Danielle Pletka: “The choices for America in Afghanistan are simpler than they appear…We can win or we can lose”

Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group

We have a simple choice in Afghanistan, argues Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute: “we can win or we can lose.”  But can we actually win?  Pletka thinks so, and she helpfully counters eight arguments which have been raised by war skeptics.  Here a counter-counter argument to each of the points she raises:

1.        Partnership Gap:  Pletka offers up a version of the old Rumsfeld adage:  We go to war with the partners we have not the partners we want—or as she puts it, “Karzai needs to be improved, not swapped for a better model.  There isn’t one. “  Pletka actually hits on one of my own pet peeves: the incessant focus on Karzai/Kabul, when the critical decisions are being made in the provinces.  I am much more concerned about the warlords and drug-dealers we “partner with” in Kandahar (where fighting actually takes place), than I am about Karzai and his ministers living the good life in Kabul.  The Iraq experience is instructive.  Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki may or may not be any better than Karzai, but the tribal Sheikhs we allied with in Iraq had a lot more legitimacy than some of the strongmen we continue to support in Afghanistan.

2.       The Ethnic Divide:  Dividing Afghanistan along ethnic lines is a bad idea for the reasons Pletka outlines.  However, this does not mean a more federalized system cannot be implemented.  For most of Afghanistan’s history, the rural regions were granted broad autonomy.  Imposing some other form of government (as we’re trying to do) strikes me as incredibly foolish.  Looking at ethnic, regional and sectarian divides also helps to understand some of the limitations of counter-insurgency.  Is it possible to win the hearts and minds, when there exist such long-standing tensions across broad and diverse swathes of the population?

3.       Counter-Terror Option:  Pletka says a light footprint strategy is tantamount to surrender.  But this begs the question:  If victory is ensuring that terrorists don’t come back to Afghanistan as Pletka argues, do we really need 100,000 troops to accomplish that goal? We did not need this level of troop presence to kill bin Laden in Pakistan—why should we need it to hunt terrorists in Afghanistan?  Over the long term, U.S. strategy has to become more sustainable—this means treating Afghanistan like any other country which harbors terrorists and moving toward a counter-terrorism strategy.  Put simply, we can “win” in Afghanistan with less troops and with less money, but this requires a shift in strategy.

4.       Graveyard of Empires:  Pletka calls historic parallels between our experience and other Afghan occupiers as defeatist. Similar to point number two, understanding the complexities of Afghanistan can help us to understand the limitations of a strategy like counter-insurgency.  Yes, this sometimes means going back to the historic record and looking at the experiences of the Soviets and British.

5.       Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan:  Pletka dismisses the argument that Pakistan is the real front on the war on terror and quotes Fred Kagan to point out two vulnerabilities in the insurgency: the sanctuaries themselves and the support networks.  Under ideal circumstances, both the sanctuaries and the support networks should be targeted.  Indeed this is the method taken in the successful counterinsurgency in the Philippines in the 1950s.  In Afghanistan, it is becoming increasingly clear that we have failed to degrade both the sanctuaries in Pakistan and their support networks in Afghanistan.  A classic illustration of this latter failure was the Sarpoza Prison break in April.

6.       Al Qaeda is Finished:  Pletka is correct:  Al Qaeda is not finished by the death of Osama bin Laden, but it is not clear that they have a burning desire to return to Afghanistan either.  Indeed, they haven’t left their safe havens in Pakistan for Afghanistan, even as the insurgency has gained momentum.   This may be explained by historic tensions between the two groups that Felix Kuehn and others have pointed out.

7.       Negotiations the Only Road to Victory:  Negotiations may or may not be the only road to victory, but an enforceable agreement is undoubtedly the least costly path to victory.  Henry Kissinger’s recent op-ed for the Washington Post was absolutely correct on this point:  “…a new definition of American leadership and America’s national interest is inescapable. A sustainable regional settlement in Afghanistan would be a worthy start.”  In Afghanistan, the U.S. does not have clear path to military victory, as even Pletka lets slip: “talking without holding the upper hand militarily is a recipe for disaster.”

Significant hurdles remain to achieving a settlement, including a lack of trust and an inability on the Taliban’s part to enforce an agreement, but the gains from a potential breakthrough with the Taliban far outweigh costs associated with negotiation.

8.       The economy stupid:  Pletka echoes Michael O’Hanlon, saying that the savings ($100 billion plus?) doesn’t amount to much.  It’s true that ending the Afghan War is not going to solve the fiscal crisis, but it could net some significant savings and help ease the necessity for more draconian cuts elsewhere.  But the bottom line about costs remains the same.  Is Afghanistan worth spending our limited resources on?  Most Americans would correctly say no.

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