ASG Blog
-
General Mattis on Afghan Timelines
Published: February 8th, 2011
General Mattis, the head of Central Command gave a speech in London on the prospects of the 2014 timeline. In general, the U.S. spends too much time worried about timelines and troop levels, when our energy and resources would be better served trying to design a strategy to end the conflict. Mattis’s statement illustrates the tradeoffs of timelines. On the minus side, they potentially give the Taliban “heart to some degree”, they also limit flexibility and remove a potential bargaining chip for negotiations. On the plus side Mattis said,
“Having a conditions-based withdrawal is also a way to refute the enemy line that somehow we are there to occupy this country forever. I think there is actually a strength to it.”
The main problem with U.S. timelines is that they are not credible. Simply saying that we will end combat operations in 2014 is unbelievable unless the U.S. has a clear plan on how to get there. Thus far, we continue to cling to the blind hope that the Afghan army will be able to take our place in three years. If the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) fails to live up to expectations, U.S. troops will undoubtedly be forced to stay. What the U.S. needs is a strategy to achieve broad reconciliation as soon as possible. Only then will the 2014 withdraw date have meaning.
-
“Tweaks” to our Afghanistan War Strategy
Published: February 7th, 2011
An article in Sunday’s Boston Globe reported that Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry (D-Mass.) is calling for a revision of US strategy in Afghanistan with a more limited focus for the mission and a significant reduction in the number of American forces deployed there. The story has garnered considerable attention as Senator Kerry is seen as a key proponent of the Obama administration’s strategy in Afghanistan and was a supporter of the plan to “surge” an additional 30,000 troops into the country.
However, the Globe issued a clarification this morning, stating that Kerry had in fact not called for a “significant” reduction in US military forces, but rather a “tweak” of current strategy that would reduce US troop levels by an unspecified amount and place a greater emphasis on counter-terrorism.
Regardless of the correction to the record, other statements made by Senator Kerry in the Globe story depict an important administration ally moving toward a critical re-examination of the assumptions and goals underlying US involvement in Afghanistan. Indications of such a shift are particularly significant given the upcoming round of oversight hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Further, they echo concerns over Afghanistan from a growing number of voices in Congress on both sides of the aisle.
Senator Kerry’s concerns over the current strategy come on two main points that hold considerable promise should they become a focus of the oversight hearings:
First, Sen. Kerry calls for clarification on the metrics of success in Afghanistan, noting that despite claims of recent military gains there is general agreement that no military solution to the conflict exists. Rather he states, “What I worry about is whether or not the government [improves] sufficiently to make a difference.”
This worry is well-founded, as evidenced by CJ Chivers’ article in Sunday’s New York Times which describes a shadow government run by the Taliban and flourishing in the vacuum left by the Karzai administration in Kabul. However, while Kerry’s focus on governance is warranted, difficulties in extending the reach of the central government must not slow efforts to forward the political negotiations whose success should be the true measure of an effective strategy.
Second, Sen. Kerry seems intent on defining US strategic interests in Afghanistan. In the Boston Globe article Kerry differentiates between Vietnam and the war in Afghanistan stating, “Unlike Vietnam, where there was no threat to the United States, and no real strategic interest…here there is a real one.”
There are indeed real strategic interests for the United States in Afghanistan and the oversight committee hearings that Senator Kerry will serve on would do well to keep focused on them.
The first: prevent Afghanistan from becoming a “safe haven” that could significantly enhance Al Qaeda’s ability to organize and conduct attacks on the United States.
The second: keep the conflict in Afghanistan from threatening the stability of the Pakistani state and the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
Both of these interests would best be served by putting the full weight of US engagement in Afghanistan behind the effort to reach a political settlement.
On the first point, a report published today by the Center for International Cooperation at N.Y.U. argues that the relationship between Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban is a matter of pragmatic politics rather than ideology. This finding highlights the potential of a political approach to achieve the separation between Al Qaeda and the Taliban necessary to accomplish the US’ strategic goal of denying Al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the reports authors argue that increased military targeting of Taliban field commanders and provincial leaders has left the movement in the hands of increasingly younger and more radical fighters and, if continued, this strategy will strengthen the influence of Al Qaeda among the Taliban.
