ASG Blog
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Tracing the Afghanistan and Iraq drawdown debate; Politicians and Public Divided
Published: September 22nd, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
In the heated debates surrounding the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s sometimes difficult to keep track of who stands where. The past week was no exception.
Rick Perry kicked off an inter-party dispute during the GOP debate, when he seemed to side with Jon Huntsman in calling for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. ”I think the entire conversation about how do we deliver our aid to those countries, and is it best spent with 100,000 military who have the target on their back in Afghanistan. I don’t think so at this particular point in time,” Perry said. “I think the best way for us to be able to impact that country is to make a transition to where that country’s military is going to be taking care of their people, bring our young men and women home.”
Perry later clarified his position (“a precipitous withdrawal is not what he’s recommending”) but Huntsman has stuck to his guns. “We need to send a clear message to the world that we understand the asymmetrical threat we face and will respond with counter terror forces, intelligence gathering, and a limited number of troops to train Afghan forces,” his foreign policy advisor said. “This does not require 100,000 boots on the ground in Afghanistan. We need to bring those troops home.”
Huntsman’s (and Perry’s) views don’t sit well with other Republicans. Senator Lindsay Graham, a consistent and vocal supporter of maintaining a strong presence in both countries, confessed to being “disappointed” with calls for a drawdown.
Former Vice President Dick Cheney feels the same. In a CNN interview, Cheney argued that “both Afghanistan and Iraq are extraordinarily important,” and warned against a leaving too soon: “And I think that would be tragic if in fact it led to a resumption of the kinds of problems that both those nations faced when we went in.”
Given Graham’s consistent support for the wars, and Cheney’s involvement in the them, their position on the drawdown is hardly surprising. But it’s also out of step with what the American public wants.
A quick glance at the comments on the Cheney article shows how the argument for staying in Afghanistan completely misses the mark for most readers. “‘both Afghanistan and Iraq are extraordinarily important’ Why??” One asked. “”When you recognize you are in a quagmire with no end, it is time to make an end,” another said.
This is far from a public opinion poll, but it certainly tallies with recent polls. 58% of respondents in a Quinnipiac University Poll agreed that the US should not be involved in Afghanistan right now. In this poll from Pew, 56% said that US troops should be brought home as soon as possible. And 59% said that the US has accomplished its mission and should bring its troops home, according to this Gallup poll.
Perry’s first statement was probably more in line with what the majority of Americans wants. Maybe he should have stuck with that it.
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Afghanistan Study Group Weekly Reader: The Wars America Doesn’t Talk About, Confusion on the Drawdown
Published: September 21st, 2011
Following the attacks on the US embassy in Kabul last week, the death of Burhanuddin Rabbani, president of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, in a suicide bombing this morning was a grim reminder of how far we are from peace and stability in Afghanistan. Yet the wars figured only briefly in the political arena this week, with everyone from the President to the GOP presidential candidates focusing mainly on domestic issues. A brief mention of Afghanistan from Rick Perry sparked a confused debate that shows how little consensus there is when it comes to the drawdown. In addition to the political rhetoric, the past week saw two indicators of reluctance to wrap up the wars: an open letter calling for an extension of the US presence in Iraq, and the Senate appropriations bill, which fully funds the war costs request.
FROM ASG
9-19-11
Time to Cut the Cord: It’s Time Afghanistan National Security Forces Were in Charge of Afghan Security
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
The jury’s still out on whether the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are completely ready to take on responsibility for enforcing security in Afghanistan. Regardless of the exact extent of their capabilities, however, it’s time to stop relying on US troops and let the local forces take on the role they were trained for.
9-14-11
Notes From Afghanistan Part IV: Politics is Broken in Afghanistan
Afghanistan Study Group by Edward Kenney
Hamed, an Afghan journalist and good friend put it to me bluntly over dinner: “the government has lost the confidence of the Afghan people.” Time and again Afghans, NGOs, and researchers have echoed Hamed’s sentiment. What went wrong with the Afghan State and how can the U.S. rectify the situations? The answer to these questions depends on where you sit.9-21-11
Notes From Afghanistan Part V: Understanding the Taliban. Are Our Assumptions Wrong?
Afghanistan Study Group by Edward Kenney
If there is one thing this month in Afghanistan has taught me, it is that our common assumptions about the Afghan conflict are likely to be fundamentally wrong. One assumption that is frequently made is that the war is basically political. Empirical support for this argument comes mainly from work done examining the roots of the uprising.ARTICLES
9-13-11
First steps in cutting US spending on Afghan war
CBS NEWS
Congress took a first step toward scaling back U.S. spending plans for the Afghan war, reflecting a mounting political pressure to reduce budget deficits and a recalculation of what it will take to stabilize Afghanistan as U.S. and allied forces begin to withdraw forces.
