The Iraq Withdrawal: Implications for Afghanistan
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
The announcement that the US will withdraw virtually all troops from Iraq, as mandated by the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), has been met with praise, criticism, and speculation. Mostly about the behind-the-scenes negotiations. Setting aside the political questions – who’s “to blame” for the withdrawal, – let’s take a look at what the facts of the Iraq case may mean for the future of US policy in Afghanistan.
The Good: The SOFA timeline was never set in stone. Just a few weeks ago we heard of negotiations to keep 3,000 to 5,000 troops in Iraq. Then there was the withdrawal announcement, and the story seemed to be that Iraq simply hadn’t asked us to stay. Later, we learned that immunity for US troops was the sticking point in negotiations.
Clearly domestic politics was a factor for both countries. Ultimately, however, when all the politics played out, the Status of Forces Agreement held up. And that’s a good thing for Afghanistan.
2014, the administration’s planned deadline for withdrawing from Afghanistan, is still several years away, and a lot can happen in the meantime. But sticking to the Iraq drawdown timeline is a step towards strategic and fiscal discipline.
The Bad: All of the troops are leaving Iraq (with the exception of about 150 to guard the embassy) but some 5,000 security contractors will remain. Add to that approximately 4,000 contractors who will assist diplomats, as well as a still-to-be-determined number of military trainers. It’s clear that the US will be maintaining a significant presence there for some time.
An enduring presence in Iraq and Afghanistan translates into enduring costs. In addition to personnel costs in both countries, the US commitment to maintaining Iraqi and Afghani security forces may be substantial. And as the base defense budget starts to feel the squeeze of budget cuts, non-war spending is making its way into the war budget. All of these factors will combine to keep war costs high, even as the drawdowns progress.
The Ugly: Critics equate the US withdrawal from Iraq to a victory for Iran. This is a twisted version of an ugly truth. The US invasion, and subsequent operations, undoubtedly pushed Iraq into the Shiite/Iran camp. This was undoubtedly a mistake. But it’s a past mistake that cannot be corrected with troops, whether we leave ten or ten thousand.
The fact of the matter is that threats to US national security interests still exist, and will continue to do so, regardless of the number of US boots on the ground. Recognizing this fact, scaling back our ambitions for the region, and investing in the right tools to achieve limited goals is crucial if we are to achieve any kind of success.
One Response to The Iraq Withdrawal: Implications for Afghanistan
The Arabs Shia are the winners and the US the lsoer. The Shia have defeated both Saddam and the US and will never be subservient to the Persian. Still Iran is a neighbor, was a refuge for the Shia, and the only country to protect them when they were being killed by Saddam.
American pundits and faux experts conveniently overlook the fact that the US backed Saddam’s slaughter of the Shia especially after 1980, when the brunt of casualties and death in the Saddam’s war on Iran were overwhelmingly borne by the pressganged Shia who made up to 90% of front line troops. The US provided Saddam with arms, including chemical and biological weapons in this proxy war against Iran.
Adding insult to injury, Bush 1 backstabbed the Shia when he urged them to rise against Saddam with promise of support and when they did he let Saddam slaughter them.
And don’t forget the Waffen SS behavior of the US mercenaries in 03-05.