negotiates a peace deal which preserves core U.S. interests.
Regional diplomacy is important not because talking to Afghan’s neighbors can resolve all our problems, but because countries like Pakistan and Iran are perfectly capable of disrupting the peace process. CAP recognizes this fact saying “Pakistan is clearly the biggest challenge and the most likely of Afghanistan’s neighbors to serve as a spoiler for a peace settlement.”
Reducing the U.S. military footprint will likewise ensure that peace talks go forward. A military drawdown might act as a confidence builder. Paul Pillar has suggested that distrust is sometimes the biggest obstacle to successful negotiations—reducing troops will proove to the Taliban that the U.S. is negotiating in good faith. A military drawdown also creates an incentive for Karzai and local leaders who benefit from U.S. largess to approach the negotiating table. Currently, “Afghan Leaders have few incentives to compromise and to exert leadership as long as a large foreign military presence remains”
Last, the question of government reform is potentially a key bargaining chip with which to entice Taliban leaders to the negotiating table—after all, political grievances are a main cause of the insurgency. The Council on Foreign Affairs had it right when it recommended that constitutional reforms along the lines the CAP suggest should be implemented in tandem with the reconciliation process. This policy both incentivizes reconciliation and increases the likelihood that a peace agreement lasts.
Policy recommendations, which encourage a negotiated political settlement is an important step to building a broader political coalition and eventually end the war.
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An Honest Partner in Afghanistan?
Published: December 13th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerThe New York Times has reported that U.S. diplomats in Afghanistan “seem to search in vain for an honest partner” . The idea is that with the right honest leadership, the Afghan ship of state can be righted, and the U.S. strategy salvaged. However, the reason the U.S. will continue to search in vain for honest leadership is that the Afghan system itself is corrupt. No honest politician would ever be able to attain a position high enough in the Afghan government to institute change. The systemic nature of the problem is apparent in recently leaked diplomatic cables:
“ A November 2009 cable described the acting governor of Khost Province, Tahir Khan Sabari, as “a refreshing change,” an effective and trustworthy leader. But Mr. Sabari told his American admirers that he did not have “the $200,000-300,000 for a bribe” necessary to secure the job permanently.
Mr. Sabari may be an “effective and trustworthy leader”, but for him to hold any position in the Afghan government he needs massive amounts bribe money. A similar story revolves around Abdul Sahibi, the mayor of Kabul. Mr. Sahibi was recently convicted to four years in prison for “massive embezzlement”. Far from being a victory against corruption,
“a cable from the embassy told a different story. Mr. Sahibi was a victim of “kangaroo court justice,” it said, in what appeared to be retribution for his attempt to halt a corrupt land-distribution scheme.
This anecdote again highlights the systemic nature of the corruption. Anyone who attempts to counter the system soon finds themselves on the outside looking in, (or in the case of Mr. Sahibi on the inside looking at hard time.) These stories should caution anyone who thinks the governance problem can be solved by removing Karzai or his close advisors. Unless substantial reforms are made—reforms done in tandem with reconciliation—the governance problem in Afghanistan is not likely to go away.
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Center for American Progress Policy Paper Part II: Governance
Published: December 13th, 2010
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerOne of the hallmarks of a good policy paper is a full and accurate understanding of the problem the recommended policy aims to solve. The Center for American Progress (CAP)’s paper focuses on arguably the most problematic aspect of the current strategy, the problems of governance:
[The insurgents] primary strengths lie in their ability to capitalize on public discontent—especially in Pashtun areas in the south and east—and mobilize finances and arms through both cooption and coercion in opposition to the Karzai government’s abusive and exclusionary practices.
CAP recognizes that the insurgency takes up arms because of political grievances. Until some mechanism is created to address these grievances, security gains are likely to be temporary. Addressing the governance issue is also at the top of the CAP’s recommendations. They argue that the U.S. and International community should use leverage against the Karzai government to push for reforms. In particular the CAP would like to see less power concentrated at the executive branch. Although, we should not overestimate the ability of the U.S. to coerce the Afghan government to do its bidding.
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Afghanistan Review – A Show Without any Substance
Published: December 10th, 2010
A few thoughts on the Obama Administration’s Afghanistan Strategy Review that is currently under way and expected to be publicly released within the month:
As already noted in the press, the strategy review will conclude that progress is being made, but more tough months of fighting lay ahead. Unfortunately, I doubt we will see any quantitative data or proof of such success. Mainly, it will be anecdotal stories or general assertions, temporary in nature and easily disproved, similar to what we have heard for many years now. We will probably also hear the very popular and oft-issued warning that “things might get worse before they get better”. Of course the problem being: it has never gotten better.
Will an understanding of the nature and motivation of much of the insurgency, such as the one below from Major General John Campbell, be incorporated into the review?
“General Campbell said his troops were making progress, but “a lot of the reason we get attacked is because we’re up here.” The goal of United States forces is to disrupt insurgent activity in the border area, but the general said he wanted to get to the point where he could withdraw troops from the remote mountains and reposition them in small towns to try to win over the local people.
“People don’t want us up there, but they don’t want the Taliban either,” he said. “They want to be left alone.”
He added that the region was vast and that his forces could not be everywhere. “We can’t be in every single valley; I mean there’s thousands of them out there, we just can’t do it,” he said.”
The Administration announced last month at the NATO conference in Lisbon that the current policy would not be changed and that US is committed to having troops in combat in Afghanistan until at least 2014. So what is the purpose of this review? The policy has already been decided. It’s hard to imagine this review is anything other than a show.
All this reminds me very much of the early to mid-way point of the Iraq war; and that’s a terrible thought.
Matthew Hoh
Director of Afghanistan Study Group
