ASG Blog
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Afghanistan Weekly Reader – Drawdown Debates
Published: October 19th, 2011
You may have read a report from the Associated Press this Saturday that the US will follow through on the agreement to remove virtually all military forces from Iraq by the end of the year. If so, you were probably disappointed when the White House immediately dismissed the report, saying negotiations on US troop levels post-2011 are still ongoing.
A similar debate is happening for Afghanistan. The administration’s plans to transition to local security forces by 2014. Military leaders, from JCS chair Gen. Martin Dempsey to Gen. John Allen, the commander of allied forces in Afghanistan, have stated that that US troops will be there longer.
Meanwhile, as we read about record-high casualties, continuing costs, and the faltering peace negotiations, we can’t help but wonder: how much longer will the debate continue before it becomes clear/before we realize that a new strategy is needed?
FROM ASG
10-14-11
Want Security? Buy A Warlord
ASG blog by Mary Kaszynski
Earlier this year we reported on the case of Afghan National Police Commander Azizullah, a protégé of US Special Ops Forces and human rights offender, according to an internal UN report. The report detailed several instances of police brutality involving Azizullah, and questioned the reasoning for keeping him on the US payroll. NATO officials conducted an internal investigation and brushed off the allegations, so TIME’s Julius Cavendish looked into the case, conducting interviews with local sources to find out how the stories match up. The results of the investigation are disturbing.10-18-11
Beyond Boots On The Ground – A Cost-Effective Approach To US Foreign Policy
ASG blog by Mary Kaszynski
The violence of the past several weeks, particularly the assassination of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani and the collapse of the peace negotiations, have highlighted the multifaceted nature of Afghanistan’s troubles: poor governance, faltering economy, not to mention ongoing tensions with Pakistan. US soldiers and Marines cannot provide solutions to these problems – they are not trained to do so, they shouldn’t be asked to try.ARTICLES
10-12-11
Nato success against Taliban in Afghanistan ‘may be exaggerated’
The Guardian by Julian Borger
The success of one of Nato’s principal tactics against the Taliban – targeted night raids aimed at killing or capturing leaders of the insurgency – may have been exaggerated to make the military campaign in Afghanistan look more effective, according to a report published on Wednesday.
The study shows that for every “leader” killed in the raids, eight other people also died, although the raids were designed to be a precise weapon aimed at decapitating the Taliban on the battlefield by removing their commanders.
10-15-11
CIA to Fuse Troops’ Opinions in War Analysis
AP by Kimberley Dozier
The CIA is giving the military a greater say in the debate over how the war in Afghanistan is going by allowing battlefield commanders to weigh into the analysis at early stages, U.S. officials say.
The move prompted a flurry of criticism in the intelligence community’s old guard, worried the change presages a campaign by newly arrived general-turned-CIA director David Petraeus to improve the poor marks the CIA gave the war effort in its own analysis earlier this year.
10-17-11
More than Half of Afghans See NATO as Occupiers
SpiegelOnline
Fully 60 percent of Afghans fear that the country will descend into civil war once NATO forces leave, but over half see the Western alliance as occupiers. A new survey carried out be the Konrad Adenauer Foundation has found that the mood in Afghanistan is worsening.10-18-11
Afghan security to cost “$5 billion a year” after pullout
Reuters by Zhou Xin
A fully fledged Afghan national security force, including army and police, will cost about $5 billion a year after international combat forces pull out in 2014, the Afghanistan defence minister told reporters on Tuesday. The price tag estimated by Abdul Rahim Wardak was more than three times the Afghan government’s domestic revenue in 2010, and about a third of the country’s gross domestic product. -
Beyond boots on the ground – A cost-effective approach to US foreign policy
Published: October 18th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
In her recent Foreign Policy op-ed on forward deployed diplomacy in the Asia Pacific, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote, “With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic challenges in our own country, there are those on the American political scene who are calling for us not to reposition, but to come home. They seek a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing domestic priorities.”
Sec. Clinton went on to argue for a comprehensive foreign policy that employs a wide range of diplomatic tools; she did not explicitly equate the Afghanistan drawdown with downsized engagement. However, others have made that claim, calling the drawdown “neo-isolationism” and equating “leaving Afghanistan” with “abandoning Afghanistan.”
