ASG Blog
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The Military Industrial Complex and the Future of COIN
Published: January 13th, 2011
January 17th marks the fiftieth anniversary of Dwight D Eisenhower’s farewell speech in which he coined the phrase “military industrial complex” to describe the nexus of arms manufacturers, the congressional and federal branches of government, and the military. On Tuesday, the New America Foundation hosted a discussion to commemorate the occasion, which was moderated by Bill Hartung and included panelists, David Berteau, Danielle Brian, and Gordon Adams. Adams, a professor at American University and former director of the Office of Management and Budget, is also a member of the Afghanistan Study Group. He has long advocated curtailing the defense budget so that we can efficiently address our core national interests.
After the conference Adams explained the implications of the military’s embrace of “nation building” practices in Afghanistan. He suggested that if the Pentagon’s budget were curtailed, development and reconstruction would be among the first two areas to be cut back. I am not so sure. The counter-insurgency doctrine, which depends on reconstruction and development, has been accepted by many in the military as practically a sacred text. Funding for the Defense Department depends on its ability to sell the importance of intervening in failed states—and in persuading congress that once we have intervened we must see the job through. Adams acknowledges as much in his co-authored article in Foreign Affairs, when he writes:
“Gates’ effort to nonetheless tailor U.S. military capabilities to [counter-insurgency] suggests that there is still significant support for them in the Pentagon.”
Further along in the same article, General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army is says, “the United States is in an era of persistent conflict”, a comment which sounds strikingly similar to an infamous General Petraeus statement.
There are two factors that lend support to Adams view, however. First, there is disagreement among the branches of the military as to the utility of COIN. Because the strategy is more ground focused, the Army and Marines tend to support it, whereas the Navy and Air Force remain more skeptical. Second, the future of COIN may well depend on how Afghanistan turns out. If the war ends badly, COIN may well end up being a short-lived fad. Indeed this doctrine was in “vogue” during the 1960s, but following the Vietnam War the military abandoned these ideas and adopted a more conventional focus with the support of traditional military thinkers and, of course, the defense industry.
Will history repeat itself? We should keep an eye on the extent to which traditional defense firms such as DynCorp continue to expand into the development sector. If this trend continues, there may be significant resistance from the military industry to changing our strategic posture. On the other hand if Adams is correct, tightening budgets combined with fallout from Afghanistan will push policymakers away from nation-building quagmires like Afghanistan. Let’s hope Professor Adams is right.
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Afghanistan Study Group – Survey Results of Conservatives
Published: January 12th, 2011
The following is an analysis of a poll taken of conservative voters nationwide. Drawn from a sample of randomly selected phone numbers, this poll contains 1,000 registered voters who describe their political ideology as conservative. Voters with listed landline phones, unlisted landline phones, and cellular phones were eligible to be called. Respondents were interviewed from 5:00 to 9:00 in their time zone from January 4th through 10th. The responses to this survey should be within plus or minus 3.1 percentage points of those that would have been obtained from interviewing the entire population of registered conservative voters. 550 respondents describe themselves as a “Tea Party Supporter”. The margin of error for this group is 4.2 percentage points. The following summarizes key results from the survey:
- Conservatives and Tea Party supporters are worried about the costs of the war in Afghanistan. 71% of conservatives overall, and 67% of conservative Tea Party supporters, indicate worry that the costs will make it more difficult for the United States to reduce the deficit this year and balance the federal budget by the end of this decade. Significant percentages of conservative men (67%) and women (75%) indicate concern about the costs of the war as do conservatives in all age groups. Those in active duty military or veteran households are as worried about the costs of the war (69%) as those in non-military households (72%). 61% of conservatives who believe the war has been worth fighting are worried about the current level of costs.
