ASG Blog
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Priorities and Perspective: Are we Reasonably Allocating our Resources in the Af-Pak Region
Published: December 19th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
If you had to choose which country is the most strategically important – Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iran – you might have a hard time deciding.
On the one hand we have Pakistan: Population 175 million, the sixth largest in the world. An unstable civilian government facing off with a powerful military. A haven for insurgents – not to mention Osama bin Laden – who attack US troops across the border in Afghanistan. The extent to which Pakistani officials are complicit is unclear, although former JCS Chair Adm. Mike Mullen called the ISI “the virtual arm” of the Haqqani network. Comments like these from both countries, combined with incidents like the NATO airstrike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, have US-Pakistan relations at an all-time low. Finally, there’s the little matter of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which numbers some 100 weapons.
On the other hand we have Iran, a smaller country, but arguably more unstable and potentially threatening. Jon Huntsman called Iran’s nuclear ambitions “the transcendent issue of this decade from a foreign policy standpoint.” Hyperbole? Perhaps. But there’s no question that preventing Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is important.
That leaves Afghanistan. When Newt Gingrich called Afghanistan “the least important of the three countries,” no one remarked – because everyone is thinking the same thing. The US has already achieved its primary strategic objectives in Afghanistan; it is no longer our fight.
This leaves us with something of a puzzle. Afghanistan represents little in terms of srategic importance – and yet 90,000 US troops are still stationed there. We have spent over one trillion dollars on the wars, and will spend $100 billion next year. War spending is a main driver of the current financial crisis.
As one wasteful war winds down, it’s worth thinking about what our national security interests really are. Building our economy – that is vital to our national security. So is preventing Iran from building a bomb as well as preventing the dangerous situation with Pakistan from spiralling out of control. Compared to goals like these, nation-building in Afghanistan seems trivial.
Look at it another way. An American official told New York Times’ Bill Keller: “If you stand back and say, by the year 2020, you’ve got two countries [Afghanistan and Pakistan]— 30 million people in this country, 200 million people with nuclear weapons in this country, American troops in neither. Which matters? It’s not Afghanistan.”
In thirty years, will we look back and be glad that we spent $100 billion on Afghanistan in 2012? Or will we regret such vast expenditure in Afghanistan that was not commensurate with regional priorities? -
Afghanistan Weekly Reader: High Costs, Uncertain Progress
Published: December 15th, 2011
Speaking to the troops in Afghanistan this week, Defense Secretary Gates was optimistic about our chances of success. “We’re moving in the right direction and we’re winning this very tough conflict,” Sec. Gates said.
In fact, whether we’re winning in Afghanistan is very much open to debate. The UN has reported that violence in Afghanistan increased significantly over the past ten years. Just last week an unprecedented sectarian attack left 84 dead. Afghanistan’s economy is also struggling – it relies heavily on foreign aid and will continue to do so for quite some time.
We have invested a lot in this war, all for dubious success. It’s time to stop insisting we can win, and start asking how much more we can afford to pay.
FROM ASG
12-9-11
The Black Hole of Afghanistan Infrastructure Projects
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
Two foreign invasions for a total of three decades of war have largely taken their toll on Afghanistan infrastructure – there isn’t much left. And what remains is only partially usable. Building Afghanistan’s infrastructure has been a centerpiece of US efforts, for both security reasons and to encourage economic development. However, what was there before the U.S. stepped in?12-13-11
Weighing (War) Costs Versus Benefits
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
Assessing our chances of meaningful success in Afghanistan isn’t just about the benefits of the war – it’s about how much it will cost to achieve them.ARTICLES
12-7-11
OMB asks Defense to shift programs out of war bill
Financial Times by Kate Brannen
The White House is placing new limits on war spending, making it more difficult for the Pentagon to outmaneuver its new budget caps, according to recent guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Instead, the White House wants the Pentagon to start funding more activities through its base budget, shutting off a potential loophole to the Budget Control Act passed in August.12-10-11
Coming Home
McClatchy by Chris Adams
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be winding down, but the long-term costs of caring for those wounded in battle is on path to rival the costs of the Vietnam War.U.S. Troops Could Stay in Afghanistan Past Deadline, Envoy Says
New York Times by Rod Nordland
The American ambassador to Afghanistan on Saturday raised the possibility that United States combat troops could stay in the country beyond the 2014 deadline that the White House had set for their withdrawal.OPINION
Our Remote Wars Are Hitting Home
Mother Jones by William Astore
America’s wars may be fought in distant countries, but they’ve weakened our military, drained our treasury, and eroded our freedoms. -
Weighing (War) Costs Versus Benefits
Published: December 13th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerIn a recent Politico op-ed, Michael O’Hanlon (Brookings) and John Nagl (CNAS) wrote that “our odds of attaining at least the core of our strategic goals [in Afghanistan] are reasonably good if we remain patient over the next three years and work to build up and support the Afghan troops, who will bear responsibility for their nation’s future.”