As for the second point, engaging regional stakeholders like Pakistan and India in the process of creating a political settlement in Afghanistan holds far more promise for stabilizing the Pakistani state and safeguarding its nuclear arsenal than carrying on an increasingly kinetic military campaign that encourages the maintenance of sanctuaries for militant groups within Pakistan and radicalizes generations of Pakistanis in the furor over drone attacks in their country.
-
Petraeus and the Death of Counter-Insurgency
Published: February 7th, 2011
Anecdotal evidence in recent weeks from Afghanistan suggests that the U.S. military has moved away from some of the central tenants of Counter-Insurgency (COIN)—protecting populations, winning the “hearts and minds”, and establishing governance. First there was the sensational blog by Paula Broadwell from the Argandab Valley depicting the complete destruction of a small town—not exactly population protection, or winning the hearts and minds.
Next there was a disturbing BBC production entitled the “battle for bomb alley”, which depicted the clearing of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from one of the most dangerous roads in Afghanistan. In order to eliminate the threats of these bombs, the Marines were forced to destroy homes, buildings and even a mosque. As the commander acknowledged, the troops are “trying to build a country up by destroying it.” Last came Rolling Stone’s notorious Michael Hastings with a depiction of the new war strategy under Petraeus, which relies on arming criminal warlords and their militias—governance be damned:
“The problem is that the militia program undercuts what is supposed to be a central tenet of counterinsurgency — which, according to a memo issued by Petreaus in August, requires drawing the local population away from the enemy by providing them with “accountable governance.””
What’s going on here? Either, Petreaus, who literally wrote the book on counter-insurgency, has forgotten the central tenents of his own strategy, or, more likely, military officials have concluded that the conditions in Afghanistan are not suited to the types of nation-building that COIN entails. If the brass has essentially thrown in the towel on winning the hearts and minds, policy makers must answer some awkward questions.
Why are we fighting in Afghanistan? Even if the U.S. were leaving behind a stable, functioning society, the Afghan War might not be worth it—the U.S. does not have vital strategic interests at stake. If the U.S. is leaving behind nothing but rubble and an angry anti-U.S. population, the current strategy is worse than pointless, it’s harmful.
-
How to Get Enemies to the Negotiating Table
Published: February 4th, 2011
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerOn Thursday, the Center for American Progress and the National Security Network put on a series of panels to discuss policy options on Iran. The highlight of the event was a debate between Afghanistan Study Group Member Paul Pillar and Brookings’ Kenneth Pollack. Both retired intelligence analysts agreed on the broad contours of American foreign policy: War with Iran would be foolish; and although nuclear Iran would be dangerous, the U.S. could live with this scenario. There was one sharp disagreement however, and it bears directly on a question central to the Afghan War debate. Pollack believed that Iran would only approach the negotiating table if the U.S. put the regime under immense pressure. Pillar worried that too much stick without the necessary carrot would only serve to further alienate the two sides.
How does this Discussion Relates to Afghanistan?
This debate bears a striking resemblance to discussions on how best to drive the Afghan insurgency to the negotiating table. Pro-surge advocates have long taken the Pollack position—the U.S. needs to aggressively pressure the insurgency and only once it’s marginalized will it seek a settlement. Pillar and others have suggested that aggressive counter-insurgency is counterproductive. The weaker the Taliban’s position, the less is the incentive to bargain.
Matt Waldman and Thomas Ruttig recently weighed in on this question with a paper examining the prospects for negotiation in Afghanistan: Citing “ripeness theory” , Waldman and Ruttig argued that the best environment for deal making is one in which neither side can achieve their stated goals through military (or other) means. A “mutually hurting stalemate” is therefore the likeliest environment for negotiations to take place. Waldman and Ruttig write,
The [Ripeness] Theory does not suggest what some Western officials believe: that negotiations can only be attempted after a successful military surge to achieve a position of strength. In fact a “position of strength”’ implies conditions of asymmetry that are not consistent with the theory’s central proposition.”
In other words, getting adversaries to the negotiating table requires balance. Too much pressure on the insurgents in Afghanistan and they will not trust our willingness to negotiate in good faith. Too little pressure and the insurgents have every incentive to avoid deal making. In Afghanistan, where both the Taliban and U.S. forces seem to be operating under the illusion that victory is possible, negotiations at present seem unlikely to take place.