Although an intense and costly program to build up Afghanistan’s army and police is a cornerstone of the NATO and U.S. strategy for winding down the war, renewed effort is under way to find further savings without undermining recent progress in training and equipping the Afghan forces.8-16-11
Young Afghan fighters eager to rejoin Taliban
Washington Post by Kevin Sieff
As the Taliban presses its efforts to recruit teenage fighters, Afghan officials and their international backers have crafted a program to reintegrate the country’s youngest insurgents into mainstream society. But that ambition is coming up against the intransigence of the teens, who say they would rather be on the battlefield.9-15-11
Rick Perry clarifies no speedy withdrawal from Afghanistan
The Cable by Josh Rogin
Republican presidential candidate Rick Perry kicked up a firestorm inside the GOP when he seemed to endorse Jon Huntsman’s call for a speedy withdrawal from Afghanistan during this week’s debate, but his real views on Afghanistan don’t match those of Huntsman, the GOP hawks, or President Barack Obama.9-19-11
Afghanistan: NATO’s night raids cause more harm than good, report says
Christian Science Monitor by Tom A. Peter
Over the past year, US and NATO forces say they have made considerable progress against the Afghan insurgency through the use of night raids. But a new study suggests that the long-controversial nighttime operations are doing more harm than good. -
Notes From Afghanistan Part V: Understanding the Taliban. Are Our Assumptions Wrong?
Published: September 21st, 2011
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerIf there is one thing this month in Afghanistan has taught me, it is that our common assumptions about the Afghan conflict are likely to be fundamentally wrong. One assumption that is frequently made is that the war is basically political. Empirical support for this argument comes mainly from work done examining the roots of the uprising. For instance Anand Gopal’s excellent report examining Kandahar in the early 2000s suggested that the Taliban were willing to recognize the Afghan government at that time, and only resumed hostilities after being harshly repressed by the local government.
Viewing the conflict as political has immense policy implications because it implies that a political process based on power sharing could potentially succeed. Or to paraphrase that old Prussian Clausewitz: If conflict is an extension of politics, then politics can potentially resolve conflict.
Viewing the war as political also implies that the insurgency has clear political objectives. What are the objectives of the Taliban? First and foremost, they demand that the U.S. removes the troops based in Afghanistan. Unfortunately this seems less like a “political” objective and more a short-term aim to strengthen their military and strategic position. I specifically asked a reporter contact from Wardak, whether the Taliban’s core demands would be met once the U.S. withdraws. He was highly skeptical.
The Taliban’s broader goal of re-establishing an Islamic Emirate is incompatible with the Afghan state. A return to Taliban governance is understood by many Afghans to mean the destruction of the state. The government has justifiably shown little appetite for deal-making, a point highlighted by the recent revelations in AP detailing how the Afghan government scuttled the U.S.-Talib Berlin negotiations.
Unfortunately, the forces driving this conflict run deeper than politics. If there is one startlingly obvious feature of Taliban tactics, it is that their missions are increasingly suicidal. The attacks on the British council and inter-continental in Kabul show a trend of increasing suicide attacks. These do not suggest a movement that has any intention of compromise. An individual doesn’t agree to blow himself up over a dispute that can be resolved by “talking about it”.
The Taliban have a triple strategy to achieve their objective.
1. Intimidation through night letters, assassination attacks, and bombings. Increasingly this intimidation includes allies of Karzai (see the Charikar attacks) as well as foreign aid workers whose projects are tied to the government.
2. Outreach through culturally conservative vision of Islam that appeals to young socially constrained Afghans across diverse sectors of society.
3. Exploitation of tribal rivalries.
Propaganda/Messaging
Propaganda is a fascinating, and I believe under-researched topic in Afghanistan. Local Afghans point out, correctly I think, that in terms of actual numbers, the Taliban remain a relatively small force. True, I argue, but the most salient feature of the Taliban’s strength is not there total numbers of support, but their seemingly infinite ability to recruit. Understanding this phenomenon is of paramount importance to defeating the insurgency.
Even in Kabul, propaganda and messaging seems to play an important role in shaping beliefs. Two features you often hear are that the government is somehow un-Islamic (this sounds to me like Talib propaganda), and that the Taliban are a bunch of Pakistanis (government propaganda maybe?) At the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, the an editor felt so strongly about this Pakistani connection that he interrupted my interview. An Afghan aid worker was equally emphatic on this point; as evidence, she pointed to the captured “foreign Talibs” paraded on state television news channels. If that doesn’t convince you that this is government propaganda, I don’t know what will.
To be fair, elements within Pakistan have played (and continue to play) a role in supporting the insurgency and they heavily influence the insurgency—particularly the Haqqanis. For instance, much of the radicalization of Afghans reportedly occurs in Pakistani madrasahs. It should be re-emphasized, however, that the insurgency remains overwhelmingly local.