A few weeks earlier, CSIS’ Anthony Cordesman concluded in his new study on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, “the odds of meaningful strategic success have dropped from roughly even in 2009 to 4:1 to 6:1 against at the end of 2011.”
This begs the question: how can highly regarded experts look at the same information and yet come to such widely different conclusions?
The answer is simple: it’s a matter of how the authors assess the costs versus benefits of US strategy in Afghanistan.
For O’Hanlon and Nagl, victory in Afghanistan will depend on our willingness to continue to maintain a certain level of military operations: 68,000 troops through 2013, and 15,000-20,000 troops “even after 2014.” (Exactly how long they expect troops to stay is unclear).
Also unclear is how much the authors expect this strategy to cost. To be fair, they are not the only ones to gloss over war costs – the Bush administration’s practice of budgeting through supplemental appropriations obscured the true cost of the wars. Meanwhile the Obama administration uses a $50 billion “placeholder estimate” that “[does] not reflect any policy decisions…[but indicates] that some as-yet unknown costs are anticipated.”
The authors aren’t specific on the costs, but they conclude that the strategic benefits of victory outweigh the costs, whatever they may be.Cordesman reaches exactly the opposite conclusion. Carefully considering the costs of the war up to this point, and the costs that are likely to continue, he concludes that “the human and financial costs have far outstripped the probable grand strategic benefits of the war.” If current policy continues, Cordesman argues, “the result will still be strategic failure in terms of cost-benefits to the US and its allies.”
In other words, it’s no longer a question of what more we can accomplish in Afghanistan. It’s a question of whether it makes sense to continue to invest in a war in which we’ve already obtained our main strategic objectives, when we’ve already spent so much.Cordesman concludes:
“It is time the Obama Administration faced these issues [of strategic failure] credibly and in depth. The US and its allies need a transition plan for Afghanistan that either provides a credible way to stay – with credible costs and prospects for victory – or an exit plan that reflects at least some regard for nearly 30 million Afghans and our future role in the region. It needs to consider what will happen once the US leaves Afghanistan and what longer term approaches it should take to a steadily more divided and unstable Pakistan.
In the case of the US, this also means a detailed transition plan that spells out exactly how the US plans to phase down its civil and military efforts, what steps it will take to ensure that transition is stable through 2014, and a clear estimate of the probable cost. The US needs a meaningful action plan that Congress, the media, area experts, and the American people can debate and commit themselves to supporting. If President Obama cannot provide such a plan within months, and win the support necessary to implement it, any hope of salvaging lasting success in the war will vanish.”
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The Black Hole of Afghanistan Infrastructure Projects
Published: December 9th, 2011
U.S. Navy sailors attached to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 move K-Span panels to an assembly area at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, on July 25, 2010. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 deployed to Afghanistan to execute general engineering, infrastructure construction and project management in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerTwo foreign invasions for a total of three decades of war have largely taken their toll on Afghanistan infrastructure – there isn’t much left. And what remains is only partially usable, according to a 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Building Afghanistan’s infrastructure has been a centerpiece of US efforts, for both security reasons and to encourage economic development. However, what was there before the U.S. stepped in?
The GAO estimates that in late 2001 about 16% of Afghanistan’s roads were paved, compared to 80% in neighboring countries. Approximately 31%, or $16 billion, in US aid to Afghanistan since 2001 has gone towards economic, social, and political development efforts, according to the Congressional Research Service. As much as 25% of USAID’s Afghanistan budget goes specifically to road construction, to which the DOD has also contributed over $500 million through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, a flexible fund for small reconstruction projects.
There are some positive indications in the quest to improve Afghanistan’s infrastructure – for example, as of September 2008, USAID had built or repaired over 1,600 miles of road. However, the challenges are far more numerous. Lack of transparency and insufficient interagency cooperation have plagued US efforts. Questions have been raised in particular about poor of oversight for the CERP program, which was originally intended for small projects, but has been increasingly used to fund large-scale projects.
Some construction projects are even counterproductive. For example, the Great Wall of Kandahar. This infrastructure project may alleniate the local population more than protect it, thus ultimately setting back the war effort and wasting taxpayer dollars.