This argument overlooks the nuances of a balanced foreign policy – a policy that relies on more than just military strength. As Admiral Mike Mullen, former JCS Chair, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “American presence and interest and commitment are not defined by boots on the ground, but rather by persistent, open and mutually beneficial engagement.” Bringing the troops home will not mark the end of the US commitment to Afghanistan, but a new approach that will be not only more effective but also more cost-effective.
The violence of the past several weeks, particularly the assassination of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani and the collapse of the peace negotiations, have highlighted the multifaceted nature of Afghanistan’s troubles: poor governance, faltering economy, not to mention ongoing tensions with Pakistan. US soldiers and Marines cannot provide solutions to these problems – they are not trained to do so, they shouldn’t be asked to try.
Developing a more nuanced strategy that includes fostering economic development and regional diplomacy will be not only a more effective approach, but also far less costly. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction estimates that the cost to deploy one civilian is about $570,000, compared to $697,000 for a soldier. According to a recent report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the State Department will spend $25-$30 billion in Iraq over the next five years. That’s more than twice what the Department of Defense spent in the first year alone, according to CRS.
We should be spending smarter, not more. Bring the troops home, and revise our approach to make the most of our many foreign policy tools.Our economy will be the better for it, and our soldiers will thank us.
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Want Security? Buy a Warlord
Published: October 14th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerEarlier this year we reported on the case of Afghan National Police Commander Azizullah, a protégé of US Special Ops Forces and human rights offender, according to an internal UN report.
The reports detailed several instances of police brutality involving Azizullah, and questioned the reasoning for keeping him on the US payroll. NATO officials conducted an internal investigation and brushed off the allegations, so TIME’s Julius Cavendish looked into the case, conducting interviews with local sources to find out how the stories match up. The results of the investigation are disturbing.
Cavendish relays incidents of violence and abuse, including a rape, theft and the desecration of a mosque by Azizullah and his men, some 400 Afghan national security guards. What locals had to say matched up with the cases documented in an assessment by a reconstruction firm as well as the original UN report.
Abuse of power is all too common in Afghanistan, according to a recent study by the, and not enough is being done by the US and NATO allies to prevent it. It is even more unacceptable that these abuses are bankrolled by US taxpayers.
Continued support for Azizullah despite the evidence is further proof of short-sighted US policy in Afghanistan. Our leaders – both political and military – emphasize that the goal is to deny a safe haven to terrorists. In trying to accomplish that, we’ve empowered men like Azizullah, who have established a measure of stability, at the expense of human rights. We get a more-or-less reliable ally, and the Afghanis get a warlord in a police uniform.
This year we spent $11.6 billion training and equipping the Afghan National Army and Police. Some of that money went to Azizullah and others like him ( and there most certainly are others like him). The Afghan people deserve better than this, and so do we.
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War Costs Part 3: Hidden costs in the war budget
Published: October 13th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerBudgeting for war is tricky. On the one hand, when it comes to supporting our troops, cutting corners is out of the question. On the other hand, spending billions of dollars every year without questioning what the Department of Defense labels “war costs” isn’t the answer.
We’ve learned this the hard way over the past ten years. For several years the administration used the emergency supplemental process, which allowed war budgets to bypass the regular appropriations process- and the scrutiny applied to regular appropriations. Now, war spending is back in the standard budget, but are still separated from base costs in the overseas contingency operations (OCO) account. This reinforces the special status of war funding: if it’s for the war, it gets a free pass.
The bottom line here is that the lack of accountability in war budgeting is a consistently exploited loophole. OCO serves as a “safety valve” for items that don’t fit into the base budget. And war costs are artificially high as a result.
It’s particularly easy to sneak base defense costs into the war account because of the pervasive lack of transparency in the defense spending. This shouldn’t come as a surprise – this is the agency, after all, that is still unable to preform a complete audit. Even the Congressional Research Service finds it difficult to get the data on what the war budget actually paid for, for a number of reasons: “unexplained discrepancies in DOD’s war cost reports,” “difficulty in allocating funds between [Iraq and Afghanistan],” and “limited DOD information on the factors driving costs incurred to date as well as the lack of a history of war outlays or actual expenditures because war and baseline funds are mixed in the same accounts.”
