ASG Blog
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Danielle Pletka: “The choices for America in Afghanistan are simpler than they appear…We can win or we can lose”
Published: June 10th, 2011
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
We have a simple choice in Afghanistan, argues Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute: “we can win or we can lose.” But can we actually win? Pletka thinks so, and she helpfully counters eight arguments which have been raised by war skeptics. Here a counter-counter argument to each of the points she raises:
1. Partnership Gap: Pletka offers up a version of the old Rumsfeld adage: We go to war with the partners we have not the partners we want—or as she puts it, “Karzai needs to be improved, not swapped for a better model. There isn’t one. “ Pletka actually hits on one of my own pet peeves: the incessant focus on Karzai/Kabul, when the critical decisions are being made in the provinces. I am much more concerned about the warlords and drug-dealers we “partner with” in Kandahar (where fighting actually takes place), than I am about Karzai and his ministers living the good life in Kabul. The Iraq experience is instructive. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki may or may not be any better than Karzai, but the tribal Sheikhs we allied with in Iraq had a lot more legitimacy than some of the strongmen we continue to support in Afghanistan.
2. The Ethnic Divide: Dividing Afghanistan along ethnic lines is a bad idea for the reasons Pletka outlines. However, this does not mean a more federalized system cannot be implemented. For most of Afghanistan’s history, the rural regions were granted broad autonomy. Imposing some other form of government (as we’re trying to do) strikes me as incredibly foolish. Looking at ethnic, regional and sectarian divides also helps to understand some of the limitations of counter-insurgency. Is it possible to win the hearts and minds, when there exist such long-standing tensions across broad and diverse swathes of the population?
3. Counter-Terror Option: Pletka says a light footprint strategy is tantamount to surrender. But this begs the question: If victory is ensuring that terrorists don’t come back to Afghanistan as Pletka argues, do we really need 100,000 troops to accomplish that goal? We did not need this level of troop presence to kill bin Laden in Pakistan—why should we need it to hunt terrorists in Afghanistan? Over the long term, U.S. strategy has to become more sustainable—this means treating Afghanistan like any other country which harbors terrorists and moving toward a counter-terrorism strategy. Put simply, we can “win” in Afghanistan with less troops and with less money, but this requires a shift in strategy.
4. Graveyard of Empires: Pletka calls historic parallels between our experience and other Afghan occupiers as defeatist. Similar to point number two, understanding the complexities of Afghanistan can help us to understand the limitations of a strategy like counter-insurgency. Yes, this sometimes means going back to the historic record and looking at the experiences of the Soviets and British.
5. Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan: Pletka dismisses the argument that Pakistan is the real front on the war on terror and quotes Fred Kagan to point out two vulnerabilities in the insurgency: the sanctuaries themselves and the support networks. Under ideal circumstances, both the sanctuaries and the support networks should be targeted. Indeed this is the method taken in the successful counterinsurgency in the Philippines in the 1950s. In Afghanistan, it is becoming increasingly clear that we have failed to degrade both the sanctuaries in Pakistan and their support networks in Afghanistan. A classic illustration of this latter failure was the Sarpoza Prison break in April.
6. Al Qaeda is Finished: Pletka is correct: Al Qaeda is not finished by the death of Osama bin Laden, but it is not clear that they have a burning desire to return to Afghanistan either. Indeed, they haven’t left their safe havens in Pakistan for Afghanistan, even as the insurgency has gained momentum. This may be explained by historic tensions between the two groups that Felix Kuehn and others have pointed out.
7. Negotiations the Only Road to Victory: Negotiations may or may not be the only road to victory, but an enforceable agreement is undoubtedly the least costly path to victory. Henry Kissinger’s recent op-ed for the Washington Post was absolutely correct on this point: “…a new definition of American leadership and America’s national interest is inescapable. A sustainable regional settlement in Afghanistan would be a worthy start.” In Afghanistan, the U.S. does not have clear path to military victory, as even Pletka lets slip: “talking without holding the upper hand militarily is a recipe for disaster.”
Significant hurdles remain to achieving a settlement, including a lack of trust and an inability on the Taliban’s part to enforce an agreement, but the gains from a potential breakthrough with the Taliban far outweigh costs associated with negotiation.
