ASG Blog
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Pawlenty Punts on Afghanistan
Published: June 1st, 2011
Will Keola Thomas – Afghanistan Study Group
Former Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty has been on a foreign policy tear since beginning his campaign for the White House. In brandishing his foreign policy credentials (such as…<cough> “governor” <cough>), Pawlenty is apparently attempting to fill a void, which some observers have noticed among the Republican candidates, a lack of experience in international affairs.
If Pawlenty’s performance so far is any indication, the void remains.
There’s his “basic perspective on foreign policy” derived from early experiences with sandbox realpolitik:
“You may have learned it on the playground, you may have learned it in business, sports. You may have learned it in some other walk of life, but it’s always true. If you’re dealing with thugs and bullies, they understand strength. They don’t respect weakness.”
Okay, so Pawlenty admitted he was oversimplifying in the interest of time when he distilled his foreign policy vision as “strength.” Still, staking out a “pro-strength” position isn’t going to put much distance between the former governor and his opponents.
Then there’s the whole keeping Iran and Iraq straight thing:
But it was hard to hear the reporter’s question and Gov. Pawlenty is undoubtedly tired from all the campaigning and it’s just that one damned letter separating the two countries anyway, right? It wouldn’t be fair to judge the governor’s potential for strong leadership on foreign affairs based on such minor details.
The war in Afghanistan, on the other hand, is no detail. And when Pawlenty was asked what he would do if he found himself in charge of the longest war in U.S. history, a war that is currently maxing out the national credit card at almost $120 billion a year with no end in sight, the governor essentially dodges the question like it was a bullet in The Matrix.
From the Des Moines Register’s account of a meeting between Pawlenty and Republican party activists in Iowa:
“Former Minnesota Gov. Tim Pawlenty said the country should try to decrease its troop levels in Afghanistan within the next two years, if conditions are right…
When addressing specific troop levels, Pawlenty deferred to recommendations from military leadership, who have said decisions should be based on conditions in the country.”
“…try to decrease troop levels…” + “…deferred to recommendations from military leadership…” + “…based on conditions in the country…” = PUNT
Why would he pass off responsibility for the most important foreign policy issue facing the country?
“Pawlenty said General David Petraeus told him during a visit to Afghanistan last fall that troop levels could be decreased in two years. Petraeus has since said the timeline could be shortened to about a year and a half.”
Come on, Governor…you fell for the “two-years” line? Man, that one is just plain tired.
As Democracy Arsenal’s Michael Cohen reminds us, Gen. Petraeus was whispering that sweet nothing into President Obama’s ear back in the heady days of September, 2009:
Inside the Oval Office, Obama asked Petraeus, “David, tell me now. I want you to be honest with me. You can do this in 18 months?”
“Sir, I’m confident we can train and hand over to the ANA [Afghan National Army] in that time frame,” Petraeus replied.
“Good. No problem,” the president said. “If you can’t do the things you say you can in 18 months, then no one is going to suggest we stay, right?”
“Yes, sir, in agreement,” Petraeus said.
So much for projecting strength. Pawlenty is showing deference to the big boys and girls at the Pentagon before he even steps foot onto the presidential playground, Gov. Pawlenty is guaranteeing that if he is in charge the taxpayer’s lunch money is going to get “taken”.
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Reconciliation: Then and Now
Published: May 31st, 2011
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
About eight months ago, a spate of articles were published in major American newspapers suggesting that the U.S. and Afghan government had begun serious overtures to the Taliban. At the time, some optimists suggested that the U.S. was turning a corner in its Afghan strategy, particularly with the decision in that month to allow insurgents safe passage to negotiate with the Afghan government. (As Afghanistan Study Group Director Matthew Hoh pointed out, nothing dampens an insurgent’s incentive to talk peace as much as a hellfire missile through the windshield.) These reports died down, soon after it was revealed that the man supposedly representing the Taliban was actually a lowly shopkeeper from Quetta, not the number two man in the Taliban as had been believed.
Flash forward eight months, and its reconciliation season again.
The latest report in a string of “secret talks” articles comes from the German paper Der Spiegel. Apparently, the Germans have been mediating talks between Tayyab Agha (a relative of Mullah Omar) and senior U.S. officials. I imagine the vetting process this time around was a little more stringent, although depressingly David Ignatius writes in this morning’s Washington Post:
“[U.S. officials] are trying to establish whether Agha speaks for Omar and his Quetta Shura, or for a faction of it, or whether he is a lone wolf.”Oh, boy. Here we go again.