If there is one lesson that Afghanistan should teach, it is that aggressive action often leads policymakers to conclude their enemies are “irreconcilable”. This term is often used to describe the various Afghan insurgent groups; unfortunately, policymakers seldom assume that their own aggressive policies will be interpreted this way by the enemy. U.S. counter-insurgency policies—particularly night raids and special-ops—have widened the gulf between insurgents, ISAF and the Afghan government. Similarly aggressive policies targeted at Iran, which are likely to be interpreted in Tehran as “regime change”, will not be greeted with calls for negotiation.
The most telling moment in the Pollock-Pillar debate came when Pollack was challenged to name one country which responded to severe military and economic pressure by entering negotiations; his only answer—Libya—was immediately challenged by Professor Pillar as an example which in point-of-fact illustrated the importance of dialogue and diplomacy. In the end engagement not pressure, was the real key to a lasting settlement.
-
The Afghanistan Weekly Reader
Published: February 4th, 2011
Happy Friday! Here are the top stories about Afghanistan that we were reading this week.
King David’s War
Rolling Stone by Michael Hastings
On the morning of June 15th, 2010, Gen. David Petraeus skipped breakfast. He was jetlagged from a trip earlier in the week to the Middle East, and he was due at the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill at 9:30 a.m. to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. A veteran at these things — he had testified at least half a dozen times over the past three years, most famously as commander of U.S. troops at the height of the Iraq War — he decided not to drink much water that morning. He knew, as others sitting in front of the senators had learned the hard way, that once the marathon session began, he wouldn’t have a chance for a bathroom break. “No one wants to be sitting there with a full bladder,” a senior military official close to Petraeus tells me.Military Downplays Key U.S. Objective in Afghanistan
Huffington Post by Amanda Terkel
WASHINGTON — A top U.S. commander in Afghanistan is contradicting comments by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen on whether a military offensive by Pakistan is necessary to win the war, reflecting frustrations over pinning down metrics for success.
At the Pentagon on Tuesday, Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, the No. 2 commander in Afghanistan, briefed reporters about U.S. progress in pushing Pakistan to go after militants in North Waziristan, a haven for Taliban and al Qaeda along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.Afghan Police ‘Nearly as Unpopular as Taliban in South’
The Guardian by Reuters
Afghanistan‘s police force is only slightly more popular than the Taliban in the insurgent heartlands of the south, according to a survey commissioned by the UN. The results of the poll, published today, portrayed a police force widely viewed by Afghans as corrupt and biased, underscoring doubts about a planned Nato handover. About half the 5,052 Afghans surveyed across all 34 provinces said they would report crime elsewhere.Meanwhile in Afghanistan…
Time by Joe Klein
If the liberation of Egypt weren’t in progress, this story from Afghanistan would be huge front-page news. The losses at Kabul Bank, first reported to be several hundred million in the Times last summer, are actually in the neighborhood of $900 million. Apparently, the bank directors–perhaps including Hamid Karzai’s brother Mahmoud–took a substantial portion of the assets, leveraged them and invested in Dubai real estate, which promptly crashed. The Afghan government does most of its business through Kabul Bank; if it fails, the government won’t be able to pay its civil servants–and a fair amount of international aid, deposited in the bank, may be washed out as well. -
The Afghanistan Weekly Reader – Week of January 24th, 2011
Published: January 28th, 2011
This is a new feature we are introducing to give you the must reads from the week. Its purpose is to create a quick and easy way to obtain this weeks vital Afghanistan news from a variety of mainstream news sources, analysts and experts.