8. The economy stupid: Pletka echoes Michael O’Hanlon, saying that the savings ($100 billion plus?) doesn’t amount to much. It’s true that ending the Afghan War is not going to solve the fiscal crisis, but it could net some significant savings and help ease the necessity for more draconian cuts elsewhere. But the bottom line about costs remains the same. Is Afghanistan worth spending our limited resources on? Most Americans would correctly say no.
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The Mendacity of Hope: Why We Need to Leave Afghanistan
Published: June 9th, 2011
Will Keola Thomas – Afghanistan Study Group
From “Col. YYY,” described by former Air Force officer and Dept. of Defense military analyst Chuck Spinney as, “an active duty colonel who travels all over Afghanistan…This colonel, unlike many of his peers, actually goes on foot patrols with troops to see things for himself.” The anonymous colonel’s letter is a must read:
“The mendacity is getting so egregious that I am fast losing the ability to remain quiet; these yarns of ‘significant progress’ are being covered up by the blood and limbs of hundreds – HUNDREDS – of American uniformed service members each and every month, and you know the rest of this summer is going to see the peak of that bloodshed.
…
It’s sheer madness…”
Simon Klingert, a German freelance journalist in Afghanistan, responds to Col. YYY’s letter via twitter:
“I can confirm this. 2 months in Kandahar, Helmand, almost no one I talked to below the rank of LTC (Lieutenant Colonel) thinks we’re winning”
“#Afghanistan spin Rule 1: ‘Progress’ is ALWAYS to be referred to as ‘fragile and reversible’. Rule applies to ISAF, policymakers and media.
“#Afghanistan spin Rule 2: Refer to anticipated and/or imaginative progress as being ‘around the corner’. The corner is always 6 months ahead
“#Afghanistan spin Rule 3: To prove doubters wrong, tell about planned clearing operation that will deliver ‘decisive blow’ to enemy.”
Outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates plays according to the aforementioned rules. In a speech to coalition officers on his farewell tour of Afghanistan he almost managed to squeeze them all into a single sentence:
“I leave Afghanistan today with the belief that if we keep this momentum up, we will deliver a decisive blow to the enemy and turn the corner on this conflict.”
Lots of momentum, decisive blows, and corner-turning. But neither Secretary Gates, nor General Petraeus, would tell ABC’s Diane Sawyer that the U.S. is winning in Afghanistan:
“We’re really loathed to use this very loaded term of winning or losing.”
And CIA Director Leon Panetta hasn’t been confirmed as the next Secretary of Defense, but on Thursday he showed the Senate’s Armed Service Committee that he’s as well-versed in the rules as Gates:
“Important gains have been made over the past 18 months, establishing security and Afghan government authority in former Taliban strongholds such as Helmand and Kandahar, as well as building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Although the gains are fragile and reversible, momentum has shifted to the Afghan government, and they are on track to begin the transition process by assuming lead security responsibilities in several areas of the country this summer.”
Panetta felt confident in declaring all those successes, but he wasn’t about to go out on a limb and say when, and in what numbers, our troops will be able to leave Afghanistan. That will be determined by “conditions on the ground.”
And, of course, hope:
“…I think if we stick with it, if we continue to provide help and assistance to them then I think there is going to be a point where Afghanistan can control its own future. We have to operate on that hope.”
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Measuring Quicksand
Published: June 9th, 2011
Matthew Hoh – Director of the Afghanistan Study Group
In the Autumn of 2006, in the western part of Iraq’s Anbar Province, US Marine and Army units were taking dozens of attacks a day. Leaving one of the many bases we occupied in the Euphrates River Valley seemingly guaranteed a firefight, attack by a sniper or, more likely, a strike from an IED. Cooperation and coordination with local Anbaris, was, to put euphemistically, difficult. When we came on the streets, the people left the streets. Tom Ricks’ prize winning account of our war in Iraq, Fiasco, could not have had a better title to account for what we were enduring.