While the news out of Germany may be promising, Pakistan’s role in potential talks remains complicated. During a previous reconciliation period, Pakistan successfully scuttled negotiations by arresting Mullah Baradar—the Taliban’s lead negotiator. Ironically, the arrest was at first depicted as a coup for the U.S.-Pakistani relations, that is until someone annoyingly pointed out that: a. Baradar was not really hiding (remind you of someone else?) and b. was the most approachable member of the Quetta Shura.
Thank goodness this time around the Pakistanis are playing a more constructive role, pushing one of the most violent groups, the Haqqani Network, to engage in talks according to a recent report. How does the U.S. respond to this Pakistani collaboration? From the Wall Street Journal:
“I don’t see any evidence that makes me think Haqqani is a guy we’re going to want to be talking to,” said a U.S. official.
The U.S. is pissed that the Pakistanis are pushing for talks, and not taking it to the insurgency militarily in the FATA region.
Makes you wonder how committed we really are to a negotiated settlement.
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Afghanistan Weekly Reader May 27, 2011: Congress checks President (almost)
Published: May 27th, 2011
138 votes two years ago. 162 votes last year. 204 votes yesterday. Congress is slowly waking up from its decade-long slumber and realizing that the country has been at war in Afghanistan for ten years without a clear exit strategy. Proposals requiring the Obama administration to present a plan for ending U.S. military involvement in the conflict have been introduced for the last three years to a chorus of yawns outside of traditional anti-war circles. But the McGovern-Jones “Afghanistan Exit and Accountability Act” surprised everyone when it came within 12 votes of passing in a floor vote on Thursday.
What kept Congress from hitting the snooze button again? The death of Osama bin Laden certainly had a rousing effect. As did the realization that support for $120 billion a year nation-building adventures may not convey the appropriate image of fiscal responsibility to constituents enduring budget cuts back home. And polls showing that voters’ security concerns have more to do with debt and long-term unemployment than the Taliban may have helped sharpen legislators’ focus.
But if Congress required that extra something to shake them awake going into the vote they needed look no further than the news coming out of Afghanistan that day. As the representatives headed to the floor, outlets reported the deaths of eight more U.S. troops in Kandahar.
ARTICLES
5-23-11
A Slice of Afghanistan Well Secured by Afghans
NY Times by Carlotta Gall
Afghan Army battalions have deployed in the districts of Zabul, and are the first in the country to operate independently. They are emerging as a real authority acceptable to local people and as an alternative to both the Taliban and international forces, which are still received ambivalently. Increasingly, they are handling security, relations with the people and even dispute resolution.5-25-11
Walter Jones: The Anti-War Republican from North Carolina
The Nation by George C. Wilson
Even though more retired military people live in Jones’s district than in most other districts in the country, he has discovered that many marines who served in Afghanistan agree with him that the United States is fighting a hopeless, never-ending war for a corrupt government.Afghanistan war tactics are profoundly wrong, says former ambassador
The Guardian by Julian Borger
Britain’s former ambassador to Afghanistan has attacked the conduct of the war by the US commander, General David Petraeus, describing the future CIA chief’s tactics as counter-productive and “profoundly wrong”.War-weary lawmakers push Obama to end Afghan war
Reuters by David Alexander
War-weary lawmakers pushed President Barack Obama to wind down the 10-year-old conflict in Afghanistan on Wednesday as the House of Representatives began debating a bill to authorize $690 billion in defense spending for the next fiscal year.5-26-11
U.S. Has Held Meetings With Aide to Taliban Leader, Officials Say
NY Times by Carlotta Gall and Ruhullah Khapalwak
American officials have met with a senior aide to the fugitive Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, at least three times in recent months in the first direct exploratory peace talks, officials in the region said.
Afghanistan Withdrawal Measure Falls Just 12 Votes Short of Passage in Congress
The Huffington Post by Amanda Terkel
In its first votes on the war in Afghanistan since the killing of Osama bin Laden, Congress sent a strong message to President Obama that its patience for the conflict is wearing thin.
A measure requiring the President to present a plan “with a timeframe and completion date” for the transfer of military operations to Afghan authorities failed 204-215. It would also have mandated a plan for “negotiations leading to a political solution and reconciliation in Afghanistan” and a new National Intelligence Estimate on al Qaeda.
Rep. Bruce Braley Calls for Immediate Withdrawal in Afghanistan
The Huffington Post by Amanda Terkel
A recent trip to Afghanistan, the death of Osama bin Laden and the toll on U.S. soldiers has convinced Rep. Bruce Braley (D-Iowa) that the United States should withdraw all combat troops out of Afghanistan by the end of the year.OPINION
5-20-11
Afghanistan has three wars at once. Let’s fight the right one.