- Two-thirds of conservatives support a reduction in troop levels in Afghanistan. When given a choice between three options, 66% believe we can either reduce the troop levels in Afghanistan, but continue to fight the war effectively (39%) or think we should leave Afghanistan all together, as soon as possible (27%). Just 24% of conservatives believe we should continue to provide the current level of troops to properly execute the war. 64% of Tea Party supporters think we should either reduce troop levels (37%) or leave Afghanistan (27%) while 28% support maintaining current troop levels. Among conservatives who don’t identify with the Tea Party movement, 70% want a reduction (43%) or elimination (27%) of troops while only 18% favoring continuation of the current level.
- A majority of conservatives agree that the United States can dramatically lower the number of troops and money spent in Afghanistan without putting America at risk. 57% say they agree with that statement after hearing about the current number of troops in country and the funding needed to support them. Only a third (34%) do not agree with this statement. Among Tea Party supports 55% agree that we can reduce the number of troops without compromising security while 38% disagree. Among non Tea Party conservatives, 60% agree with this statement while 27% disagree.
- More conservatives believe the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting (46%) than not worth fighting (39%). Among those who believe the war has been worth fighting, as many support reducing troop levels (43%) as favor maintaining the current level (44%). Just 5% of these conservatives support leaving as soon as possible. Those who do not believe the war has been worth fighting overwhelming support reducing the level of troops (31%) or getting out altogether (60%) with only 5% supporting the current troop level. While Tea Party supporters overall are more likely to believe the war has been worth fighting (51% worth it, 38% not worth it) than other conservatives (41% worth it, 43% not worth it), those who strongly identify with the Tea Party movement are split (42% worth it, 45% not worth it).
AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP – Matthew Hoh & Steve Clemons
Prepared by: Stephen Clermont/Third Eye Strategies
PDF of Poll Results of Conservatives
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Anonymous from Afghanistan
Published: January 11th, 2011
Mathew Hoh
Director, Afghanistan Study GroupThe below is an email I received last week from a friend of mine in the Army on his second combat deployment to Afghanistan. In addition, to his two Afghan deployments, he has fought for our country in both Iraq wars.
Unfortunately, I cannot attribute his views to his name, however they are representative of many of the conversations I have had or the regular correspondence I receive from friends and former colleagues, both military and civilian, currently in or just returned from Afghanistan. This is just one illustration of the disconnect that exists between many of our service members and diplomats who are in daily contact with the reality of the conflict in Afghanistan and the generals, politicians and pundits who advocate the current US policy in Afghanistan, proclaim its progress and espouse the supposed worth of this war (see the Afghanistan Study Group website for the latest discussion on the most recent report of “progress“).
Below is unedited and unabridged, with the exception of the removal of information that would identify the writer:
“Matt, look brother, all kidding about reading the news aside, i can’t believe how this is passing without challenge or question by anyone. the Vice President of the United States went on national television less than three weeks ago to – again – emphatically explain that come July a meaningful number of US combat troops will be coming home.
and yet here we have the Secretary of Defense announcing the ADDITION of 1,400 more Marines to “consolidate recent gains” less than six months before “sizable numbers” of US combat troops will be coming out? but look, here’s what gets precious little (if any) notice in the United States: it isn’t just a good chunk of American combat troops that will be leaving Afghanistan this year. there are also published reports independently from the Foreign Minister or Defense Minister from Germany, Canada, Italy, the UK, Australia, and France suggesting or outright specifying that their troops will also start withdrawing sometime in 2011. this is a rhetorical question whose answer is painfully obvious, but: does anyone think that the Taliban insurgents, the citizens of Afghanistan, the government leaders in Kabul, and the military and political leaders of every country in the region don’t see this for what it is: the beginning of the end of the NATO military presence, whose end is going to be 2014?