However, visible and evident change in the conflict occurred because of the Anbar Awakening and the transformation of “Anti-Iraqi Forces” into “Sons of Iraq”. Those Iraqis that had formed the core of the insurgency in Anbar changed sides. The Anbaris that had been putting bombs in the sides of roads and providing safe shelter for snipers turned on the bomb makers and shooters. Politically, the tribal leaders of Anbar abandoned their previous hospitality towards al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, and reversed their previous rejection of cooperation with the Shia dominated government in Baghdad. For those present, what was most important was that attacks against us, against US Marine and Army units that were operating in the hell that was Anbar Province, were, by early Spring 2007, down to merely a handful. The presence of this change was meaningful and concrete. It was not limited to just certain locations, its rapidity was spooky and the very dramatic drop in our casualties was real proof of its existence.
The change in the Iraq War that began in Anbar in late 2006 was sincere and lasting. In April 2007, one of my replacements lamented his deployment into “a boring area”, while by September, General David Petraeus, backed by clearly understandable data and evidence, was testifying to Congress that progress in Iraq, again, best underscored by a very real drop in violence and casualties, was well underway.
Now, similar claims of progress in Afghanistan are being pronounced and accepted despite an absence of evidence to demonstrate such progress. Statements from officials, military or civilian, are swallowed without question and even stalwart critics of the war in Afghanistan caveat their assessments and recommendations with assertions of military progress.
But progress, militarily and on a strategic level, is just not there.
If General Petraeus were to testify today and to use the same forms of data he used in 2007 it would show this past May to have been the deadliest May ever for US and NATO troops; with April and March achieving the same dubious titles. He would note wounded totals on pace for 600 a month, while IED attacks occur over 50 times a day. The General would show that from January-March 2010, the insurgency launched roughly 1800 attacks in Afghanistan, while from January-Mach 2011 they were able to launch nearly 2700. General Petraeus would highlight that attrition in the Afghan Security Forces is so bad that we must recruit three Afghans to fill each space and would acknowledge that currently eight in ten Afghan men believe our operations are bad for their country. All this following 2010, which was the deadliest year of the war for all sides.
Against this, and nearly all other data and evidence, it is clear that the insurgency’s momentum and tempo of operations has not been adversely affected by our surge in Afghanistan. Against a great input of American troops and money over the last two years, and by any measurable standard, the insurgency has only gained in its effectiveness and strength, which translates into an increased reluctance to negotiate.
In 2009, the United States had the opportunity to disengage itself from an internal Afghan conflict and to transition its role from one of belligerent to one of mediator. Rather than de-escalate the conflict in an attempt to stabilize Afghanistan and the broader region, we chose to escalate the conflict. We now must accept we have gone from being waist deep to chest deep in someone else’s quicksand.
We expect our service members in Afghanistan to do the hard, brutal and savage fighting our policies ask of them without question. They do. Their expectation of those of us in Washington, those of us in air conditioned offices, wearing ties and high heels, who wake each day safe with our families, is that we ask hard questions, examine the reality of the conflict and not accept assertions of success without fact. As we reach an opportunity in July to transition our role in Afghanistan, we must recognize our current policies have proven counter-productive and shift to a policy of de-escalation and negotiation.
Similar to Henry Kissinger’s recommendation yesterday, the Afghanistan Study Group recommends ceasefires, large troop reductions (30,000 this year, 40,000 in 2012), reformation of the Afghan government, and political negotiations within Afghanistan and amongst its neighbors to stabilize Afghanistan and the region, and to begin to get the United States out of Afghanistan’s quicksand.
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You can help by calling your Senators’ offices and tell them to sign onto the bi-partisan Merkley-Lee-Udall letter urging President Obama to begin significant and substantial troop reductions from Afghanistan next month. Click here to locate your representative www.contactingthecongress.org
This article was originally posted on Huffington Post on 6-9-11
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Secretary Gates talks tough on Afghanistan, but so do the Taliban. Is this just rhetoric?
Published: June 9th, 2011
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
Robert Gates is delivering some of his final speeches as Secretary of Defense, and many commentators have written excellent assessments of his tenure at the Pentagon. Perhaps Gates’ most important legacy will be the ongoing war in Afghanistan, so it has been especially interesting to hear Gates talk about the war to U.S. troops in Kabul this week.
His talks could not be more timely: The conditions are set for a major re-evaluation of the war effort following Gates retirement and Petraeus’ new assignment to the CIA. Early indications suggest that the President is deeply concerned about the cost of the war and is contemplating a speedier withdrawal—meanwhile support has softened considerably in Congress. But perhaps the biggest game-changer is not occurring in Washington—I refer of course to the prospects for reconciliation between the insurgency and international forces.