Washington Post by Douglas A. Ollivant
The outgoing U.S. commander of forces in eastern Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. John Campbell (with whom I worked as counterinsurgency adviser), made perhaps the most understated comment about the Pech when he once quipped, “It is different than other places.” Perhaps a better strategy — better than the one that has cost more than 100 U.S. military lives and billions of dollars in that valley alone — would have been to let it stay different.5-27-11
For the U.S., it’s time to get out of Afghanistan
Los Angeles Times by Sen. Barbara Boxer
Although we must remain vigilant in our efforts to defeat Al Qaeda and must continue our support for the Afghan people, there is simply no justification for the continued deployment of 100,000 American troops in Afghanistan. This July, the president should expedite his promised withdrawal of our combat forces. Moreover, we should now set an end date for the U.S. deployment there. -
Afghanistan Weekly Reader May 20, 2011: A Bull in the China Shop and a Skunk at the Party
Published: May 20th, 2011
Questioning the dominant narrative of the war in Afghanistan can be an unpleasant exercise. For those who work in close proximity to the institutions driving war policy, criticizing the notion that victory lies just around the corner can mean the loss of access, influence, and even one’s paycheck. But then, as this week’s news of ongoing night raids, civilian casualties, violent protests, and duplicitous allies showed, unquestioned loyalty to the status quo has yielded little that is pleasant after a decade of fighting.
Which is why the bright spots this week were provided by those who are shaking things up and raising a stink. Rep. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) referred to himself as a “skunk in the party” during the “48-hour sales pitch” that was his recent trip to Afghanistan. By asking the tough questions, Rep. Murphy came to the conclusion that with the current strategy, “We are taking one step forward while taking two steps back.” Similarly, the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, was described as a “bull in a china shop” by his colleagues, but his forcefulness in arguing against military escalation was constrained by his position within the Obama administration. Thankfully, there are others carrying on Holbrooke’s legacy by challenging the current counterproductive strategy and calling for total commitment to finding a political solution for the war in Afghanistan.
FROM THE ASG BLOG
5-18-11
Two days with Felix Kuehn
Afghanistan Study Group by Edward Kenney
Felix Kuehn, a Kandahar-based researcher, came to Washington DC last week to discuss the state of the insurgency and the ties between al Qaeda and the Taliban. You may recall that Kuehn co-authored with his colleague Alex Strick van Linschoten, a paper examining the history of the al Qaeda-Taliban connection in February. (Here is ASG’s take). It’s obviously very difficult to summarize in a few paragraphs the wealth of insights that Kuehn provides but here are some of the key points5/20/11
Afghanistan’s Road to Ruin: Paved with Good Intentions, Soldiers’ Lives, and Taxpayer Dollars
Afghanistan Study Group by Will Keola Thomas
Planners believed the highway would strengthen the central government’s links with the border region and encourage commerce that would promote local buy-in, increase government legitimacy, and improve stability as markets flourished. All for the (low?) price of $69 million dollars. But things didn’t work out that way. First, the law of contracting entropy kicked in.ARTICLES
5-16-11
U.S. speeds up direct talks with Taliban
The Washington Post by Karen DeYoung
The administration has accelerated direct talks with the Taliban, initiated several months ago, that U.S. officials say they hope will enable President Obama to report progress toward a settlement of the Afghanistan war when he announces troop withdrawals in July.Chris Murphy: GOP Congressman Told Me He’s Afraid To Openly Criticize Afghanistan War
Huffington Post by Amanda Terkel
At a town hall meeting in his district on Sunday afternoon, Rep. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), a member of the House Foreign Relations Committee, discussed how his latest trip to Afghanistan reaffirmed his belief that the United States needs to withdraw its troops from there. Accompanying Murphy on the week-long congressional delegation trip were Democrat Cedric Richmond (La.) and Republicans Sean Duffy (Wis.), Adam Kinzinger (Ill.), Jon Runyan (N.J.) and Bill Shuster (Pa.).5-17-11
Murphy Sees Little Improvement in Afghanistan War
DanburyPatch by Jessie Sawyer
After his third trip to Afghanistan, the first in his term on the Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Rep. Chris Murphy, D-5th District, said he was concerned that he didn’t notice much change.5/18/11
Afghan government’s delays hinder recruitment of Taliban defectors
The Washington Post by Rajiv Chandrasekaran
The Afghan government has moved so slowly to recruit Taliban defectors that U.S. and Afghan officials say they are losing an opportunity to capitalize on hard-won military gains and the death of Osama bin Laden.5/20/11
Jon Huntsman Criticizes Heavy U.S. Presence In Afghanistan: It’s Not ‘How We Ought To Be Responding’
The Huffington Post by Amanda Terkel