The waste will continue after construction is completed, because many of these projects are unsustainable. GAO estimates that 90% of Afghanistan’s budget comes from foreign aid, meaning that the US and other countries will be picking up the tab for building and maintaining Afghanistan’s infrastructure for quite some time.
Afghanistan estimates they will continue to need outside aid until 2025. The U.S. taxpayers have already contributed significant funds to Afghanistan infrastructure. Monies that could have been utilized to help our own lagging economy and crumbling infrastructure. In this time of necessary austerity how much more can we contribute to Afghanistan without negative consequences here at home?
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Afghanistan Weekly Reader: No Answers at Bonn
Published: December 7th, 2011
In Afghanistan this week, suicide attacks targeting Shia Muslims left at least 58 dead. Experts say the unprecedented attacks may be an attempt to spark sectarian violence. Meanwhile, in Bonn, world leaders (minus Pakistan) met to discuss Afghanistan’s future post-2014. They left with few clear answers, and one big question: without Pakistan, is there hope for peace in Afghanistan?
Here in the US, we’re left wondering. Why are we so set on spending billions of dollars on military operations in Afghanistan, when it’s clear from the continuing violence and inability to plan for Afghanistan’s future that the current policy isn’t working?
FROM ASG
12-1-11
Merkley Amendment Update
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
Caveats and questions aside, the Senate’s approving the [Merkley] amendment is a very positive sign. It means that some members of Congress are starting to ask the questions that need to be asked…“Given our success in destroying al-Qaida training camps and pursuing those responsible for 9/11, why haven’t we brought our troops and our tax dollars home?”ARTICLES
12-2-11
Nato plans push in eastern Afghanistan to quell Pakistan-based insurgents
The Guardian by Julian Borger
Nato commanders are planning a substantial offensive in eastern Afghanistan aimed at insurgent groups based in Pakistan, involving an escalation of aerial attacks on insurgent sanctuaries, and have not ruled out cross-border raids with ground troops.12-6-11
U.S.’s Afghan Headache: $400-a-Gallon Gasoline
Wall Street Journal by Nathan Hodge
Parachuting a barrel of fuel to a remote Afghan base takes sharp flying skills, steady nerves and flawless timing. It also costs a lot of money—up to $400 a gallon, by military estimates. But the Pentagon is stuck with the expense for the foreseeable future, especially given the recent deterioration in U.S.-Pakistani relations.OPINION
11-29-11
Five Things Afghan History Can Teach Us
Huffington Post by Suleiman Wali
If we look beyond Afghan history of the previous decade and well into the last century, five key points emerge that could help the country lay a better foundation for itself once American and NATO forces reduce their presence or leave altogether.12-6-11
The Bonn Conference: Don’t Be Discouraged
National Interest by Paul Pillar
The United States needs to keep working energetically on regional diplomacy as a major front in its handling of the Afghan problem, whether it is in the form of more big conferences or less publicized negotiations…Regional diplomacy aimed at joint tackling of the Afghanistan problem also can have the bonus effect of encouraging cooperation and better relations on other issues between the United States and regional powers, especially Iran and Pakistan. -
Merkley Amendment Update
Published: December 1st, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
Yesterday, the Senate passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act calling for an expedited drawdown from Afghanistan. As we noted before, the amendment, introduced by Sen. Jeff Merkley and a sponsored by a bipartisan group of senators, is a good step towards a smarter Afghanistan strategy. But it is just one step.The NDAA still has to clear a number of hurdles before becoming law, and its chance of success is unclear. The Senate is expected to vote on the bill today. If it passes, Senate and House will then have to reconcile their different versions of the bill. Whether the Afghanistan amendment will stick or be stripped out in the conference committee is anyone’s guess.
On top of all this, even if the bill makes it out of Congress, it may not get past the White House, which has threatened to veto the bill over controversial amendments relating to detention and prosecution of terror suspects.Assuming the NDAA survives this process with the Merkley amendment intact, there is still a big caveat: the amendment calls on the president to produce a timeline for an accelerated drawdown, but it is not legally binding. Drawdown critics like Sen. John McCain have noted this, dismissing the amendment as “a nice informational, notional kind of thing.”
Caveats and questions aside, the Senate’s approving the amendment is a very positive sign. It means that some members of Congress are starting to ask the questions that need to be asked. Sen. Merkley posed a particularly good one in yesterday’s floor debate. “Given our success in destroying al-Qaida training camps and pursuing those responsible for 9/11, why haven’t we brought our troops and our tax dollars home?” he said. Questions like these should be the driver for getting our Afghanistan strategy back on track.
