Reconciliation: Then and Now
Edward Kenney Afghanistan Study Group
About eight months ago, a spate of articles were published in major American newspapers suggesting that the U.S. and Afghan government had begun serious overtures to the Taliban. At the time, some optimists suggested that the U.S. was turning a corner in its Afghan strategy, particularly with the decision in that month to allow insurgents safe passage to negotiate with the Afghan government. (As Afghanistan Study Group Director Matthew Hoh pointed out, nothing dampens an insurgent’s incentive to talk peace as much as a hellfire missile through the windshield.) These reports died down, soon after it was revealed that the man supposedly representing the Taliban was actually a lowly shopkeeper from Quetta, not the number two man in the Taliban as had been believed.
Flash forward eight months, and its reconciliation season again.
The latest report in a string of “secret talks” articles comes from the German paper Der Spiegel. Apparently, the Germans have been mediating talks between Tayyab Agha (a relative of Mullah Omar) and senior U.S. officials. I imagine the vetting process this time around was a little more stringent, although depressingly David Ignatius writes in this morning’s Washington Post:
“[U.S. officials] are trying to establish whether Agha speaks for Omar and his Quetta Shura, or for a faction of it, or whether he is a lone wolf.”
Oh, boy. Here we go again.
While the news out of Germany may be promising, Pakistan’s role in potential talks remains complicated. During a previous reconciliation period, Pakistan successfully scuttled negotiations by arresting Mullah Baradar—the Taliban’s lead negotiator. Ironically, the arrest was at first depicted as a coup for the U.S.-Pakistani relations, that is until someone annoyingly pointed out that: a. Baradar was not really hiding (remind you of someone else?) and b. was the most approachable member of the Quetta Shura.
Thank goodness this time around the Pakistanis are playing a more constructive role, pushing one of the most violent groups, the Haqqani Network, to engage in talks according to a recent report. How does the U.S. respond to this Pakistani collaboration? From the Wall Street Journal:
“I don’t see any evidence that makes me think Haqqani is a guy we’re going to want to be talking to,” said a U.S. official.
The U.S. is pissed that the Pakistanis are pushing for talks, and not taking it to the insurgency militarily in the FATA region.
Makes you wonder how committed we really are to a negotiated settlement.