“The deployments are mighty expensive,” he said. ‘We’ve got to ensure that going forward into our new world that we have a foreign policy that is an extension of our core national interests. And does that mean that we’re going to have to look at the map at some point and reset our level of engagement and our deployments in some corners of the world. Absolutely it does.”OPINION
5-14-11
What Holbrooke Knew
New York Times by Richard Kristof
As one of America’s finest strategic thinkers and special envoy to the Af-Pak region, Holbrooke represented the administration — but also chafed at aspects of the White House approach. In particular, he winced at the overreliance on military force, for it reminded him of Vietnam.5/17/11
Afghanistan War: What Richard Holbrooke Really Thought
The Washington Note by Steve Clemons
Thanks to Kati Marton, the late Richard Holbrooke’s wife, Kristof was given access to key files and notes of Holbrooke’s in her possession — and with these, Kristof has painted a compelling picture that Holbrooke strongly believed that the Afghanistan War needed to be ended through tough-minded negotiations and eventual reconciliation with the Taliban.Five reasons to leave Afghanistan
The Hill by Anne PenKeth
The death of Osama Bin Laden in a Navy SEALs strike deep inside Pakistan has focused new attention on the administration’s strategy in Afghanistan, which aims to enable a troop drawdown from July. Here are five reasons why President Obama should consider pulling out the 100,000 troops in Afghanistan now5/19/11
Bored to Death in Afghanistan (and Washington)
CBS News
Let me explain with seven headlines ripped from the news, all of which sit atop Afghan War articles that couldn’t be newer — or older. Each represents news of our moment that was also news in previous moments; each should leave Americans wondering about Washington’s learning curve. -
Afghanistan’s Road to Ruin: Paved with Good Intentions, Soldiers’ Lives, and Taxpayer Dollars
Published: May 20th, 2011
Will Keola Thomas – Afghanistan Study Group
On May 1st, the New York Times published an article describing the construction of a 64-mile-long highway through two of the most volatile provinces in Afghanistan. The story, “Costly Afghanistan Road Project Is Marred by Unsavory Alliances,” had almost no chance to register in the national consciousness before it was lost in the news cycle wake of Osama bin Laden’s death the following day. But the tale it told, one of organized crime, political violence, corruption, and waste, all underwritten by the American taxpayer, reveals much more about the war in Afghanistan as it is fought today than anything that will be found in bin Laden’s diary.
The Gardez-Khost Highway was presented as a counterinsurgency panacea. Construction of a paved road across the Paktia and Khost provinces of southeastern Afghanistan would facilitate the movement of U.S. forces in a mountainous region that had long been a key supply route for insurgents bringing weapons and fighters over the border from Pakistan. Planners believed the highway would strengthen the central government’s links with the border region and encourage commerce that would promote local buy-in, increase government legitimacy, and improve stability as markets flourished. All for the (low?) price of $69 million dollars.
But things didn’t work out that way.
First, the law of contracting entropy kicked in. Americans paid their taxes and financed the project. On behalf of those taxpayers, the U.S. Agency for International Development drew up the proposal and then gave the contract to a joint venture of the Louis Berger Group, a New Jersey consulting and construction services firm, and Black & Veatch a construction company based in Kansas.
(Sidenote: In November, the Louis Berger Group was ordered to pay $69 million in fines for overbillling the federal government. This is one of the highest wartime contracting fraud penalties in history. Yet the Group’s grip on the federal teat remains firm. Louis Berger currently oversees $1.4 billion in reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan.)
The Berger Group and Black and Veatch then hired Indian construction subcontractors and a South African private security firm who, in turn, hired a variety of Afghan subcontractors for security and construction services, who hired still more subcontractors…and so on, and so forth…until, according to a civilian interviewed by the NY Times who worked with the U.S. military on the project, “…we had a problem that with the final subcontractors, they didn’t have enough money to get the work done.”
Four years later the highway still isn’t complete. The final bill for the project is expected to come in at $176 million with cost overruns of more than 100%. The NY Times reports that a section of the road finished six months ago is already falling apart.
Unfortunately, the story gets worse.
It has cost $43.5 million so far to provide security for the construction of the highway that was meant to bring stability to the region. Among those receiving funds for protecting the road project was one Mr. Arafat, a local strongman who was paid at least $1 million a year for his security services. But, as the NY Times reports:
“Some American officials and contractors involved in the project suspect that at least some of the money funneled through Mr. Arafat made its way to the Haqqani group, a particularly brutal offshoot of the Taliban.”
