Weighing (War) Costs Versus Benefits
Mary Kaszynski
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
In a recent Politico op-ed, Michael O’Hanlon (Brookings) and John Nagl (CNAS) wrote that “our odds of attaining at least the core of our strategic goals [in Afghanistan] are reasonably good if we remain patient over the next three years and work to build up and support the Afghan troops, who will bear responsibility for their nation’s future.”
A few weeks earlier, CSIS’ Anthony Cordesman concluded in his new study on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, “the odds of meaningful strategic success have dropped from roughly even in 2009 to 4:1 to 6:1 against at the end of 2011.”
This begs the question: how can highly regarded experts look at the same information and yet come to such widely different conclusions?
The answer is simple: it’s a matter of how the authors assess the costs versus benefits of US strategy in Afghanistan.
For O’Hanlon and Nagl, victory in Afghanistan will depend on our willingness to continue to maintain a certain level of military operations: 68,000 troops through 2013, and 15,000-20,000 troops “even after 2014.” (Exactly how long they expect troops to stay is unclear).
Also unclear is how much the authors expect this strategy to cost. To be fair, they are not the only ones to gloss over war costs – the Bush administration’s practice of budgeting through supplemental appropriations obscured the true cost of the wars. Meanwhile the Obama administration uses a $50 billion “placeholder estimate” that “[does] not reflect any policy decisions…[but indicates] that some as-yet unknown costs are anticipated.”
The authors aren’t specific on the costs, but they conclude that the strategic benefits of victory outweigh the costs, whatever they may be.
Cordesman reaches exactly the opposite conclusion. Carefully considering the costs of the war up to this point, and the costs that are likely to continue, he concludes that “the human and financial costs have far outstripped the probable grand strategic benefits of the war.” If current policy continues, Cordesman argues, “the result will still be strategic failure in terms of cost-benefits to the US and its allies.”
In other words, it’s no longer a question of what more we can accomplish in Afghanistan. It’s a question of whether it makes sense to continue to invest in a war in which we’ve already obtained our main strategic objectives, when we’ve already spent so much.
Cordesman concludes:
“It is time the Obama Administration faced these issues [of strategic failure] credibly and in depth. The US and its allies need a transition plan for Afghanistan that either provides a credible way to stay – with credible costs and prospects for victory – or an exit plan that reflects at least some regard for nearly 30 million Afghans and our future role in the region. It needs to consider what will happen once the US leaves Afghanistan and what longer term approaches it should take to a steadily more divided and unstable Pakistan.
In the case of the US, this also means a detailed transition plan that spells out exactly how the US plans to phase down its civil and military efforts, what steps it will take to ensure that transition is stable through 2014, and a clear estimate of the probable cost. The US needs a meaningful action plan that Congress, the media, area experts, and the American people can debate and commit themselves to supporting. If President Obama cannot provide such a plan within months, and win the support necessary to implement it, any hope of salvaging lasting success in the war will vanish.”
One Response to Weighing (War) Costs Versus Benefits
Its the military brass who control all aspects of the war. And Congress. Too bad that our brass is the most incompetent bunch of uniforms ever..despite trillion$ and all sorts of resources they can’t wipe out AQ which never numbered even 1000 on 9/10, and now maybe 100, or the Taliban, which at most is 30,000 on both sides of the Durand Line and only among the Pushtoon tribes thereon.
This is a very good war for our Junker class. Praise non stop from the ignorant public, miniscule caualties..4000 out of 1 million deployed which is much much less than the rate nationally for men 18-30. Of course very few Junkers have died in combat..90% are grunts.
Patriotism here is the last refuge of the scoundrels milking the war budget!