Even with the OCO safety valve, base budgets have grown considerably, and they may continue to do so, thanks in part to the opacity of war funding. One of the arguments for maintaining high levels of defense spending is the need to “reset” the force – that is, returning to pre-war readiness. In fact, most of the costs of the reset for the Army and the Marine Corps have already been absorbed into the OCO budget.
The Defense Department isn’t the only guilty party here. Congress, always reluctant to scrutinize war spending, has taken advantage of war costs loopholes as well. The latest example: the debt ceiling deal exempted war costs from the spending caps. The Senate exploited this its fiscal year ‘12 appropriations bill, moving $10 billion in base defense costs to the OCO account.
The specific problem here – the war costs loophole – will eventually fade away. But the underlying problems – lack of transparency, unwillingness to scrutinize security spending – will remain. We need/deserve/should demand greater accountability in the defense budget, and war funding is the right place to start.
*And that’s just in the defense budget allocations for “war costs”- a more comprehensive estimate of the costs (including, for example, veterans care) is $3.2 trillion.
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Afghanistan Weekly Reader: Shadow Wars
Published: October 12th, 2011
In a speech on the Challenge of a National Defense yesterday, Defense Secretary Panetta said, “This is a complicated relationship…we are fighting a war in their country.” He was referring not to Afghanistan, but to Pakistan. And Pakistan is not our only shadow war: the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador has escalated tensions in what some are calling a covert war between the US and Iran.
As the debate on the shadow wars continues, it’s worth remembering that the US is still very much involved in two real, and very costly, wars. 100,000 US troops are still stationed in Afghanistan alone. And last year we spent over $150 billion on the wars. Winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is a crucial step in developing a more effective approach to the complexities of shadow wars.
FROM ASG
10-10-11
Afghanistan And Iraq War Costs, Part 2: Operational Versus Personnel Costs
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
War costs will go down as we withdraw troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. But they won’t go down quickly. A lot of our war expenditure is in support operations, not personnel. As a result, even factoring in the drawdown, we should expect to spend hundreds of billions on the wars over the next several years.ARTICLES
10-7-11
A Costly Evolution
TIME by Richard Haass
The goals of ousting the Taliban regime and ridding Afghanistan of most of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 hijackings were accomplished in short order. Nevertheless, American troops not only remained in Afghanistan but increased in number, ultimately reaching 100,000 under President Obama. The mission also expanded. U.S. soldiers fought not just the few terrorists they encountered but also the many Taliban who moved into and out of Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan. What began as a narrow, modest war of necessity evolved into a broad, ambitious war of choice.10-10-11
Huntsman: Limit US involvement in Afghanistan
AP by Phillip Elliott
Republican presidential contender Jon Huntsman on Monday called for scaling back U.S. involvement in international conflicts – including Afghanistan – so America can focus on rebuilding the economy.OPINION
10-10-11
America’s New War with Pakistan
The Washington Note by Steve Clemons
As long as the US is dependent on Pakistan’s support, and fears that a nuclear-armed Pakistan that is untethered, would be disastrous for US and global interests, then Pakistan has license to continue to misbehave and taunt the US political and military operations inside Afghanistan. America has got to shrink its footprint in Afghanistan, become less dependent on Pakistan with which it is already in low level hot conflict, and begin a new strategy in the region that helps10-11-11
Ten Years Gone: The Unraveling of Afghanistan
National Interest by Bruce Riedel
Combined with the shattering end of hopes for a peace process, Afghanistan is now a surrogate battlefield for a sixty-four-year-old regional conflict. -
Afghanistan and Iraq War Costs, Part 2: Operational versus Personnel Costs
Published: October 10th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerWar costs will go down as we withdraw troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. But they won’t go down quickly. A lot of our war expenditure is in support operations, not personnel. As a result, even factoring in the drawdown, we should expect to spend hundreds of billions on the wars over the next several years
Operations costs are not insignificant, particularly in remote and difficult environments like Iraq and Afghanistan. (In just one example the Department of Defense spends an estimated $20 billion per year on air conditioning in Iraq and Afghanistan). Fuel is costly, as are base construction and maintenance. Then there are the substantial costs associated with decommissioning bases.