And if you think that Khost and Paktia are the only provinces where this is happening there’s a bank in Kabul I’d like to sell you:
“Critics say that payoffs to insurgent groups, either directly or indirectly, by contractors working on highways and other large projects in Afghanistan are routine. Some officials say they are widely accepted in the field as a cost of doing business…As a result, contracting companies and the American officials who supervise them often look the other way.
‘Does it keep the peace?’ asked one United States military officer with experience in volatile eastern Afghanistan. ‘Definitely. If the bad guys have a stake in the project, attacks go way down.’”
If the United States is putting soldiers in harm’s way to defeat the Taliban while at the same time filling the Taliban’s coffers with protection money it more than begs the question of what we are doing in “volatile eastern Afghanistan” in the first place.
Especially when one considers the extraordinary price paid in blood and treasure to implement infrastructure projects in areas where, according to a former U.S.A.I.D. worker interviewed by the Times, “…the local population is as likely to sabotage a project as to protect it.”
And particularly when one ponders the desperate need for infrastructure investment in the United States.
Hundreds of miles of paved roads are being removed and returned to gravel in states where officials can’t find the money to maintain them. As the Minneapolis/St. Paul Star Tribune reports:
“The paved roads that finally brought rural America in to the 20th century are starting to disappear across the Midwest in the 21st. Local officials, facing rising pavement prices, shrinking budgets and fewer residents, are making tough decisions to regress. In some places, they have even eliminated small stretches of gravel road altogether.”
And then there’s the crumbling bridges and levees across the country whose decrepit state puts thousands of lives at risk. Increasingly, building highways at the point of a gun in Afghanistan means playing budget roulette at home.
(Update: The BBC reports that the Taliban ambushed construction workers camped by the Gardez-Khost Highway on Wednesday night. At least 35 workers were killed making this the deadliest single attack in Afghanistan since February. According to the New York Times, “there have been 364 attacks on the Gardez-Khost Highway, including 108 roadside bombs, resulting in the deaths of 19 people, almost all of them local Afghan workers.”)
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Fox News Poll Shows 64% of Americans Want Troops Out of Afghanistan by Summer
Published: May 19th, 2011
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
Fox News has a new poll covering President Obama’s approval rating on a number of different issues. Included in this survey are three questions on the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, each with widely different results, exemplifying why the wording of a poll question matters.
Poll # 1 measures President Obama’s handling of the war in Afghanistan. A poll seven months ago reported that the president’s approval of the war was close to an all time low with 43% approving of Afghan policy. The most recent poll, however, suggests a sudden turnaround for the President with a whopping 57% now approving of the current war policy.
Poll # 2 asks whether the American public supports military action in Afghanistan. Here the results have been remarkably stable in favor of the troops. In 2009 64% said they support the military in Afghanistan, in 2010 and 2011 support has held steady at 62%.
Finally poll # 3 asks whether the U.S. should withdraw troops. A quarter of those surveyed advocated an immediate withdrawal. Another 39% advocated sticking to Obama’s announced withdrawal deadlines. Together 64% of those surveyed favor withdrawal.
So to sum up, the public (always) supports military action, and increasingly likes the President’s war policy, particularly the part about ending military action.
Fortunately, two of these polls are likely influenced by outside events or poor wording. Only one of these polls (see if you can guess which one) accurately describes public opinion.
Obama’s strong Afghan approval rating (poll # 1) likely reflects the death of Osama bin Laden. Indeed, this result is mirrored in virtually every post bin Laden poll on the Afghan war.
For Poll # 2 the problem is how the survey question is worded. Americans are notoriously reluctant to come out against the troops, so it’s hardly surprising that a poll which includes the words “support” and “military”, elicits a steady positive response. We should be especially skeptical over the poll’s seemingly steady numbers across multiple years. Is American public opinion on such a volatile issue really that stable?
The poll that probably best reflects public opinion on the war is poll # 3 which asks about a specific policy proposal. Here the result is unambiguous: By a wide margin Americans want the troops home.
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Two days with Felix Kuehn
Published: May 18th, 2011
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
Felix Kuehn, a Kandahar-based researcher, came to Washington DC last week to discuss the state of the insurgency and the ties between al Qaeda and the Taliban. You may recall that Kuehn co-authored with his colleague Alex Strick van Linschoten, a paper examining the history of the al Qaeda-Taliban connection in February. (Here is ASG’s take). It’s obviously very difficult to summarize in a few paragraphs the wealth of insights that Kuehn provides but here are some of the key points:
The State of War
On the security situation and the death of bin Laden
Kuehn left Kandahar one day before the 40 hour siege last weekend, and expressed regret that he missed the beginning of what he expects will be a brutal summer season. He dismissed DoD reports suggesting that the war is turning around. In Kandahar, according to Kuehn, war wounded are up 60 % to 70 % in Jan and Feb from a year ago.He also believes that the death of bin Laden will have no effect on the insurgency and only a minimal impact on al Qaeda’s operational capabilities. Bottom line, says Kuehn quoting an actual Taliban leader, is that the insurgents never fought for al Qaeda and so will be unaffected by his demise.