My engineer host (mentioned last post) put it most accurately when he said, emotion in his voice: “I know my people have a lot to do with what happened, but the Pakistanis played a role too.”
Tribal Exploitation:
The relationship between the tribes and the insurgents also remains ambiguous. On the one hand, the insurgent movement is seen correctly as an attempt to usurp power from tribal structures. On the other hand Afghan tribes have been an insurgent’s best friends: Since the movement’s inception, the Taliban have continually exploited tribal rivalries.
It should be noted that the tribal governance as a root cause of the insurgency contradicts the common explanation that state or warlord abuses are the main drivers of the conflict. For instance, in Uruzgan longstanding blood feuds between the Popolzai (Karzai’s tribe) and Nurzai as well as inter-tribal rivalries seem to have played a larger role in the Taliban’s resurgence than the admittedly heavy-handed policies of former governor and warlord Jan Muhammad. Even Jan Mohammad’s replacement with a more conciliatory governor, the security situation has continued to deteriorate (see The Liaison Office Report on Uruzgan).
As for the central government, they continue to have a very limited presence in rural districts. For instance 80 to 90% of disputes in non-Talib areas are settled in the tribal judicial system; to the extent that Talib resurgence represents a rejection of predatory governance, its predatory governance at the tribal level.
That’s all for now. Next post I will conclude with the pros and cons of various policy options.
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Time to Cut the Cord: It’s Time Afghanistan National Security Forces Were in Charge of Afghan Security
Published: September 19th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerThe jury’s still out on whether the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are completely ready to take on responsibility for enforcing security in Afghanistan. Regardless of the exact extent of their capabilities, however, it’s time to stop relying on US troops and let the local forces take on the role they were trained for.
Fortunately, we have some good news recently on ANSF’s ability to do just that. They had a large role in ending the Taliban attacks on the US Embassy and NATO command center in Kabul, according to US Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker. “Since Kabul is in the hands of Afghan security it’s a real credit to the Afghan National Security Forces,” Crocker said. “They are the ones that took down the building and took down those attackers.”
Recruitment measures also indicate success in developing ANSF, according to the Department of Defense. The force has grown steadily, meeting its recruiting targets in 2010, and growing from 266,000 to the current level of 305,000, an increase of 15%, in less than one year. According to Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the commander of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, ANSF is on track to meet the new goal of 352,000 by the end of next year.
This is certainly encouraging, but it’s clear that the ANSF still has a long way to go. First and foremost there is the fundamental question of whether the ANSF can do what it’s supposed to: provide security. Beyond that, are accusations of brutality and abuse, documented in a recent report by the Human Rights Council. Finally, there’s the question of whether DOD’s facts and figures really mean what DOD says they mean. Critics argue that attrition rate is a better measure of success than recruitment rates, and by this measure, ANSF doesn’t do so well. According to DOD’s own estimates, which are likely low, the attrition rate for the Afghan National Army is 25%, and 20% for the Police.
The bottom line here is that there’s no clear-cut answer when it comes to evaluating ANSF. With so many unknowns, perhaps the best we can say is that their “performance..has been uneven.”
Acknowledging that whatever progress that has been made in developing a capable local security force is certainly fragile, we are left with two options. The first is to maintain or even increase our presence in Afghanistan, relying on US troops to make up for the unreliability of the Afghan forces. This way promises low risk to US goals, but very high costs, in terms of time as well as money.
The “we’ll leave when the job is done” policy is not without advocates, from commanders in the field to policymakers and opinion leaders. General John R. Allen, commander of coalition and U.S. forces in Afghanistan articulated this school of thought in an interview with CNN’s Suzanne Malveaux. Asked why we’re still in Afghanistan, ten years after 9/11, Gen. Allen replied,
“We’re here because Afghanistan must be left as a sovereign nation, a member of the international community, governed by a democratic government that ultimately dispenses human rights, dispenses the rule of law and is not a platform for foreign terrorism.”
It’s not hard to see where this is leading. If the nation Gen. Allen described is our vision for Afghanistan, then, as TIME’s Mark Benjamin put it, “Guess we’ll be there a while.”
The problem, of course, is that this path is simply not sustainable, even in the short term. That brings us to the other option, one we’ve recommended before: continue to invest in the Afghan National Security Forces, but bring US troops home.
This option is not only more sensible, it also the more fiscally responsible. ANSF costs are a small fraction of the costs to support US troops in the field. In FY 2011, Congress appropriated $157.8 billion for overseas contingency operations totaled. Of that, $11.6 billion, or 7.4%, went to training and equipping the ANSF.
Considering the crucial role ANSF plays in maintaining stability in Afghanistan, the relatively low cost of investing in ANSF, and current fiscal constraints, it might make sense to continue investing in ANSF while cutting other war costs.