Petraeus Skips Drawdown Talk in New Letter to Troops
Wired by Spencer Ackerman
Need another indication that July 2011 is going to come and go without substantial troop reductions? Take a look at Gen. David Petraeus’ brand new letter to his troops and civilians in Afghanistan about the state of the war. There’s a lot of talk about the “hard work” to expect in 2011, and absolutely none about troop withdrawals.GOP Lawmakers Planning Meeting to Explore Alternatives in Afghan War
Huffington Post by Amanda Terkel
WASHINGTON — Three Republican lawmakers who have been outspoken on the war in Afghanistan are trying to push their party to start debating alternative policies and will be convening a meeting next month to start the debateThe Battle for Conservative Hearts and Minds
AntiWar.com by Kelley B. Vlahos
News that a clear majority of conservatives want to reduce the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, plus reports of an emerging right-left coalition against the war, have served as hopeful signs in the heretofore quixotic pursuit to arrest the giant gears of the American war machine.Why Military Spending Remains Untouchable
Salon by Andrew Becevich
In defense circles, “cutting” the Pentagon budget has once again become a topic of conversation. Americans should not confuse that talk with reality. Any cuts exacted will at most reduce the rate of growth. The essential facts remain: U.S. military outlays today equal that of every other nation on the planet combined, a situation without precedent in modern history. -
Reality Check on “Sanctuaries” in Pakistan
Published: January 24th, 2011
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerA New York Times report on Pakistani sanctuaries last Monday suggested that the presence of safe-havens has made it easier to target terrorists with drone attacks.
Pakistani Army operations in the other six of seven tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan have helped drive fighters from Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani network and other militant groups into North Waziristan, the one tribal area that Pakistan has not yet assaulted. With several hundred insurgents largely bottled up there, and with few worries about accidentally hitting Pakistani soldiers battling militants or civilians fleeing a combat zone, the Central Intelligence Agency’s drones have attacked targets in North Waziristan with increasing effectiveness…
It’s an interesting theory, but divorced from reality. The insurgency’s presence in North Waziristan is an indication that our counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency efforts have failed. Far from being bottled up in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Haqqani Network and Quetta Shura (who are actually in Baluchistan) have successfully escalated the war in Southern Afghanistan and expanded the conflict to the North. Meanwhile Al Qaeda’s offshoots have gained strength in countries such as Yemen, Somalia and even the former Soviet Republics, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
The success of done attacks is uncertain. Drone attacks have dramatically increased in the last year, and there have been some notable successes, such as the killing of Al Qaeda operatives al Masri and Ab’d al Rahman. However, Bin Laden and his inner circle remain seemingly out of reach from the onslaught of attacks and increasing evidence suggests predator overuse may turn locals against the U.S.
As long as the U.S. remains bogged down in Afghanistan, al Qaeda will likely have the protection of the Haqqanis and other insurgent groups. Unless an acceptable peace deal can be reached to end the Afghan war, the incentive to protect Bin Laden and his cohorts will remain and the potential for high-yield counter-terror strikes will be limited.
-
What we Asked Conservatives about the War in Afghanistan
Published: January 21st, 2011
Last week, we released results of a poll that we conducted asking conservatives (including self-identified members of the Tea Party) their views about the Afghanistan war and the level of American commitment that they thought was appropriate and necessary. The results weren’t pretty if you are in favor of continuing (or escalating) the conflict. A full two-thirds of conservatives support a reduction in troop levels in Afghanistan. At the same time, well-known and respected conservative Grover Norquist publicly questioned the strategy and asked basic questions about what we’re doing over there.
Here’s what Norquist said last week:
“Can we have a conversation about what we’re doing, and how long we’re going to be there, and what the point is, and how much it’s supposed to cost, and what the plans are?”Of course, that doesn’t work for those who do favor a continuation of the status quo. But rather than engage in a substantive discussion of the pros and cons of the American campaign in Afghanistan, they decided to attack Norquist and imply that our polling was bogus. Writing on Commentary’s blog, Max Boot wrote:
“Nor am I convinced by a poll sponsored by the liberal New America Foundation, with which Norquist has affiliated himself, claiming that most conservatives favor drawing down our troop numbers now. I suspect this is typical of the partisan “polls” that Washington operatives like Norquist put together to make their cause du jour appear more popular than it actually is. In reality, Republicans in Congress are solidly behind the war effort; I rather doubt they do so in the face of adamant opposition from their conservative constituents. In any case, I have not seen much sign of conservative opposition to the Afghan war effort — which is why Norquist is working with the New America Foundation, not, say, the Heritage Foundation.”Notwithstanding that the poll was not sponsored by the New America Foundation, Boot’s supposition that we concocted some sort of non-scientific poll in order to score points is absurd. In fact, if he had actually read our own blog last week when we released the poll, he could have seen for himself that we asked non-biased questions aimed at getting to the core of what conservatives really think about the war, because we linked to a PDF of the survey questions. We stand by it as a true reflection that even the most conservative Americans are wondering what we’re doing in Afghanistan and whether the current policy is in America’s interest. We’d be interested to see polling from Boot or others to suggest otherwise.