Ongoing costs include support for local security forces. Last year, however, the Afghan government was only able to contribute about 4% of of the $11.6 billion that the US invested in the Afghan security forces. So it seems likely that security assistance, as well as economic aid, will continue for some time.
The result is that the costs associated will not drop quickly, even as the drawdown progresses. We’ve seen this trend over the past several years, as operational costs have increased significantly from $507,000 per troop in fiscal year 2009 to $667,000 in 2010 and $694,000 in 2011, according to the Congressional Research Service.
Because of continuing costs not associated with personnel, war costs will continue even as the drawdown progresses The Center for a New American Security estimate is $7 billion in savings in Afghanistan war costs, assuming we go down to 85,000 troops over the next year.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that war costs will decline from $118 billion in 2012 to $83 billion in 2013, $54 billion in 2014, and about $35 billion a year from 2015 on, assuming a reduction to 45,000 troops in 2015. The grand total would be $325 billion over the next five years.
Knowing that the wars are winding down, and war costs are declining, it’s easy to get complacent. This is a mistake. We can’t afford to be complacent or irresponsible, especially on the scale of billions of dollars. The wars are winding down, but war costs are still significant, and we should question how our money is being spent.
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The Afghanistan Weekly Reader: Ten Years Later, No End in Sight
Published: October 7th, 2011
With the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan today, retrospectives on the war, from numbers to pictures, are everywhere. All of these have one thing in common: the recognition that peace and stability in Afghanistan is still a long way off, even after ten years. The small victories – like the capture of a Haqqani clan leader – are outweighed by reports of increasing violence, the faltering peace process, and the always troubled US-Pakistan relationship. With so much invested, and so little to show for it, it’s hardly surprising that half of Americans think the was has not been a success.
ASG
10-7-11
The Afghanistan War: Ten Years Later and Counting
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
We will read many stories similar to these today, the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan. These particular quotes, however, are not from October 7, 2011. They are from earlier anniversaries: 2002, 2004, and 2006. Same story, different years.ARTICLES
10-5-11
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan not worth the cost, many US veterans say
The Christian Science Monitor by Brad Knickerbocker
One-third of those who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan say neither conflict has been worth the cost, a new Pew report finds. And 84 percent say the US public doesn’t understand their problems.10-7-11
In Washington, 10-Year Afghanistan War Mark to Pass Quietly
Fox News by the Associated Press
President Obama plans no public events Friday to mark a moment the nation never really expected: 10 years of war in Afghanistan. Out of sight and off the minds of millions of Americans, the war is the most prolonged conflict this country has been engaged in since Vietnam. Obama has gone so far as to declare it “the longest war in American history.”Coordinated Attacks in Afghanistan Hit U.S. Sites
New York Times by C.J. Chivers
The coordinated attack, apparently timed to mark the 10th anniversary of the start of the Afghan war, caused minimal damage and wounded only one American soldier … But it underscored the frustrating complexities of a war entering its second decade. Most of the high-explosive 107-millimeter rockets striking the outposts were fired from just inside Afghanistan, suggesting that the attack had been prepared and launched from Pakistan, and the rocket crews withdrew there as the Americans fired back.10-6-11
Musharraf: Afghanistan Is a Proxy War Between India and Pakistan
ABC News by Luis Martinez
Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf today described Afghanistan as a proxy war between India and Pakistan. He made his comments as part of the rolling panels at the Washington Ideas Forum taking place at the Newseum.Hundreds of Afghans demonstrate in Kabul, demand withdrawal of foreign troops
Washington Post by the Associated Press
Hundreds of people marched through the streets of the Afghan capital on Thursday, demanding the immediate withdrawal of international military forces ahead of the 10th anniversary of the U.S. invasion. The peaceful demonstration in downtown Kabul was meant to mark the Oct. 7 invasion of Afghanistan 10 years ago, following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks against the United States.9-27-11
Luring Fighters Away from the Taliban: Why an Afghan Plan Is Floundering
TIME by Julius Cavendish
Concerns over the state of reconciliation efforts have been amplified by last week’s assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the government’s designated negotiator with the Taliban. Although his High Peace Council has recorded little tangible progress either in talks with the Taliban leadership or in grassroots efforts to reintegrate the movement’s rank-and-file fighters, the running costs for its joint secretariat stood at $2.3 million as of June 30, while a further $1.5 million had gone to APRP cells within government ministries. By contrast, spending on reintegrating former Taliban fighters stood at $150,000.OPINION
10-7-11
Our Trojan War in Afghanistan rages into a second decade
Chicago Sun Times by Neil Steinberg
The savvy reader will get where I’m heading by now, since today marks the 10th anniversary of the war, our struggle in Afghanistan, dubbed “Operation Enduring Freedom” in that regrettable habit we have of coining inspirational monikers for our national bloodlettings, as if that helps.10-6-11
Ten years of war
The Economist by J.B.