Rather than cutting war costs and maintaining funds for ANSF, policymakers seem to be doing the opposite. The White House recently announced plans to significantly reduce its request for ANSF funds from $12.8 billion in FY 2012 to below $6 billion in FY 2014. Even more indicative of the inclination/preference/proclivity to lean on US troops rather than transition to the ANSF is the Senate appropriations bill for FY 2012, which cuts $1.6 billion, almost 13%, from the administration’s request, but fully funds the overseas contingency operations request at $ 117.8 billion.
ANSF may need a lot of things to become the capable security force that Afghanistan needs. What it does not need is 100,000 American troops doing the work it was trained to do.
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Notes From Afghanistan Part IV: Politics is Broken in Afghanistan
Published: September 14th, 2011
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerHamed, an Afghan journalist and good friend put it to me bluntly over dinner: “the government has lost the confidence of the Afghan people.” Time and again Afghans, NGOs, and researchers have echoed Hamed’s sentiment. What went wrong with the Afghan State and how can the U.S. rectify the situations? The answer to these questions depends on where you sit.
Two NGOs working in Kabul the principal problem is one of government capacity. The government, they say, simply does not have the ability to deliver the necessary services to its citizens. The ministries have yet to appropriate funding towards projects such as building schools, digging wells and other development projects and even if the Afghan government were to succeed in freeing up more money, it is unclear that they have the technical expertise to complete these projects. Exacerbating the problem is uncertainty over donor funding. A vicious cycle occurs when the finance ministry under-budgets because he is unsure of development funds. When donors, (read U.S. government) see that resources are unspent, funding is cut back creating more uncertainty for the ministry.
When government can’t attract the top talent, the results are poor, so in one sense, the disappointing results in governance are to be expected. One Afghan NGO worker said that he would make one-tenth what he earned if he were working for the government. This phenomenon filters down to two important state institutions, police and teachers. In an earlier post I called the police “reviled”. Perhaps a better term would be disrespected. The ANP are viewed by most Afghans as the dregs of society—people who have few other options but to serve in the police.
For Afghan teachers, the quality of talent is similarly low. Only students who score poorest on the university entrance exam become teachers. We discussed the teacher problem with Michael Blundell, who runs the Higher Education Project in Kabul. After confusing the Higher Education Project with a private school down the block labeled “institute for higher education”, we finally sat down with Blundell. Our confusion over the “institute for higher education” was representative of the problem in education. As Mr. Blundell pointed out, the proliferation of these unregulated institutes have further drained the regulated public schools of resources and trained teachers.
The capacity problem is real, but as an explanation for our currently security woes…something didn’t add up. For one thing, it’s not like the Taliban are rushing out to build schools and dig wells. Quite the contrary; the Taliban view economic development in government-controlled areas as a threat to their mission. If the government controlled areas look stable, peaceful, and developed the government looks good—and that’s bad for the Taliban. For this reason (among others) NGO’s are targeted by the insurgency. But if services weren’t the problem, then how was bad governance driving the insurgency? The answer to this question could only be answered by talking with Afghans who had lived through Afghanistan’s turbulent past.
Over the last week we have been staying with a pair of Afghan professionals and an Iranian exchange student, who graciously allowed us to set up a tent in their back yard. One night, one of our hosts, a civil engineering student at Kabul University described the American mentality towards Afghan history—a mentality which has blinded us to potential governance problems: When Americans talk about Afghanistan’s recent history, they know about the Communist period and Taliban period, but no one ever talks about the Mujaheddin period in between these two regimes from the fall of Najibullah in 1992 to 1996.
This five-year “mujahidin nights” period is viewed universally as the worst period in Afghan history. Factions in Kabul lobbed mortars from hills utterly destroying the city. In Kandahar armed warlords and militias ruled the countryside. Many of these warlords are back. Gul Agha Sherzai who was governor of Kandahar during “mujahidin nights” period is governor of Nangarhar, and there are strong rumors he is headed back to Kandahar. Tajik Muhammad Atta Noor and Uzbek Rashid Dostum, warlords from the Northern Afghanistan hold important positions within the government (governor of Balkh and chief of the army, respectively—as does Abdul Malek Palahwan the rival Uzbek warlord, who invited the Taliban into Mazar-e-Sharif (a revenge against Dostum who had killed Malek’s brother).
These warlords represent the tip of the iceberg. Almost all have private militias that could threaten the state. Karzai, when confronted by potential rivals has repeatedly backed down. As an example, some Afghans we talked to were shocked that Noor remained governor of Balkh province (a position appointed by Karzai) after he openly backed Karzai’s rival Dr Abdullah in the election. Whether he intended to or not, Karzai’s decision projected weakness.
Added into this warlord mix are U.S. backed armed local militias from the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. Unsurprisingly, there are already reports of huge ALP abuses. Even less surprising, it has proven utterly impossible to distinguish between the ALP (good militias!) and warlord (bad militias). The NGO community may be in a position to monitor these forces, but for obvious security reasons have chosen not to step in. As a result, there has been no accountability.