what rational person would still cling to the hope that we can win politically and/or militarily when the deck is so profoundly stacked against us? the enemy, who Phoenix-like rose from almost complete annihilation after early 2002 to the height of their power today – despite the ‘surge’ of 40,000 additional NATO combat troops – has every logical reason to have optimism for ultimate success, as they’ve not simply weathered the storm of the best we have to throw, but actually managed to increase their effectiveness. by every measurable metric, the TB has risen in power six consecutive years, irrespective of how many western troops we added, strategies adopted, or new commanding generals we hired; no detectable alteration in their ascent.
meanwhile, the Afghan government at virtually every level that matters has changed nothing of their character and are as corrupt today as they were in 2002 when they started; no detectable alteration. the people of Afghanistan see all this for what it is. it is for this reason that they have not, after a decade of our best efforts and hundreds of billions of dollars of investment, come to our side. hasn’t anyone ever wondered why, when the people of Afghanistan confirm in poll after poll that they dislike the TB by a staggering 94% or higher figure year after year, they have not come to our side and worked with us the way the Iraqi people did in 2007? It’s because as much as they dislike the TB, they have an equal or higher dislike of their own government! Thus, they are trapped in the middle, trusting no one.
the government of Pakistan in particular, but the governments of all the countries of the region generally recognize that the “fourth quarter” has begun and in four short years the clock will read ‘double-00′, the US will be mainly gone, and everyone in the region will continue to live with what remains. what possible motivation do any of them have to work towards a solution that helps out mainly the United States in the short term but leaves them vulnerable in the medium and long term? again, ‘double-00′ in a mere four years and all of NATO is gone. and of no small significance, they recognize the ridiculous claims of ‘consolidating gains’ to be horse dung and to be given no serious consideration.
all of which returns us to the physical battlefields in RC-East, South, and Southwest where men continue to die in record numbers. as NATO countries finally start reducing their footprint in the local areas later this year, the casualty count will finally start falling, and many ISAF leaders will no doubt start citing that as evidence of military success. but how many men will die between now and December 2014, and of more significance, how many more will have their legs blown off, arms ripped out of their sockets, eyes punctured, or “simply” having their brains sloshed around in their skulls as a result of explosions?
and for what gain? we already know the end. it’s already on the schedule and we’re going to follow that schedule almost no matter what.
how many men, how very many men’s lives are going to be shattered between now and then, and no one in the United States will benefit from this remarkable sacrifice; like blood being carelessly and pointlessly discarded onto and then disappearing without a trace into trackless desert sands…”
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American Enterprise Institute: Where’s the Beef?
Published: January 11th, 2011
Frederick and Kimberly Kagan take an unusual approach in their recent paper on Afghanistan for the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Ignoring the vast amount of research and commentary to the contrary, they have prepared a thoroughly optimistic portrait of Afghanistan. Not only do they argue that the U.S. is winning the war—thanks to the counter-insurgency “surge” strategy, of course—they also suggest that victory is essential to the U.S. global war on terrorism. Neither claim is true.
The Kagan’s flatly assert that “unprecedented damage” has been inflicted on the insurgency: safe-havens have been eliminated, insurgent leaders captured or killed and the Taliban’s momentum “unquestionably arrested.” This argument happens to be both unsubstantiated and untrue as even our own intelligence services can attest. Based on two National Intelligence Estimate’s released last month, the insurgency remains resilient and cannot be defeated unless Pakistan acts against Taliban strongholds in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. A November Department of Defense Progress Report also delivered a candid appraisal of the insurgency’s strength at odds with the AEI report. The Kagans do not comment on these reports, other than to dismiss them as “alarmist”; nor do they discuss measurable metrics available to the public such as troop and civilian casualties, both of which show a continued downward trend. One wonders whether the Kagans missed last week’s Associated Press article which cited NATO officials arguing that the Taliban’s strength has not diminished over the past year or Monday’s USA Today article on the Taliban’s “surge” of deadly improvised explosive devices. Seldom has a report been written that is more at odds with both the media narrative and what the vast majority of Afghan experts are saying; still, one has to credit their audaciousness.