This week Gates had a chance to set the record straight on Afghanistan, but on the surface his talk disappointed on this front. He continued to follow the administrations canard of hyping ISAF’s momentum by pointing to the usual cherry picked data points and concluding that the U.S. is ready to deliver the “decisive blow” against insurgents. Meanwhile news from Afghanistan shows considerably less reason for optimism. Jawad Zahhak, the Provincial Chief of Bamiyan Province (once home to the Bamiyan Buddhas and regarded as one of the more stable regions) was assassinated by local insurgents. As the Afghan blogger Ali Karimi points out, Zahhak’s death draws out the ethnic aspect of the conflict. Zahhak was a known as a vocal defender of the Hazara minority.
If there is a ray of optimism to support the Secretary’s rosy outlook, it may be coming from a very different location. Last Friday, the Embassy of India hosted a fundraiser for the Nooristan Foundation, an NGO that has done excellent work in some of the most insecure regions of the country. They have even opened a school in Taliban controlled Nuristan, which reportedly educates 70 boys and girls. So, as is typical for Afghanistan, the picture of the insurgency is incredibly complex—are they going to push for ethnic cleansing as the news from Bamiyan suggests? Or can they be pressured to respect the gains in human rights as the Nooristan Foundation school would indicate?
But back to Gates: The Secretary of Defense paints a picture of an insurgency on its deathbed, but tellingly says that within a year the Taliban will be negotiating a peace deal. This optimistic forecast is based on the assumption that the Taliban will not negotiate as long they are “winning”. (By this logic and the deathbed Taliban scenario we keep hearing from DoD, one wonders why the U.S. is seeking a deal with the insurgency!). Meanwhile the Taliban themselves have issued a press release calling reports of a potential deal completely fabricated. The Taliban’s argument mirrors Gates’ in many ways. “Why negotiate while we are winning?”
Putting an optimistic spin on this week’s events, perhaps both Gates and the Taliban are playing up their strengths ahead of potential talks. A positive sign is the decision by the Afghan government, undoubtedly with U.S. input, to lobby the U.N. to de-blacklist key members of the Taliban. My half-hearted defense of Gates is this: in order to maximize the likelihood of a successful negotiation, he has to “talk up” the war effort. He is in effect a used-car salesman selling a piece of junk: Will anyone notice that the brakes are gone?
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What a Load of Crocker! Senate Hears Nominee for Ambassador of Kabul
Published: June 9th, 2011
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
Ryan Crocker, nominee to be the next ambassador of Afghanistan, testified on Wednesday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as part of his confirmation process.
An exchange between Senator Webb (D, VA) and Crocker was emblematic of the event, with Webb questioning both the cost of the war and our strategic priorities. Quoting a Peggy Noonan op-ed, the Senator suggested that we need plenty of nation-building right here in the United States:
“Spending billions of dollars on infrastructure in another country. It should only be done if we can articulate a vital national interest…To be quite frank we need a lot of that here.”
He ended with the question, seemingly taken right out of the Afghanistan Study Group Report.
“Can you articulate for us your view of the strategic interests and how the current military strategy can get us to an endpoint in this strategy?”
Crocker, well versed in the President’s strategy, correctly recited the rationale for war, “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and ensure that Afghanistan can never be a safe-haven for terrorist. But then something interesting happened. Instead of simply nodding and moving on to other issues, the Senators began to question these strategic goals.
Webb, a Vietnam War veteran, likened our presence in Afghanistan to a game a “whack-a-mole”, pointing out that the insurgency is mobile and has proven adept at both moving across international lines and bringing the fight to soft targets inside of Afghanistan. Along similar lines, Senator Kerry asked whether it made sense to focus on Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorists, when the real terrorist safe-haven is in Pakistan. Even Senator Risch (R, ID) got in on the action:
“This is a messy situation that isn’t getting any better… to articulate what our objectives are and what our goals are and how this is going to end with us achieving those, is very very difficult to grasp…I am very skeptical about how we’re going to handle this.”
The Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee are asking the right questions. It’s time for the administration to come up with some answers.