The Taliban have also profited from a rotten judiciary system, which the warlords have established. The very people whose job it is to uphold the law, continue to steal property and go unpunished. The one government service the Taliban have been able to establish in the countryside is law and order. According to Martine van Bijlert of the Afghan Analyst Network, the laws and rules established by the insurgency are brutal, but at least there is in order to what they do. In contrast, the government has presided over increasing anarchy—where the strong take what they can and the weak suffer what they must—a system of governance in other words, reminiscent of the Mujahidin period.
The Taliban have cemented this reformist message with clever propaganda, utilizing Afghans strong Islamic beliefs. The government, according to a reporter from Wardak, is viewed as un-Islamic due to their corruption, lifestyle of extravagant parties, not to mention their ties to American occupying forces. To the extent that the Taliban’s message has filtered down to the Afghan people and is now accepted by even non-Talibs, this is monumental failure of both the Afghan government and the U.S government.
What can be done about the problem of Afghan governance? This subject will be covered in a later post, but let me just conclude by saying that for all the effort put into building Afghan capacity to deliver services, the most important government function—the establishment of law and order remains lacking.
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The Afghanistan Weekly Reader: The Afghanistan War Ten Years after 9/11
Published: September 13th, 2011
The past week provided us with the opportunity to reflect on where we stand today, ten years after 9/11. Unfortunately, when it comes to the war in Afghanistan, this reflection is less than encouraging. Today’s report of an attack on the US embassy in Kabul is the just the latest in a series of reports on deteriorating security conditions, which indicate that we’ve made little progress. And the costs have been enormous: over ten years, more than a trillion dollars, and countless lives. Most disturbingly, there is no end in sight if, as one author suggests, we live in “an era of endless war.”
FROM ASG
9-8-11
Waste and Inefficiency Pervasive in Afghanistan and Iraq Defense Contracts
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
Waste and inefficiency in defense contracts has resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the recently released final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting. The report, which highlights the need to improve oversight and transparency, caused contingency contracting to move up the list of targets as a target for cost-saving reforms. But while all eyes are on wartime contracting, we may be losing sight of the bigger picture – the total cost.9-6-11
Notes from Afghanistan Part III: The War is Going Badly
Afghanistan Study Group by Edward Kenney
For months groups like the Afghanistan Study Group, where I work, have argued that the claims of progress made repeatedly in the American media are not backed by facts and data. Casualty rates are increasing, and security incidents are on the upsurge. Defenders of the U.S. policy would claim violence and attacks are not a good measure of success or failure —an argument, which boiled down amounts to: insecurity is a bad measure of insecurity.ARTICLES
9-4-11
A decade after the 9/11 attacks, Americans live in an era of endless war
Washington Post by Greg Jaffe
Today, radical religious ideologies, new technologies and cheap, powerful weapons have catapulted the world into “a period of persistent conflict,” according to the Pentagon’s last major assessment of global security. “No one should harbor the illusion that the developed world can win this conflict in the near future,” the document concludes. By this logic, America’s wars are unending and any talk of peace is quixotic or naive.9-6-11
Afghan Army Attracts Few Where Fear Reigns
New York Times by Ray Rivera
Despite years of efforts to increase the enlistment of southern Pashtuns, an analysis of recruitment patterns by The New York Times shows that the number of them joining the army remains relatively minuscule, reflecting a deep and lingering fear of the insurgents, or sympathy for them, as well as doubts about the stability and integrity of the central government in Kabul, the capital.9-8-11
Many Afghans Shrug at ‘This Event Foreigners Call 9/11′
Wall Street Journal by Yaroslav Trofimov
The events of Sept. 11, 2001, of course, are known to educated Afghans, and to many residents of big cities. But that isn’t always the case elsewhere in a predominantly rural country where 42% of the population is under the age of 14, and 72% of adults are illiterate.Afghanistan’s civilian surge comes with enormous price tag and uncertain results
National Journal by Yochi Dreazen
Add some new numbers to the eye-popping price tag of the unpopular Afghan war: $2 billion, which is the total cost of the Obama administration’s ongoing surge of civilian officials into Afghanistan, and $500,000, which what it costs taxpayers to deploy each federal employee to the war zone for a single year.OPINION
9-7-11
It’s Time to Rethink Counterterrorism Spending
Bloomberg Businessweek by Romesh Ratnesar
Judged solely on outcomes, the decade-long war on terrorism has been a rousing success. That success, however, has not come cheaply. The conflict in Afghanistan is now the longest military engagement in American history. More than 6,000 service members have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan and upwards of 40,000 seriously wounded. The Congressional Research Service estimates the price tag of the two wars to be at least $1.3 trillion and counting…And U.S. economic growth in the decade since Sept. 11 has been the slowest since the 1930s.9-8-11
US response to 9/11 contributed to causes of current debt crisis
The most economically costly decision post 9/11 was not whether to attack Iraq and Afghanistan, but how to pay for the ensuing conflicts and the related increases in defense and homeland security. War costs always linger well after the last shot has been fired. But this is especially true of the Iraq-Afghanistan conflicts. The $1.6 trillion or so already spent has been financed wholly through borrowing. -
Waste and Inefficiency Pervasive in Afghanistan and Iraq Defense Contracts
Published: September 8th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
Waste and inefficiency in defense contracts has resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the recently released final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting. The report, which highlights the need to improve oversight and transparency, caused contingency contracting to move up the list of targets as a target for cost-saving reforms. But while all eyes are on wartime contracting, we may be losing sight of the bigger picture – the total cost.