Al Qaeda and the Taliban
On the generational gap between Al Qaeda and the Taliban
The first obvious difference between the two organizations, says Kuehn, is generational. Al Qaeda leaders were graduating from madrasahs before the Taliban could even talk. Al Qaeda’s roots are in the Muslim brotherhood. Several foreign Islamic groups came to Afghanistan in the 1980s (after getting kicked out of Egypt and other Arab countries) and set up training camps. Osama bin Laden was successful in uniting these groups under al Qaeda’s banner.In contrast to al Qaeda’s middle and upper-class Islamist roots, the Taliban leadership grew up in poor rural Afghanistan. Most of the Taliban were members of the poorer, more warlike Ghilzai Pashto tribes. Their parents typically did not have money for private education and so sent their children to madrasahs, which were free of tuition.
On the religious divide between al Qaeda and the Taliban
Al Qaeda and the Taliban also have fundamentally different religious ideologies. Al Qaeda follow the strict Salafi movement from the Hanbali school, a very strict conservative interpretation of Islam. The Taliban are mainly of the Deobandi Hanafi School which came out of India. Kuehn points out that the Taliban often practice a form of Islamic Sufi mysticism, which al Qaeda fundamentally rejects.On political differences between al Qaeda and the Taliban
The Taliban are not a global jihadist movement and have fundamentally different political aims, however both view the United States at present as an enemy. The Taliban movement united against the lawlessness that pervaded Kandahar in the 1990s. Fifty or sixty religious students took an oath at the White Mosque in Sangesar—an enormous risk according to Kuehn, but the movement soon gained popularity by bringing security and law and order to the country and was soon able to take over. Even in this period al Qaeda was never close to the Taliban. Mullah Omar believed strongly in the Umma—Islamic unity—for this reason he did not reject bin Laden, but neither did he choose bin Laden to lead foreign forces in 2001, a major blow to al Qaeda.U.S. Policy Going Forward
On Kill Capture
Kuehn’s discussion coincided nicely with the release of a report from Frontline documenting the limitations of the U.S. Kill-Capture campaign. The news report chronicled several instances where the wrong person was targeted or even killed and the increasing radicalization of midlevel commanders. One Taliban leader talked about following the U.S. troops back to the United States. Kuehn is very worried about this increased radicalization among younger insurgents, who do not have the same perspectives as the older Talibs and act increasingly independent from the Talib leadership. Last summer during the spike in violence, Kuehn describes reaching out to senior Talibs to ask whether he or van Linschoten were in any danger. The Talib leader said the two Germans were not on any Taliban “hit list”, but he could not vouch for the new young insurgent leaders in Argandab.On Rapid Withdrawal
Kuehn is most worried about the prospects of civil war in Afghanistan. For this reason he did not advocate a rapid withdrawal of troops. He did acknowledge that the surge forces in places like Marjah were costly and counterproductive. The locals there just want to be left alone. He seemed to advocate a managed withdrawal of international forces.On Reconciliation
Kuehn supported reconciliation as outlined by Pickering and Brahimi, but he cautioned against some potential risks and obstacles:1. The lack of trust between Afghans and Americans has grown significantly. A majority of Afghans in Kandahar believe that the U.S. was behind the Sarposa prison break. Apparently, Afghans believe we want the violence to continue as an excuse to occupy the country. This lack of trust that we will someday leave is the opposite of what one hears here in Washington, where “experts” claim the Afghans don’t trust us because we might leave.
2. The Northern Alliance opposes reconciliation and is, according to Kuehn, openly preparing for civil war. There is some indication that members such as Sarwari, who was intel chief under Ahmad Shah Massoud are amenable to the notion of Talib governors in the South. On the insurgent’s side, Kuehn believes they will not give up ties to al Qaeda for free, but their fear of Civil War may force them to compromise on this point. If the U.S. and Afghan government can appeal to the insurgents’ pragmatism, an agreement might be possible.