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Pew Poll Deflates the Post’s Overblown Headline
Published: June 8th, 2011
Will Keola Thomas – Afghanistan Study Group
Just one day after The Washington Post tripped over its own poll numbers and fell face-first into some sloppy conclusions (see the article: “Support for Afghan war rises, poll shows”), the Pew Research Center released polling data that seemed to rub the Post’s nose in the mess it had made.
The Post’s headline ignores the fact that a majority of Americans continue to believe that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. It also buries the real story told by its poll: 73% of Americans think the U.S. should withdraw combat forces from Afghanistan this summer.
The Pew Research Center’s poll adds an additional storyline:
“Far more Americans say that the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has contributed a great deal to the nation’s debt than say that about increased domestic spending or the tax cuts enacted over the past decade.
Six-in-ten (60%) say the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has contributed a great deal to the size of the debt.”
The survey also asked respondents about their support for reducing overseas military commitments as a deficit cutting measure. 67% of all respondents (including 56% of Republicans and 71% of Independents) would support the proposal.
The Washington Post claims that its poll figures provide President Obama with “more political breathing room.” The Pew poll shows that public support for the decade-long war in Afghanistan has run out of air.
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The Washington Post Is Confused (The American Public Is Not)
Published: June 8th, 2011
Will Keola Thomas – Afghanistan Study Group
From an article in Monday’s Washington Post titled “Support for Afghan war rises, poll shows”:
“The number of Americans who say the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting has increased for the first time since President Obama announced at the end of 2009 that he would boost troop levels, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll.
The finding may give Obama slightly more political breathing room as he decides how many troops to withdraw from Afghanistan in July, the deadline he set 18 months ago to begin bringing home the additional U.S. forces.”
What happened?
Did President Karzai make a binding pledge to end the culture of impunity among Afghanistan’s elite and root out corruption in his government (and family) once and for all? Did Pakistan decide that it wasn’t really in their interest to provide militant extremists with a safe haven in its backyard? Are we winning?
Why would Americans, whose support for the fight in Afghanistan has declined precipitously over the last few years in response to the war’s skyrocketing cost in dollars and lives, all-of-a-sudden decide that the enormous price tag is worth it?
Oh, wait. They didn’t.
“22. All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, or not?
Worth fighting: 43%
Not worth fighting: 54%”
Apparently the editors at the Washington Post scrapped the more appropriate title for an article summarizing the poll, “Majority of Americans Think the War in Afghanistan Isn’t Worth The Cost,” because, well, it’s old news.
And since the poll was taken post-Osama, it makes some sense that a portion of the public would think that the war has (past-tense) been worth it. 9/11 has been avenged, it took us ten years but we got our man, etc…
But in their attempt to squeeze an eye-catching headline out of a poll that confirms what has been clear for a long time, the Post’s editors missed the real story: an overwhelming majority of Americans want a substantial number of troops brought home this summer.
“Do you think the United States should or should not withdraw a substantial number of U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan this summer?
Should: 73%
Should not: 23%”
There shouldn’t be anything confusing about those numbers. They haven’t changed since the last ABC/WaPo poll was taken in March.
Alas, the Washington Post’s editors aren’t the only ones who are confused about the will of the American public. Senator John McCain, former presidential candidate, has called on Pres. Obama to withdraw no more than 3,000 troops in July. He told the Financial Times, “I would hope that it is very small,” in response to a question on the proposed drawdown.
With 73% of Americans demanding a substantial drawdown in July, the number of presidential hopefuls who follow McCain’s advice should be very, very small.
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Afghanistan Weekly Reader 6-3-11: 10,000 Troops Ain’t Enough
Published: June 3rd, 2011
The Washington rumor mill is dishing out estimates of troop numbers to be brought home as part of the promised July drawdown in Afghanistan. Those estimates have shrunk over the last two years, from Vice President Biden’s “a whole lot of people moving out” to “significant” to “not token” to “as few as a couple thousand troops.”
Now unnamed officials are forecasting a reversal of the trend in speculating that President Obama could announce a pullout of 10,000 troops over the next year. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, speaking for a majority of Americans, is not impressed. Plainly stating that “It’s time to leave Afganistan”, the Sentinel’s editorial board echoes the views of the public at large: the U.S. has achieved the goals set out after 9/11, securing America’s national interests in Afghanistan does not require the presence of over 100,000 troops, and the continuing cost in dollars and lives can no longer be justified.