The bipartisan commission has published several special reports since its establishment in 2008, so its conclusion was not unexpected. Still, the numbers are staggering: at least $31 billion, and as much as $60 billion, spent on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan has been lost to waste and fraud.
With contracting costs running over $200 billion since FY 2002, this means a loss of one out of every six dollars. It means a loss of $12 million per day over the past ten years.
It’s bad enough to think that billions of dollars could just disappear. But with war funds, the stakes are even higher. As the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction noted in a July report, money “lost” in Iraq and Afghanistan may be finding its way into the hands of insurgents.
As efforts continue to find savings in the defense budget, reports of waste and inefficiencies is big news on the Hill. One congressman is already preparing legislation to create a permanent inspector general to oversee contingency operations. Citing the contracting report as evidence of the need to improve oversight and transparency, Rep. John Tierney (D-MA) said in a press release, “The kind of waste we have witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be repeated.”
Rep. Tierney’s call for greater scrutiny of wartime contracting is a step in the right direction. By focusing exclusively on overhauling the contracting system, it’s easy to lose sight of the larger goal, fiscal responsibility, in all areas of government, including defense.
$60 billion is a lot of money. And it’s only a fraction of the amount we’ve invested in Iraq and Afghanistan (over $2.3 trillion, according to a recent study that takes indirect costs such as veterans care into account).
The war in Afghanistan is far from over. This is true on the ground – ASG blogger Edward Kenney writes from Kabul that “If “freedom of movement” is a good metric to determine success of the counter insurgency, we are the ones who are losing.” It’s true by the numbers – according to the contracting report, there are currently about 99,300 US troops in Afghanistan, plus an additional 90,339 contractors. And it’s certainly true in terms of sacrifice – how could we forget that August was the deadliest month yet for US troops in Afghanistan?
If we’re serious about cutting government spending, then making contracting dollars more efficient is a good first step. But we should really be looking at the trillion-dollar war as a whole. Targeting “waste, fraud, and abuse” in areas like contingency contracting is a good start. Making real inroads into reducing the deficit will require more: it will require a definitive, rapid drawdown in Afghanistan.
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Notes from Afghanistan Part III: The War is Going Badly
Published: September 6th, 2011
For months groups like the Afghanistan Study Group, where I work, have argued that the claims of progress made repeatedly in the American media are not backed by facts and data. Casualty rates are increasing, and security incidents are on the upsurge. Defenders of the U.S. policy would claim violence and attacks are not a good measure of success or failure —an argument, which boiled down amounts to: insecurity is a bad measure of insecurity.
But, whether or not, you believe that violent attacks are a good measure of insecurity, we can judge success or failure of the mission in Afghanistan based on DoD’s own metric—how much strategic territory is controlled by the insurgency. The Pentagon and White House claim that the insurgency has lost “freedom of movement” in the south, often (laughably in my opinion) citing increased IED and assassination attacks to support this claim. (No, this doesn’t make sense to me either).
Now that I am in Kabul, the joke about freedom of movement is even clearer. Ex-pats in Kabul cannot leave their compounds without an escort for fear of kidnapping or terrorist attack. On a tangential note, one of the first lessons you learn here is never ask an Ex-Pat for directions in Kabul. They almost universally don’t know their way around the city at all, a result of the security requirements keeping them off the streets. Early on we asked directions to ISAF from the U.S. embassy and got a blank stare. (ISAF is across the street).
One prominent “expert” in the U.S. claimed earlier this year that a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan would result in “fortress Kabul” with State Department officials unable to leave the embassy compound. My response: Have you been to Afghanistan lately? We already have fortress Kabul!
Mobility in the provinces is even more stark. Consider Bamiyan—a stable province in central Afghanistan dominated by ethnic Hazara (and therefore historically fiercely anti-Taliban); also the province which once held the magnificent Bamiyan Buddhas. Aid workers tell me that five years ago there were two main routes from Kabul west to this province. One went through Wardak Province south-west of Kabul before bending North. This route has been off-limits to Westerners for at least two years due to Taliban resurgence.