On Governance and Corruption
Kuehn advocates a devolution of power from the Central Government to local regions. Everything in Afghanistan happens on the local level, says Kuehn, and the U.S. correspondingly spends far too much time worrying about things like the Constitution, which have no bearing on anything that actually happens in Kandahar and elsewhere.He noted that the Taliban are far more tech literate than the Afghan government. The Taliban have both a website and twitter feed in multiple languages, including English. The reason for the Taliban’s tech advantage, according to Kuehn, is that most of the best qualified IT people are hired by NGOs, leaving the Government of Afghanistan with the dregs of the talent pool. The proliferation of government contractors, NGOs and military dollars has also led to an increasingly unequal society in Kandahar which exacerbates the conflict. Kuehn points out that there are over a thousand millionaires living in the impoverished province.
Kuehn and van Linschoten have a book coming out this summer which covers their research into al Qaeda and the Taliban. If his presentation is anything to go by, it will be very good.
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The Afghanistan Weekly Reader, May 13, 2011: The Courage of Dissenters
Published: May 13th, 2011
This week it seems U.S. policy in Afghanistan may be on the verge of turning-a-corner and shifting-momentum in a way that has yet to be seen in this decade long war. Why are we now seeing this course correction? Because the Pentagon spin masters are losing their ability to delude Congress with claims of victory just around the corner. Instead, members of Congress have finally decided to question Pentagon press releases and challenge their party leadership in an effort to change the country’s self-destructive course and gather momentum for bringing the troops home.
Congress’ spine was apparently stiffened by the death of Osama bin Laden and a growing number of questions about Pakistan’s support for the insurgency in Afghanistan. An insurgency that is killing and wounding American soldiers, and Afghan civilians, at a record rate even as the U.S. sends Islamabad billions in aid. Each week it becomes clearer that the war in Afghanistan limits, rather than leverages, American power and influence. The U.S. cannot stabilize Afghanistan if Pakistan doesn’t end its support for the Taliban. And yet, the United States can’t put its full weight behind modifying Pakistan’s behavior so long as the 110,000 American troops in Afghanistan are dependent on Pakistan’s supply routes. The new calls for a drawdown coming from members of both parties should be taken as a hopeful sign that support is growing for a strategy in Afghanistan that doesn’t involve the U.S. shooting itself in the foot.
ARTICLES
5-8-11
Strain on U.S. forces in Afghanistan at a five-year high
Stars and Stripes
U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan are experiencing some of the greatest psychological stress and lowest morale in five years of fighting, reports a military study according to USA Today.5-9-11
Bipartisan House group to Obama: Pull troops from Afghanistan now
The Hill by Mike Lillis
Congressional calls for a quick end to military operations in Afghanistan grew louder Monday when a bipartisan group in the House urged President Obama to immediately withdraw U.S. troops.5-10-11
Bob Corker: U.S. Military Leaders Frustrated With War In Afghanistan
Huffington Post by Amanda Terkle
WASHINGTON — Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) believes that the discovery and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abottabad, Pakistan has provided the United States with a “relationship-changing opportunity” to reassess its dealings with Pakistan and perhaps Afghanistan.
Strike Gives Obama Some Leeway on War Strategy
The Wall Street Journal by Gerald F. Seib
Rep. Jason Chaffetz is no fan of the American military operation in Afghanistan. In fact, he was one of only nine Republicans in the House who voted last year to curtail funding for the Afghan war effort. So, as you would expect, the conservative Utah lawmaker is arguing that the killing of Osama bin Laden a week should hasten the departure of American troops from Afghanistan, now that the terror leader who prompted the incursion in the first place is gone. In fact, he co-signed a letter to the White House Monday urging an end to the “formal” Afghan war.Afghan police committing crimes with impunity, warns Oxfam
The Telgraph by Thomas Harding
The charity has warned that unless the international community acts immediately the country will not be secure enough to hand over to Afghan forces in 2014.In Afghanistan, U.S. contracts aren’t crystal balls, but they come close
Washington Post by Walter Pincus
Want to know what the United States is planning to do in a post-bin Laden Afghanistan? One way to get a clue is by checking out government contracts. Over the past six years U.S. contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided a guide to activity on the ground.Poll: With bin Laden dead, is it time to end war?
USA Today by Susan Page
WASHINGTON — Osama bin Laden’s demise may have shifted not only the military prospects for al-Qaeda abroad, but also the political landscape for President Obama at home.5-13-11
War fatigue in House GOP
Politico by Jake Sherman and John Bresnahan
A newfound restlessness about the decadelong war in Afghanistan has reached the highest levels of the House Republican leadership, sparking serious concerns about war funding and murmurs about troop withdrawal — a sign that the GOP may be undergoing a shift in thinking about overseas intervention.