Read the survey questions here.
-
Opium Eradication and the Cost of Success
Published: January 14th, 2011
Today’s article in the Washington Post discussing the failures of our anti-drug policies brought me back to my days studying drug policy in Latin America. As in the case of Colombia, drug eradication policies in Afghanistan ignore the power of the market and the laws of supply and demand. If a drug eradication program is successful, the price of that drug rises, which in turn encourages potential cultivators to re-enter the market. In Afghanistan, drug eradication programs have evidently been very successful[1]. The price of opium has more than doubled between 2009 and 2010. As expected these price signals have incentivized opium production elsewhere.
The eradication program hasn’t led to increased production just anywhere, however. The increased production is predominantly in areas under Taliban control. This makes perfect sense since these areas lie outside the eradication zones. Basically, by eradicating poppies in the secure East or North, NATO forces are in essence subsidizing production in Taliban controlled areas. Given that the drug trade is one important source of income for the insurgency, this policy is clearly counter-productive.
What can be done? Policymakers might be inclined to abandon efforts at eradication in the North and East. This would be a mistake since transitioning away from a drug economy is a key towards developing the region and improving governance in the relatively secure areas of the country. Instead, the rise in opium prices should underscore the imperative of finding a resolution to the Afghan conflict. Once there is modicum of peace and security in Afghanistan, policymakers can pivot to dealing with the drug trade without worrying that they are indirectly fueling the insurgency.
[1] The article suggests that a fungus which has killed poppy plants may have also played a role. -
Grover Norquist is Making Sense on Afghanistan
Published: January 13th, 2011
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerTuesday night at a private salon dinner, Grover Norquist, head of Americans for Tax Reform, a conservative think tank, delivered his thoughts on the Afghanistan War. Below are some of the highlights of Mr. Norquist’s presentation.
The Good: Norquist described a conservative foreign policy vision to illustrate how far we have strayed from the policies of some former conservative presidents. He reminded the audience that Reagan, when faced with the bombing of the Marines’ barracks in Beirut, pulled the troops out of Lebanon; he certainly did not engage in or commit to long-term nation building exercises. Norquist also suggested that behind closed doors, there is a lot of skepticism about the neo-conservative agenda. He related an anecdote in which he asked Capital Hill staffers whether their Republican bosses would agree that staying in Iraq was a mistake. All of them said, yes.
Norquist articulated some of the weaknesses of the current strategy. He pointed out that the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have occupied and distracted the United States. If one fist is in the “tar baby Iraq”, the other fist is in “tar baby Afghanistan,” there are no hands left to tackle Iran, Korea, China or any of the other threats facing this country.
Norquist reminded the audience that we have strayed from the classic conservative foreign policy doctrine, which focuses foreign policy resources in areas of critical national security interests. During the 1990s Republicans consistently criticized Clinton for the military interventions in Somalia and the Balkans, and in 2000, Bush promised that he would not engage in “nation-building”. And yet here we are nation building in Afghanistan with strong support from the Republican caucus. Part of the problem, argues Norquist, has undoubtedly been a political atmosphere, where opponents of the war effort are consistently caricatured as being against the troops. Exhibit A, says Norquist, is the recent spat over RNC chairman Michael Steel’s assertion that Afghanistan was a war of Obama’s choosing.
The Bad: Norquist said the goal of the dinner was to jumpstart a dialogue about U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan, but when pushed to openly criticize the current war policy, he deflected. The problem is, unless conservative political leaders are willing to openly oppose the war, there is very little hope for constructive dialogue. On the question of military budget, prominent Republicans argued that cuts should be “on the table”. No Republican leader has taken a similar stand with regards to Afghanistan. The leading candidates for the Republican presidential nomination have likewise been silent. Norquist could have done his party and the country a favor by taking a firmer position on the war. He did not and that is disappointing; however, his willingness to discuss this issue and open debate among the center-right is definitely a good development.