Wardak has gotten so bad, according to one Afghan reporter we talked to, the government officials in this province are afraid to move outside of Provincial Reconstruction Team safe-zones. When officials do travel, they are forced to hide any incriminating documents that would tie them to their work for the government. The Taliban have been known to seize cell phones and call a random number to see if the target is indeed a government official, in which case the victim is kidnapped or killed. Wardak Province, incidentally, was also the site of the downed Chinook helicopter earlier this month, which killed 30 Americans
The second route to Bamiyan from Kabul goes north to the capital of Parwan Province (also the site of a recent Taliban attack), before bending west up the Ghorband Valley. In the Ghorband, insecurity has deteriorated markedly in the last couple months, highlighted by the assassination of the Chief of Bamiyan Provincial Council earlier this summer.
According to a representative from development NGO Aga Khan, the insecurity in Ghorband is partly due to criminal gangs feeding off of the money which has poured into the valley for road construction. Criminal gangs may indeed be a factor, but Martine van Bijlert from the Afghan Analysts Network sees a more sinister explanation. The Taliban, she says, are attempting to encircle Kabul. Indeed the pattern of attacks seems to fit this explanation with broad areas North West South West and South East of Kabul now off-limits to Westerners and even most Afghans. Whatever the explanation, the result has been that overland movement for Westerners and even many Afghans to Bamiyan has been sharply curtailed in the last couple of years.
Bottom line: If “freedom of movement” is a good metric to determine success of the counter insurgency, we are the ones who are losing.
Things aren’t going well, granted, but do the Taliban have a realistic shot at taking a major Afghan city? Could they come back to power? Before coming to Afghanistan, I would have dismissed this possibility. Today, I am less certain. If the U.S. pulls out too quickly, more than one person has told me, the Taliban could retake Kabul. Given how emboldened the insurgency appears, this seems possible if still unlikely. Moving forward, the fear of such a massive military setback will guide U.S. policy making and will likely lengthen the timeline for drawdown. This need not be such a terrible outcome, if crucially bold steps are taken to address the governance and international components of the conflict. More on that later.
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger -
Notes from Afghanistan: Part II, A Dismal Afghanistan Independence Day
Published: August 23rd, 2011
August 19th marked the Afghan independence. On this day in 1919, Amanullah Shah, King of Afghanistan signed the treaty of Rawalpindi, ending his country’s dependence of foreign (read British) support, and re-cementing the disputed Durrand Line as the border between Afghanistan and India. Since that time, two features have remained constant in Afghan politics. First, despite numerous attempts at creating a modern state, Afghanistan remains just as dependent on foreign nations as it was in 1919—then it was England and Russia, today: the U.S. and European allies. Second is the distrust between Afghans and Pakistanis. Despite the treaty of Rawalpindi, Afghanistan still disputes its eastern border, and many Afghans continue to blame Pakistan for the continued conflict.
Far from being the dawn of a strong independent state, Afghan independence ushered in a period of continued dependence, foreign intervention, and fractured and ineffective politics. Still the Afghans continue to celebrate this holiday, so it seemed almost inevitable that the Taliban would attempt to take advantage of this holiday to make a statement. All Americans registered with the State Department were put on high alert. Then, at 5:30 in the morning, on August 19th, a group of suicide bombers attacked the British Council. According to Taliban statements, the British target was chosen specifically to commemorate the holiday. Of course, many Kabulis would argue that if the Taliban were really keen on commemorating Afghan independence, they should reject Pakistani support, which has been a hallmark of the Taliban since its inception.
We awoke, not to explosions at the British Council, but to the State Department advisory warning us to stay inside. What’s an intrepid investigator to do? We briefly considered heading down to the site of the attack—a mere kilometer away—but we both rejected this idea. Why put our life at risk over an event that by this point was several hours old. What would there be to see anyway? There was also an unspoken recognition that the day was far from over, and there remained an increased chance that there would attacks in other parts of the city.
To be extra safe, we resolved to change hotels. We had been staying at an inexpensive hotel in central Kabul for over a week. Despite attempts to “keep a low profile”, most of neighborhood knew us, if not by name, than certainly by sight. On the way out, I talked to the hotel worker manning the hotel desk. He expressed disgust at the attack, particularly at the Afghan governments inability to do anything to resolve the security situation. Despite the claims of progress in terms of training Afghan National Security Forces, the hotel worker is hardly alone in his opinion. The perception among most Kabulis is that the police and army are incapable of defending Kabul on their own.
The truth is the events of the last 12 hours completely belie the notion of Afghan independence. A government, which has lost the support of its people and relies on U.S. backing, just fought off an attack from a Pakistan-backed insurgency. With such dismal news, it is easy to get discouraged, but many (in fact most) Kabulis we have talked to remain optimistic that a modern independent state can be created in Afghanistan. When that happens, I will celebrate Afghan Independence Day.