As A general rule, the longer outsiders spend in Afghanistan the more depressed they become about the place. Though there are not many foreigners who can boast of more than a few years’ experience here, the West’s decade-long adventure has made the army of diplomats, aid workers and development people positively funereal. -
The Afghanistan War: Ten Years Later and Counting
Published: October 7th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger“Much of the goodwill the U.S. built up by liberating Afghanistan from the Taliban’s rule has been dissipated by mistakes made after the fighting died down.” - October 9, 2002
“Violence is still common – a vice-president was assassinated in July, another minister was killed in February and President Hamid Karzai escaped an attempt on his life last month – and though there is the beginnings of a government army, warlords remain powerful.” – October 7, 2002
“Afghanistan continues to stumble along, barely one level above that of a failed state.” - October 5, 2004
“Soldiers on the ground are eagerly looking forward to Afghanistan’s upcoming winter when, because of the harsh conditions, there’s normally been a break in the violence. In Afghanistan, unfortunately, there is always next spring.” – September 21, 2006
We will read many stories similar to these today, the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan. These particular quotes, however, are not from October 7, 2011. They are from earlier anniversaries: 2002, 2004, and 2006. Same story, different years.The fact that the news from Afghanistan is virtually indistinguishable from one year to the next is very troubling. It seems that for every small step forward we have taken two or three steps back.
This lack of progress in everything from establishing peace and security to working with Pakistan is in fact responsible for the one thing that has definitely changed: support for a drawdown is at record lows. Nearly two-thirds of Americans want troop levels decreased. And only one in three veterans think the wars were worth fighting.
The increasing support for a drawdown has been attributed to isolationism, lack of patriotism, and just plain pessimism. Actually, it’s none of the above. The real reasons behind calls for a drawdown are simple: we haven’t progressed in ten years, and there is still no end in sight.
A Pakitstani reporter recently said what was on everyone’s mind when he put this question to former JCS chief ADM Mike Mullen:
“I believe that we can stay in Afghanistan for a hundred years, and we are not going to resolve this issue. So when you look at American mothers who lose their sons, can you tell them honestly that it’s worth to give up blood in Afghanistan, the country that has become battleground between India and Pakistan?”
Insanity, after all, is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. After ten years of doing the same thing, it’s time for a new approach to Afghanistan.
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The Afghanistan Weekly Reader: Afghanistan Questions Continue
Published: September 28th, 2011
Admiral Mike Mullen’s statement before the Senate Armed Service Committee that the Haqqani network “is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency” precipitated some heated debates. Setting aside the implications for the US-Pakistan relationship, Mullen’s comments also highlighted ongoing questions about the US strategy in Afghanistan–what we’ve achieved after ten years and billions of dollars, whether the war is winnable, and whether we can afford to stay. The news from this week reflects these questions, and growing concerns that investing billions in Iraq and Afghanistan may not be effective.