OPINION5-6-11
Our Strange Dance With Pakistan
The New York Review of Books by Elizabeth Rubin
We give billions in aid to Pakistan’s military and civilian government. Yet Pakistan is harboring our enemies and even the enemies, one could argue, of its own healthy survival. Portions of our money are being funneled into the variety of insurgent networks whose fighters are killing American soldiers, Afghan soldiers, American civilians, Afghan civilians, European civilians, Pakistani civilians—mothers, fathers, children on multiple continents.
5-9-11Mission Accomplished
The Wall Street Journal by Leslie Gelb
Afghanistan is no longer a war about vital American security interests. It is about the failure of America’s political elites to face two plain facts: The al Qaeda terrorist threat is no longer centered in that ancient battleground, and the battle against the Taliban is mainly for Afghans themselves.5-11-11
Bin Laden’s Death Won’t End His Toll on American Taxpayers
The San Francisco Chronical in with Bloomberg
The U.S. government spent $2 trillion combating bin Laden over the past decade, more than 20 percent of the nation’s $9.68 trillion public debt. That money paid for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as additional military, intelligence and homeland security spending above pre-Sept. 11 trends, according to a Bloomberg analysis.5-13-11
Sen. Lugar Raises Afghan Mission Questions
NPR interview by Steve Inkseep
Sen. Richard Lugar, the senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, talks to Steve Inskeep about funding for Afghanistan and Pakistan. This week the committee is debating funding for the Afghan war. -
Fact Checking Slaughter and Bergen
Published: May 13th, 2011
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
At the Senate Hearings last Tuesday, Anne-Marie Slaughter echoed a point that has been made in the past by Peter Bergen and others. The argument goes something like this:
“We have already tried the light footprint counter-terror approach. We tried it from 2001 to 2008. It failed.”
There are actually two assertions here.
1. We adopted a counter-terror (CT) approach prior to 2009
2. This approach proved unsuccessful.Both of these assertions are highly dubious.
First did we adopt a light footprint counter-terror approach between 2001 and 2009? Well the first obvious difference between our strategy early in the war, and the proposed “CT” strategy today is troop numbers. In the early periods of the war, the U.S. and International forces were increasing significantly. Between January 2006 and December 2008 approximately 45,000 additional international troops were sent to Afghanistan. In the U.S. we frequently forget the significant surge in European troops which predated the 2009 surge by three years. In this period the U.S. was not focused on counter-terror, either. In fact, intelligence and military resources to fight terrorism were shifted out of Afghanistan and into Iraq. So of the two key components of a light footprint CT-centric approach—a reduced level of troops and a increased focus on counter-terror—neither were present between 2001 and 2009. The Bush policy, best described as benign neglect is not the same as counter-terrorism at all.
Furthermore the conditions on the ground are very different now than they were prior to 2009. The Afghan National Army has grown significantly, and its capabilities are greatly enhanced according to the Pentagon. I remain skeptical that Afghan security forces are capable of wiping out the Taliban especially given the difficulties retaining Southern Pashtuns, but they are probably capable of defending Kabul and other relatively secure areas of the country from a potential Taliban offensive, especially with continued U.S. support. This was not the case three years ago.
So Bergen and Slaughter’s first assertion is clearly false. But was the Bush “benign neglect” approach successful? This depends on what metrics are used. The main goal of a counter-terrorism policy is to disrupt and dismantle international terrorist groups (duh!). By this criterion, Bush’s Afghanistan policy was relatively successful. Al Qaeda did not re-emerge in Afghanistan[1] after 2001; this is true despite the undisputed gains made by the Taliban between 2006 and 2009.
Slaughter and Bergen are also incorrectly assessing the Bush strategy in vacuum, not comparing it to possible alternative policies. Compared to the current COIN strategy, Bush’s policy of “benign neglect” does not look half bad. Since Obama has taken office and adopted a more aggressive military strategy, virtually every security metric has worsened, so if the “benign neglect” approach failed, it has still failed less than the current COIN approach.
This analysis does not prove that a small footprint counter-terror policy will work, but it does suggest that the alarmist rhetoric coming from the Coinistas needs better supporting evidence.
[1] Al Qaeda did re-emerge in Iraq, but that is another story.
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Update on Security Gains in Kandahar City
Published: May 10th, 2011
Edward Kenney – Afghanistan Study Group
In my post on the Defense Department’s unrealistic depiction of security gains, I argued that the improvements in Kandahar City were “cherry picked” data points, not representative of Kandahar Province as a whole. Shrewd observers could point to the Sarposa prison break as an indication that the security in Kandahar City was never as solid as the DoD claimed. Now that Kandahar has suffered a forty hour siege by the Taliban, the Pentagon’s security picture seems even more divorced from reality.
I stand corrected. Kandahar City is not a cherry-picked data point.
