From Kabul to Islamabad
Esha Mufti – Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
A continued military-focus in U.S. strategy in Afghanistan will further destabilize civilian-military relations in neighboring Pakistan.
Drone strikes in Pakistani territory are an obvious and visible part of U.S. Af-Pak strategy. The recent and most notorious strikes that killed 40 in mid-March flared up tensions between Pakistan and the U.S. that had never really died down from the Davis affair. Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Kayani immediately strongly condemned the attacks. Notably but not surprisingly, his condemnation was visibly more important than Prime Minister Gilani’s own remarks against the strikes.
Another part of the Af-Pak strategy, more subtle but with more important long-term implications, is the militarization of the power structure in the Pakistan. The military focus of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has further fortified the Pakistani Army against the civilian government that is supposed to be in charge.
Pakistanis view their civilian government as a U.S. and NATO puppet in a war that has claimed the lives of 3570 civilians in Pakistan in 2010 alone—870 more than the number of civilian lives lost in Afghanistan during the same time. In stark contrast to President Zardari’s 20% domestic approval rating, the Pakistani Army continues to fare impressively with a 94% favorability rating.
But it is the army that gets U.S. money: the U.S. has poured almost $13 billion in military aid into Pakistan since FY 2002 to ensure the army’s help against al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban, which didn’t come into existence until 2005 or so. The massive international troop deployment in Afghanistan also requires logistics lines flowing through Pakistan, which basically makes the U.S. and the international community hostage to the Pakistani Army’s whims.
A diplomacy-focused U.S. strategy in Afghanistan would not tip the balance towards civilian power in Pakistan overnight. Still, abandoning a primarily military focus and pushing for internationally-backed regional diplomacy in Afghanistan would decrease the disproportionate clout and influence of the Pakistani Army. The Pakistani civilian government would have a chance to save face and reassert itself domestically and internationally. Kayani would obviously still be a major player in any regional talks, but at least the army wouldn’t be holding all the cards.