Last week’s vote in Congress, and this week’s news from Afghanistan, support the Sentinel’s advocation: “Obama’s plan is to begin withdrawing some of the 100,000 troops from Afghanistan in July, with all combat forces due out by 2014…He should move faster.”
FROM THE ASG BLOG
5-31-11
Reconciliation: Then and Now
ASG Blog by Edward Kenney
About eight months ago, a spate of articles were published in major American newspapers suggesting that the U.S. and Afghan government had begun serious overtures to the Taliban. At the time, some optimists suggested that the U.S. was turning a corner in its Afghan strategy, particularly with the decision in that month to allow insurgents safe passage to negotiate with the Afghan government.6-3-11
Palin Goes Rogue on Afghanistan
ASG Blog by Will Keola Thomas
In Alaska, they say the only difference between Sarah Palin and a pitbull is lipstick. But on Tuesday, former Gov. Palin showed that unlike the famously obstinate pitbull, she knows when to let go.ARTICLES
5-30-11
Afghanistan War IEDs Cause Surge in Double Amputees Among U.S. War Wounded
Huffington Post by David Wood
Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against dismounted troops have skyrocketed, from five in April 2009 to 210 in April 2010 to 376 this past April, according to data gathered and analyzed by the Pentagon’s counter-IED agency, the Joint IED Defeat Organization.Cost of war in Afghanistan will be major factor in troop-reduction talks
The Washington Post with Foreign Policy by Rajiv Chandrasekaran
“Money is the new 800-pound gorilla,” said another senior administration official involved in Afghanistan policy, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity. “It shifts the debate from ‘Is the strategy working?’ to ‘Can we afford this?’ And when you view it that way, the scope of the mission that we have now is far, far less defensible.”5-31-11
Karzai orders NATO to stop airstrikes in Afghanistan
Washington Post by Joshua Partlow and Javed Hamdard
The demand was the most serious warning to the coalition that Karzai has issued to date. The immediate provocation was a coalition airstrike on Saturday in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand province that killed nine civilians, including children. But Karzai’s statement also was the culmination of years of complaints about civilian casualties and aggressive NATO military operations.
Garamendi visits Afghanistan
Mercury News.com by Lisa Vorderbrueggen
Garamendi described the Shindand operation as similar to a development initiative run by the Peace Corps, an organization he and his wife, Patty, have served in and promoted for decades. “We spent 18 hours with special operations, and I was surprised to learn that not only are they trained in the art of war, but they are also trained in community development “…6-1-11
US Trolling for Taliban to Open Talks
New York Times by the Associated Press
After 10 years of bloody battle in Afghanistan, the United States is trolling for Taliban officials to talk peace with before the July drawdown of American troops. But as Washington seeks negotiating partners, it has little knowledge of who among the Taliban has the clout to make talks worthwhile.Bagram prison, bigger than Guantanamo, its prisoners in limbo, cries out for some news coverage
Nieman Watchdog by John Hanrahan
Under a U.S. military system straight out of Kafka’s “The Trial” and Heller’s “Catch-22”, some 1,700 detainees at the Bagram U.S. Air Base in Afghanistan are being held without charges or a trial, primarily on the basis of secret evidence that they never get to see or challenge.For Many Republicans, Afghanistan Is A Budget Issue
US News and World Report by Jessica Rettig
After a decade, nearly 1,500 American soldiers have been killed and more than 11,500 have been wounded in action in Afghanistan. While these casualties have surely had an effect on U.S. policy, increasingly in Congress the focus on Afghanistan is as much about treasure as about blood.6-2-11
Boehner says Obama Needs to “Step Up” and Explain Missions in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq
abcnews by John R. Parkinson
Boehner said that having recently visited Afghanistan he has “a pretty good feel” for the national security interests there, but called on the president to clearly define the missions in all three current theatres of war. “The president has a role to play here,” Boehner, R-Ohio, said. “I really do believe that the president needs to speak out, in terms of our mission in Afghanistan, our mission in Iraq, our mission in Libya, and the doubts that our members have frankly reflected they’re reflecting what they’re hearing from their constituents.”OPINION
5-30-11
Time to Begin Leaving Afghanistan
informed COMMENT by Juan Cole
It in any case is likely to be a limited engagement. The place where there are over 100,000 US troops doing war-fighting on a large scale and over many years is Afghanistan, which for some reason gets less press and less public interest than Libya.6-1-11
Years of Stagnation
Registan by Joshua Foust
Beyond that, what Anderson’s piece, which is absolutely worth reading along with everything else he’s ever written, shows is how strategically adrift the war in Afghanistan truly is—and almost as worryingly, how shallow and mistaken our understanding of the basic issues driving the war really are. -
Palin Goes Rogue on Afghanistan
Published: June 3rd, 2011
Will Keola Thomas – Afghanistan Study Group
In Alaska, they say the only difference between Sarah Palin and a pitbull is lipstick. But on Tuesday, former Gov. Palin showed that unlike the famously obstinate pitbull, she knows when to let go.