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Afghanistan Weekly Reader: Quagmire in the Asia Pacific
Published: November 30th, 2011
It was a tough week for US efforts/forces in Afghanistan. After a NATO airstrike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan, US-Pakistan relations further soured, with the result that Pakistan has pulled out of the international conference at Bonn. As our relationship with Pakistan destabilizes Presiden Karzi has announced that more than half of Afghanistan will soon be under the control of local forces. When this process is supposed to start is anyone’s guess, as is how it will be paid for. Without reliable partners and a clear strategic plan Afghanistan will continue to be a quagmire, one that we cannot afford.
FROM ASG
11/28/11
The Afghanistan War’s Costly Refrain
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
“We can win in Afghanistan, we just need more time and money.” It’s a favorite line of those in favor of prolonging the Afghanistan war. CFR’s Max Boot especially enjoys this refrain recently writing in The Weekly Standard …11/23/11
Where Is GOP Fiscal Responsibility On The Afghanistan War?
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
Last night’s foreign policy debate saw little in the way of surprises. The Republican presidential candidates postured on Iranand Israel, argued immigration laws, and even discussed racial profiling. Substantive discussion of Afghanistan, however, was again in short order.ARTICLES
11-28-11
Pakistan Halts Supplies to U.S.’s Afghanistan Troops After NATO Air Strike
Bloomberg by Haris Anwar and Anwar Shakir
The U.S. military began a high-level investigation to help salvage relations with Pakistan after an air strike by the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan killed 24 Pakistani troops at the border.11-29-11
To Afghanistan, on the slow train
CNN by Tim Lister
Call it the ultimate in military logistics. As land routes from Pakistan into Afghanistan are cut, sabotaged or otherwise interrupted, the U.S. military has developed alternative railroad routes that make the Orient Express look like a branch line.11-27-11
Afghan Dunkirk: Exiting Afghanistan UK-Style … or … How the Military – Industrial – Congressional Complex (MICC) Will Win By Losing
TIME’s Battleland by Chuck Spinney
My previous posting, discussed some of the implications of our looming grand-strategic defeat in Afghanistan. Here, we address the narrower logistics question of how to bring our forces home.OPINION
11/23/11
Shortchanging our security
The Hill by Derek Brown, Melanie Greenberg and Milburn Line
n the coming weeks, Congress may well downsize the portion of the U.S. budget that is the least costly and most effective way of ensuring our security both at home and abroad.11-29-11
Troubled ties that US and Pakistan can ill afford to cut
The National by Shuja Nawaz
An old saying in Pakistan comes to mind as one tries to make sense of the fraught relationship between Pakistan and the United States, as these two “frenemies” lurch from one crisis to another: when you make friends with camels, you must raise the roof of your foyer. In other words, an asymmetric friendship has its costs. For many in Pakistan, these costs are becoming unbearable. Yet a mutual codependency keeps this odd couple of international diplomacy together. -
The Afghanistan War’s Costly Refrain
Published: November 28th, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
“We can win in Afghanistan, we just need more time and money.”
It’s a favorite line of those in favor of prolonging the Afghanistan war. CFR’s Max Boot especially enjoys this refrain recently writing in The Weekly Standard, “I am confident that the troops in Afghanistan can get the job done if their commanders receive the resources they need,”. Even GOP presidential candidate Rick Perry has gotten on board with “I think that our military is doin’ the best job that they can, considering the lack of support that they’re getting from this administration, telegraphing to the enemy when we’re gonna pull out.”
Whether disguised as exaggerated confidence in the troops, or a jab at the administration, the belief that success can be bought masks the larger issue. It’s not a question of whether we can succeed in Afghanistan at any cost; it’s a question of whether we can succeed at an acceptable cost. Put that way, the answer is clear: at over $100 billion per year, the Afghanistan war is too costly.
After ten years, $500 billion, and over 1,700 lives, we have largely succeeded in driving Al Qaeda from Afghanistan. What other strategic interests do we have in that country? Certainly we would like to see a stable, economically secure, well-governed Afghanistan. But US troops can do little to achieve this goal. In fact, a sustained US presence in the region will likely fuel the insurgency.
There is a smarter, more cost-effective way to achieve our goals in Afghanistan. It requires identifying our strategic interests and using the full range of economic and diplomatic tools to address those interests.
Boot and Perry tell us it’s just a matter of time; if we keep investing in military force, we are sure to win. But troops aren’t the answer to Afghanistan’s problems. And at billions of dollars each year, we cannot afford to move forward with the same ineffective strategy. It’s time to reevaluate what we’re trying to achieve in Afghanistan, and develop a strategy that is both effective and cost-effective.
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Where is GOP fiscal responsibility on the Afghanistan War?