Edward Kenney
AfghanistanStudy Group Blogger -
Notes from Afghanistan: Part I
Published: August 15th, 2011
Afghanistan Study Group blogger Ed Kenney is in Afghanistan for a few weeks. While he is there we will be featuring his thoughts and experiences.
On Tuesday, I sat down to discuss Afghanistan with the country director of a small but fairly prominent NGO based in Kabul. My goal was to understand both his take on the direction of the war, and what role specifically his NGO was playing on the political level. (To be honest, I was less interested in all the great things he claimed his NGO was accomplishing).
As far as the war was concerned things are going badly, and his message was much in accord with what western media outlets have been reporting. It is very difficult these days to travel outside of a few safe provinces principally Kabul, Parwan, and Panjshir. The NGO which operates in Wardak—the same province where the Chinook chopper was shot down—has to play politics at various levels from local to the government in order to operate. They also have to deal with the Afghan National Police, a force that seem to be universally reviled in Kabul. And, most interest for me, they have to maintain indirect communication with Taliban forces.
Here is how it works: In order to even visit Wardak Province, the NGO seeks the permission of the local Shura, which in this province at least appears to have broad legitimacy. The Shura in turn is communicating with some Afghan Talibs, probably the more moderate commanders. Once communication is established, the NGO presents its project to build a school for boys and girls. In order for the project to move forward the Shura must accept the plan, and this means selling the local Taliban. In the case of the Wardak School, the country director had pledge that Koran studies would be at the center of the curriculum.
Recently the emergence of a U.S. base in the district has further complicated the NGO’s mission, as intense fighting has broken out and more Taliban commanders, some more extreme, have filtered into the area. Fortunately for this NGO, the school is still operating.
One question remained unanswered: To what extent are local agreements with the Taliban sent up the chain of command. The country director’s take was that the leadership in the insurgency are aware of these deals, but because there is minimal command and control, local Talib leaders have autonomy to make these decisions. I continue to believe that continuing this line of research holds excellent possibilities to understand how the insurgency conducts diplomacy
The conversation then moved to religion, a theme around which much Afghan life seems to revolve. The director explained that while non-Muslims were exempt from the moral code, which binds the Islamic community, bad Muslims, which the country director described as those who fail to pray and fast, should be wiped out. This violent message was surprising coming from someone who was dedicated to human development and education—including the education of girls. The country director was also a painter, and was accustomed to being accused himself of being a “bad Muslim” due to his depictions of men in his art…
Later that night I had a wonderful dinner with, an Afghan journalist and intellectual. He believed the war was going badly, due to the incredibly rotten government. All through the dinner (which lasted several hours and included some excellent Afghan fare) he regaled us with stories of land theft, organized crime, and corruption on a massive scale. His solution to the governance problem was not to throw Karzai out, but rather to strengthen “civil society.” Now my eyes tend to roll when analysts talk about civil society—a mostly ill defined term in my opinion. I pressed him to explain what he meant by civil society, and pointed out that this term might be interpreted in the U.S. to favor policies which strengthen the tribal structures, a policy he opposes.
He would strengthen political parties, which are very fragmented in Afghanistan, unions, and other institutions (outside of religion) which mobilize Afghans against the corruption of the State. He also thinks much more emphasis needs to be placed on fixing the judicial sector, where much of the wrong-doing takes place and says the U.S. can play a role mentoring bureaucrats in government, much the way we mentor Afghan military officers. According to him the U.S. made a grave mistake adopting a hands-off government approach out of the fear that we would be seen as taking over the country. Today the U.S. is still seen as the “puppet master”, and thanks to the insecurity, corruption, and land theft, we get blamed.
The following morning we set off (painfully early) on a “tour of the provinces” with an aid group. The trip was supposed to include a workshop discussing the Afghan Constitution and women’s rights. Apparently local Mullahs, (not the Taliban) did not like the contents of the presentation, so this part of the trip was canceled for “security reasons”.
The rest of the trip ,to a university and an orphanage, left a bad taste in my mouth. The university, with its shiny new facilities was clearly not a development priority, yet they got the resources. The university has supposedly made strides to educate women, and the director claimed that 150 women were housed in the women’s dormitory. When I asked about this impressively high number, I was told candidly that the number of women in the dormitory was likely highly inflated. Because of cultures mores—of course—we could not verify any of the director’s claims.
Similarly, the orphanage that we visited was not really an orphanage. Most, if not all of the children, had at least one parent still alive. The facility might be better described as a school for children who have lost a parent. I am sure some of the charity—six or seven boxes of clothes and supplies—made a difference for these children, but the whole demonstration, with the requisite photo-ops, had the feel of propaganda to sell to donors back in the States so that the money would continue to roll in. As I said the whole event left a bad taste in my mouth.
Edward Kenney
Afghansitan Study Group Blogger