In response to Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s comments threatening unspecified “unilateral action” if coalition airstrikes on civilian homes were not halted, Palin posted a statement on Facebook questioning the United States’ continued commitment to the regime in Kabul.
“If President Karzai continues with these public ultimatums, we must consider our options about the immediate future of U.S. troops in his country. If he actually follows through on his claim that Afghan forces will take “unilateral action” against NATO forces who conduct such air raids to take out terrorists and terrorist positions, that should result in the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the suspension of U.S. aid. I still firmly support our mission in Afghanistan, but we must have the support of the host government. Our troops’ mission will be compromised and their safety endangered if the Afghan government threatens us.”
This is new territory for Palin and, as ASG co-founder Steve Clemons notes, it may be another sign that Palin is breaking with stay-the-course stalwarts like her former running-mate Sen. John McCain and “trust me we’re winning” neocons like Bill Kristol.
Kristol took a swipe at Palin in this regard during an interview with Politico’s Ben Smith:
“The surge in Iraq works. The surge in Afghanistan works…And now, everyone (even Palin, to some degree) decides, hey, time to back off? It’s foolish substantively and politically.”
Actually, it’s substantively “foolish” (putting it lightly) to throw billions of dollars and thousands of lives after a failed strategy and expect victory to follow.
And politically, Gov. Palin can take comfort in the knowledge that the conservative base is with her in questioning the logic of an open-ended commitment to a corrupt regime in Kabul.
The poll numbers support this conclusion. But Palin could also look to the 682 comments submitted in response to her Facebook post. If anything, Palin’s supporters are way ahead of her in demanding an end to the war.
From the comments:
Chris Cremeans My son is there. He is increasingly frustrated because his hands are basically tied. Let them do their jobs or BRING THEM HOME. Proud Army Mom.
Ashley Raber Dalland Its hard to read things like this cause my husband just deployed to Afghan, I would be more than happy if they pulled our troops out let them fight their own war if they dont appreciate our help. Sarah you are amazing!!
Jim Hinkle 1507 American Troops dead, $419Billion in American resources spent to date. Nine years in, we still don’t have and exit strategy, and this puppet is trying to tell us how to conduct the war. WHY ARE WE THERE? Time to plan our withdrawal.
Pat Hall I used to support our mission in Afghanistan – even when my grandson was there – but I no longer support it. We’re not getting anywhere. We’ve been there too long and have lost too many young men. Every time I hear of another one of our troops being blown up it breaks my heart. Enough is enough. And now – we’re being threatened by the Afghani govt????? We need to get out NOW.
Dave White We can support out troops without putting them in unwinnable situations, It’s time to bring the boys home, glad to see Sarah beginning to make that case..
Todd Arnold I’m moving to Afghanistan to get some US federal aid…sure as hell not getting it here!!!!!
Shayna Lee I think it is time to bring our troops home. It was time to bring our troops home two years ago, instead of escalating. I don’t know what we are doing in Afghanistan or hoping to accomplish.
Amy Weaver Jopson Sarah, I don’t know how or why you support the “effort” in Afghanistan. My husband is there & the majority of the troops realize everything they are doing is in vain! Our troops are dying in vain! We need to get out NOW!