The notion that victory in Afghanistan is a critical element of the war against terrorism is an argument that we have rebutted many times before. Al Qaeda is not in Afghanistan[i], nor do they have any logical or sensible reason to abandon their safe-havens in Pakistan and return. Furthermore, even if al Qaeda were to return to Afghanistan, it is unclear what effect, if any, this would have on their ability to conduct operations worldwide.
Rather than re-hash old arguments, let’s take a moment to address another line of reasoning that is frequently used to defend the al Qaeda-Taliban link. Pro-surge commentators frequently cite evidence that Taliban and the Haqqani are working together and have links to international terrorism to support their pro-war position. Fighting one group is paramount to fighting all of the groups, they argue. The Kagans take precisely this approach:
All of these groups coordinate their activities, moreover, and all have voices in the Peshawar Shura (Council). They are not isolated groups, but rather a network-of-networks
This argument tends to play up ideological similarities among groups, which may or may not actually exist, while downplaying the strategic rational for forming an alliance. The Afghanistan Study Group[ii], among others, has pointed out that al Qaeda’s global scope differs greatly from the Taliban, which is predominantly made up of local Afghans fighting for over local grievances, first among them the presence of foreign troops in their land. There is actually a simple explanation for the collaboration of disparate groups; they all face a common threat, the United States. They also share a common goal—in this case the withdrawal of NATO troops. Indeed, if the Taliban has any interest in self-preservation, it would be shocking if they were not working closely with the Haqqanis, Hezb Islami, the TTP and others.
Afghanistan Study Group Member Paul Pillar explains how this strategic calculation combined with faulty assumptions by policy makers in the U.S. have contributed to a counter-productive strategy:
“We read on the front page of the New York Times that armed groups along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that have long been rivals to one another are now cooperating in combat operations against NATO forces. The groups include elements of the Taliban under the Quetta shura, the fighters of the Haqqani family, and militias associated with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The impetus for such new cooperation is the military pressure that our own forces have applied. A false assumption underlying much of the rationale for the NATO campaign in the AfPak theater is that the forces on the other side are an alliance of bad guys, including militias and terrorist groups, with a common set of objectives opposed to our own. Now by our own actions we are making this false assumption come true, at least at the tactical and operational level.
Whether or not you agree that the U.S. military pressure has been “the impetus for new cooperation” among insurgent groups, this is clearly an important factor in any analysis of Taliban collaboration. The fact that the AEI completely fails to address the strategic aspect in their analysis is a major weakness of the paper.
[i] Of course information on the Taliban’s strength in Afghanistan comes from our “alarmist” intelligence community
[ii] See Myth # 5 -
More on the Sangin Deal
Published: January 10th, 2011
In a recent post, Afghanistan Study Group Director Matt Hoh gave a relatively optimistic take on the recent peace deal in Sangin province and highlighted the importance of reaching these types of deals at the local level, which can begin to establish regional autonomy, security and governance.
It is important not to overstate this achievement. First it is not clear that the Taliban were privy to this deal-making. From the fragmentary news reports, it seems the marines made a deal with Alikozai village elders, a tribal group with a long history of independence from both the Taliban and the Kabul government. Indeed some reports suggest that the Taliban has actively targeted this group precisely because of its “independence” from the Taliban. Yesterday, an Alikozai leader was shot by the Taliban in Sangin Province—likely a reprisal for the deal made with the Americans.
Another potential problem Hoh writes is that:
similar settlements must occur at other political levels and the current political and governance system must be amended to incorporate the results of the deal and to sustain those results.
At the National level, it remains highly doubtful that province by province deal making will last. Indeed, the U.S. should well heed the lessons of the British who achieved a similar peace deal in 2006 only to see a stronghold in the province fall to the Taliban in 2006.
The deal may prove to be an important test for regional governance, but it should not (yet) be construed as a game changer.