Published: November 23rd, 2011
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group BloggerLast night’s foreign policy debate saw little in the way of surprises. The Republican presidential candidates postured on Iran and Israel, argued immigration laws, and even discussed racial profiling. Substantive discussion of Afghanistan, however, was again in short order.
Of course, there’s more to evaluating a debate than just counting the words. Was the Afghanistan discussion, short as it was, substantive and insightful? Unfortunately, the answer is no.
The highlight of the Afghanistan discussion was, as expected, Jon Huntsman’s remarks. Huntsman again called for ending the war:
We need an honest conversation in this country about the sacrifices that have been made over nearly 10 years. We have dismantled the Taliban. We’ve run them out of Kabul. We’ve had free elections in 2004. We’ve killed Osama bin Laden. We’ve up-ended, dismantled al-Qaida. We have achieved some very important goals for the United States of America.
Now, the fact that we have 100,000 troops nation-building in Afghanistan when this nation so desperately needs to be built, when on the ground we do need intelligence gathering, no doubt about that, we need a strong special-forces presence, we need a drone presence and we need some going training of the Afghan National Army, but we haven’t done a very good job defining and articulating what the end point is in Afghanistan. I think the American people are getting very tired about where we find ourselves today.” [emphasis added]
Once again, Huntsman has shown that he is the only candidate who recognizes the importance of identifying threats, and developing a strategy to meet those threats. Romney’s response shows how far he and the other candidates are from a real strategy, preferring instead to rely on military force as the answer to every problem.
“The decision to pull our troops out before [2014]…would put at risk the extraordinary investment of treasure and blood which has been sacrificed by the American military…This is not time for America to cut and run. We have been in for 10 years. We are winding down. The Afghan troops are picking up the capacity to secure their country. And the mission is pretty straightforward, and that is to allow the Afghan people to have a sovereign nation not taken over by the Taliban.”
There are two glaring errors in Romney’s remarks. First, he mischaracterizes the drawdown plan. “Withdraw troops” is not equivalent to “cut and run.” Huntsman does not advocate abandoning Afghanistan – he simply says that US troops can’t solve the problems that Afghanistan faces.
Romney’s second problem is in focusing exclusively on security concerns. The goal, according to Romney, is to deny the Taliban safe haven, and the solution is to build the Afghan security forces. He is forgetting that there are far more problems than just security threats.
Take the economy, for example. The World Bank estimates that foreign aid accounts for 92% of Afghanistan’s public spending, and that Afghanistan is therefore likely to need billions in aid for years to come. Another key problem is education. Illiteracy is a major impediment to training the Afghan security forces.
Bottom line: Unless Romney and others who want to keep troops in Afghanistan are suggesting that our troops somehow improve the Afghan economy and education system, they’re going to have to come up with a better plan. Maybe they should be taking notes from Jon Huntsman.
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Afghanistan Weekly Reader: Committees Come and Go; Is the Afghanistan War Forever?
Published: November 23rd, 2011
For the past several weeks we’ve watched the supercommittee’s every move. We wondered, speculated, even placed bets on whether they would succeed in forging a debt reduction deal. And as soon as the supercommittee is dead, the questions started. Who isto blame for the failure? What could have been done differently?
With all the attention on the supercommittee, the war in Afghanistan was lost in the shuffle. During all the debates these past four months on how to rein in government spending, no one seemed to notice that we spent about $30 billion in Afghanistan. And here’s another number that’s been overlooked: in the last four months, over 150 US troops died in Afghanistan.
Theatrics like the supercommittee shouldn’t distract us from the real issue. The war in Afghanistan has been, and continues to be, too costly. Ending the war has to be a part of any serious plan for getting federal spending back on track.
ASG
11-21-11
Momentum For Ending The Afghanistan War
Afghanistan Study Group by Mary Kaszynski
Last week, we noted that most of the GOP presidential candidates don’t seem to be on the same page as the American public when it comes to the war in Afghanistan. This week, however, we have a more encouraging sign that some members of Congress are listening.ARTICLES
11-17-11
Afghanistan war strategy shift portends troop drawdown
The Hill’s DEFCON by John Bennett
A senior military official says U.S. forces soon will begin winding down counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, signaling a major shift in the decade-old conflict.OPINION
11-20-11
Is Afghanistan more violent?
Politico by Michael O’Hanlon
Is Afghanistan more or less violent this year than in 2010?
This is a crucial question in assessing progress in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization campaign. Counterinsurgency operations often grow more violent when they intensify — since troops and insurgents come into more frequent contact — so it might not be surprising if 2011 were the most violent…In fact, key databases on the war differ fundamentally on this question.