FROM ASG
9-27-11
Iraq and Afghanistan War Costs Part 1: The Pace of Our Afghanistan Drawdown
Afghanistan Study Group Blog by Mary Kaszynski
President Obama’s plan to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year and 23,000 more by next summer was a moderate but welcome beginning. We’ve already started to see war spending fall as a result: the request for fiscal year 2012 was $118 billion, a 26% drop from the 2011 total of $159 billion, and the lowest level since 2005.ARTICLES
9-20-11
U.S., other donors supported 90 percent of Afghan budget over five years, GAO finds
Washington Post by Jason Ukman
It’s no surprise that the Afghan government is dependent on foreign aid to function. But it’s striking to contemplate just how dependent it has become. According to a new analysis by the Government Accountability Office, the United States and other donors funded 90 percent of Afghanistan’s total public expenditures from 2006 to 2010. In fiscal 2010, the Kabul government’s entire domestic revenues came out to about $1.6 billion.9-26-11
U.S. troops leaving Iraq, but U.S. presence there just ramping up
National Journal by Yochi Dreazen
The current debate between Washington and Baghdad focuses on whether to leave 3,000-5,000 troops in Iraq. The U.S. embassy in Baghdad, by contrast, will soon employ more than 16,000 people across the country, though not all will be American citizens.9-26-11
Growing Afghanistan Doubts
TIME’s Battleland by Mark Thompson
Concern inside the U.S. military that Afghanistan is not going to end well is heating up. It’s always been simmering, but now seems to be coming to a slow boil. Lately, at least in private conversations with officers up and down the chain, the concerns are becoming louder.9-25-11
Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U.S. in Afghanistan
New York Times by Mark Mazzetti, Scott Shane and Alissa J. Rubin
They are the Sopranos of the Afghanistan war, a ruthless crime family that built an empire out of kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, even trucking…Today, American intelligence and military officials call the crime clan known as the Haqqani network — led by a wizened militant named Jalaluddin Haqqani who has allied himself over the years with the C.I.A., Saudi Arabia’s spy service and Osama bin Laden — the most deadly insurgent group in Afghanistan.OPINION
9-23-11
Pakistan Becomes the Recipe for Endless War in Afghanistan
National Interest by Malou Innocent
Adm. Mike Mullen, America’s top military officer, accused Pakistan of being behind the recent attack on the American embassy in Afghanistan. This is a bit too convenient. As the United States prepares to withdraw most of its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, it seems that fighting Pakistan by proxy will become Washington’s new reason to stay. -
Iraq and Afghanistan War Costs Part 1: The Pace of Our Afghanistan Drawdown
Published: September 27th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerPresident Obama’s plan to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year and 23,000 more by next summer was a moderate but welcome beginning. We’ve already started to see war spending fall as a result: the request for fiscal year 2012 was $118 billion, a 26% drop from the 2011 total of $159 billion, and the lowest level since 2005.
However, encouraging as it is to have a plan – any plan – the drawdown is not what it could be. In fact, there are a number of factors that may keep war costs high in the near term. We’ll examine three of these in the coming weeks.
Our first topic is the matter of the drawdown pace. Obama’s plan for the next year has netted some modest savings, and war costs will continue to decline if the drawdown continues. But there is plenty of support for slowing down the drawdown.
From commanders in the field to policymakers and opinion leaders, there is little consensus on the right timing for the Afghanistan withdrawal. For every Jon Huntsman who wants to bring the troops home now there is a John McCain with “deep reservations” about the “aggressive draw-down schedule,” a Rick Perry who would “like to know if it’s possible at 40,000,” and a Rick Santorum determined to stay “until victory is achieved.”
On Iraq, the debate is the same. In a recent Washington Post op-ed Senators John McCain, Joe Lieberman, and Lindsey Graham argued that the situation in Iraq is so unstable as to requires at least twice that amount – at least 10,000, and as many as 25,000.
It’s all too easy to argue for leaving troops when, as House Armed Services Chairman Buck McKeon put it, “We are at the mall while Marines are in the mud.” And it’s easy to forget about the costs of war when we’ve been putting it on the national credit card instead of paying for it up front.
This has been standard practice from the beginning for Iraq and Afghanistan, “the first wars in American history that we didn’t even try to pay for,” noted Representative Jim Cooper in a recent HASC hearing. “There was no war tax. There were no war bonds. . . . Instead, we borrowed the money from China and other foreign nations.”
Those who want to keep troops in Afghanistan try to downplay the costs, often contradicting basic economic facts. Take Indiana Gov. Mitch Daniels for example. He claims that the wars are “a very, very small part of the problem we’ve come into,” despite clear evidence that war costs are one of the main drivers of the national deficit.
If Daniels and co. get their way, the drawdown may slow down dramatically. And we may continue to pay enormous sums for wars that few believe is winnable.