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Rubbish from the Telegraph
Published: January 7th, 2011
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerCon Coughlin’s recent column for the Telegraph sets a new low for journalistic standards. Ignoring Coughlin’s main thesis that Obama’s self imposed timelines are the main obstacle to a successful end to the war—an argument which we have already addressed here—his article is rife with blatant inaccuracies.
No, the extra troops have not succeeded in “providing proper security to Afghan civilians”. Through the first ten months of 2010 Afghan casualties are up 20% according to the United Nations.
No, there has not been “a dramatic reduction in the NATO casualty rate in recent months”. Last December was the most violent December of the war with 41 coalition casualties. Last November was likewise the most violent November since the war began. True these numbers represent a modest decrease from the horrific scale of casualties during the summer months of 2010, but this most likely represents seasonal factors—since the beginning of the war, the summer months have been the most violent with December to March some of the most peaceful[1].
And no, the recent attempts by Al Qaeda to blow up cargo planes were not a response to Obama’s Afghan timetables, which are fairly open-ended. Al Qaeda remains entrenched in Pakistan—fewer than 100 Taliban remain in Afghanistan, and they are not the primary focus of our military campaign in Afghanistan. Tying a failed terrorist attack to Obama’s pledge to begin withdrawing troops, is nothing but pure demagoguery.
The news media has a responsibility to keep its readers informed. The Telegraph should not have published such an egregiously misinformed article.
[1] See Brookings Afghan Index Figure 1.16 for a dramatic illustration of the seasonal dynamic.
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Popgun Budget Cuts at the Pentagon
Published: January 7th, 2011
Much is being made over the new announcement by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that the Pentagon is being directed to reduce its budget by $78 billion over the next five years (not counting the costs of its combat operations).
We are grateful for small favors, but are not impressed. In 2000, the total military budget was $370 billion. For 2011, the budget will be $707 billion, not including any emergency appropriations that may occur during the year. It is more useful to compare 2011′s $707 billion to the amount we would be spending in 2011 if we had increased the 2000 amount by only the rate of inflation – which would be roughly $475 billion. In other words, if we had limited our 9/11 military response to the 2001/2002 military action against the Taliban, then converted to political and economic tools to address issues Afghanistan, and never invaded Iraq, we would be saving $232 billion per year in the military budget in 2011 or $1.16 trillion over five years. Compare that to Gates’ newly-touted $78 billion.
Saving $232 billion per year or $1.16 trillion over five years? – Just by treating a political problem as a political problem rather than a military problem? Hmmm. Sounds pretty appealing in an economy with a $1.3 trillion yearly deficit and $14 trillion in outstanding debt. Let’s not forget that our military strength is entirely dependent on our economic strength.
Richard W. Vague
Afghanistan Study Group -
What Does the News in Pakistan Mean for the U.S.?
Published: January 7th, 2011
Afghanistan Study Group Member Paul Pillar argues that the “turmoil” in Pakistan is overblown. Pakistan views Afghanistan through the broader prism of regional politics. Their desire is to create a pro-Pakistani buffer against India. Domestic politics are irrelevant; furthermore the military is making all the critical decisions. According to Pillar:
“on the issues and policies that matter most to the United States, the Pakistani military—and in particular the army chief of staff, General Afshaq Kayani—makes the decisions.
Pillar is writing from the perspective of someone who believes (as we’ve previously suggested) that Pakistan’s strategic calculations relating to India will trump other factors. For analysts who are bullish on the prospects of American and Pakistani collaboration, political turmoil and assassinations are an unwelcome distraction for General Kayani.
If you believe the U.S. surge can succeed with Pakistani collaboration, the news out of Pakistan is grim. If you believe the surge cannot succeed because Pakistan will never truly collaborate with the U.S., this news is indeed irrelevant.
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Think tanks on Afghanistan
Published: December 17th, 2010
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ASG Member Steve Clemons on MSNBC
Published: December 15th, 2010