Charles Zachary Belcher I have a son fighting with the Marines in Afghanistan. If we do not know why my son is risking his life, then bring him home early. Please do not risk my son for a government that does not want NATO there fighting for freedom and liberty.
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Center for a New American Security: New Paper—Same Old Ideas
Published: June 2nd, 2011
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
Thinking long-term about South Asian security issues often requires choosing between conventional/uninspiring and unrealistic/contradictory policy recommendations. Amazingly, the Center for a New American Security has a new paper entitled “Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Strategy for South and Central Asia” that manages to be both uninspiring/conventional and unrealistic/contradictory at the same time.
The CNAS report spent the first twenty-five pages pointing out the obvious: In the future, the U.S. goals of combating terrorism and promoting stability will increasingly face fiscal and geopolitical constraints. True but also readily apparent to anyone with the slightest knowledge of foreign policy.
But the real problems are in CNAS’s “recommendations”. First, they suggest that the U.S. needs to work out a strategic agreement with the Afghanistan government. Why not? The Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq allowed us to disengage from that quagmire relatively successfully. But CNAS wants the U.S. to agree to an open-ended commitment, very different from the one Maliki negotiated in 2008.
“Such an agreement must contain the broad outlines of continued U.S. defense, diplomatic and development commitments to Afghanistan…” There’s no mention of our limited interests in Afghanistan, or even an understanding that Afghanistan will have to govern itself someday.
Furthermore, they base this recommendation on the assumption that “the U.S. has sent mixed messages about its long term commitment to the region”. As Kandahar based researcher Felix Kuehn pointed out two weeks ago, if you asked almost any local in Afghanistan, the worry is not that we are about to cut and run, but rather that that we won’t leave when we say we will. In other words CNAS has it completely backwards[i].
CNAS then offers a series of contradictory and generally ill-thought out recommendations regarding Pakistan. They suggest that the U.S. can pressure Pakistan into acting on U.S.’s interest by conditioning U.S. aid.
“Continued covert Pakistani support for terrorist groups of any dispensation should be a U.S. “red line”, triggering suspension of military and intelligence funding.”
The notion that the U.S. can pressure Pakistan to do our bidding with the threat of reduced military aid is utterly preposterous. Did CNAS sleep through the 1990s? To refresh the memory, U.S. canceled most military and economic aid under the Pressler amendment starting in 1990 in order to dissuade Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Not only did these sanctions fail at slowing Islamabad’s nuclear program—Pakistan detonated a nuclear weapon in 1998—this “sanction period” was marked by increased support for insurgent radicals, a war with India in the Kargil region of the Kashmir, the continued development of AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network, and of course the rise of the Taliban with ISI’s support in Afghanistan. (See Dennis Kux for a good synopsis of this history). Put simply, CNAS’s belief in the efficacy of economic coercion is at odds with our sixty-year history with Islamabad.
The covert aspect of Pakistani support for Islamic radicals makes a reduction of military assistance even more difficult. Pakistan strives to maintain plausible deniability in its dealings with the Islamic radicals, and as the authors of the CNAS report like to point out, Pakistan is not a unitary actor, so reducing aid may serve to further isolate moderate members of the military whose interests are more aligned to our own. All of these facts suggest that coercing Pakistan on the Islamic militancy front will be more difficult than our failed efforts in the 90s regarding Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions.
Lastly, note that Pakistan has another major power backer in China, who could potentially step in if the U.S. actually followed through with our threat to cut back aid. As Afghanistan Study Group member Anatol Lieven argued in a New York Times op-ed last week any long run solution to the power politics in South Asia has to include the Chinese. CNAS barely mentions China in its recommendations, a glaring omission if the idea is to threaten to isolate the Pakistani military.
In short this report is deeply problematic, and this post only scratches the surface: For instance they recommend focusing on public diplomacy, which suggests that anti-Americanism in Pakistan is mainly a “messaging problem”, a dubious assertion if you ask me. The challenges facing South and Central Asia are incredibly complex and CNAS deserves some credit for putting their ideas out there; however, in this case they should probably go back to the drawing board.
[i] The only reason to maintain a residual force long-term in Afghanistan is to bolster the bargaining position of the Karzai government in the event that there is some sort of negotiation to end the war.
