Seven Reasons to be Pessimistic about the Prospects of Reconciliation with the Taliban
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
In the past this blog has advocated of a process of reconciliation with the Taliban tied to government reform involving a decentralization of power. This process of reconciliation is the best way to ensure that at the end of the war a power vacuum resulting from a U.S. withdrawal does not lead to civil war. However, there are several potential obstacles to this approach.
Borrowing heavily from Waldman and Ruttig’s recent paper, below is a list of seven reasons why a reconciliation process may fail.
1. The challenge of motive
To the extent that U.S. withdrawal is an objective of the Taliban, they can simply hold out until 2014, when combat operations are supposed to end. Sooner or later, public pressure from the U.S. and other international countries will force the U.S. to withdraw. As Waldman and Ruttig argue that “overlapping interests”—both the U.S. and Taliban want the occupation of Afghanistan to end—are dwarfed by the Taliban’s and the U.S.’s belief that the war can be won without negotiating.
2. The challenge of enforcing an agreement across disparate groups
Any peace arrangement has to be enforceable. This requires both coordination among various insurgent groups such as the Haqqani, the Quetta Shura and HIA HIG. It also requires the ability to enforce an agreement within insurgent groups. Will radicalized midlevel commanders heed the Taliban leadership in Pakistan? This remains an open question. Worse, the U.S. policy of killing older and more moderate commanders exacerbates this problem. Since “combatants’ security concerns dominate every decision during the peace process”, according to Waldman and Ruttig, this problem of accountability is potentially a deal breaker.
3. The challenge of identifying key players
The U.S. and International community need to be able to identify key players in the Taliban leadership. This is not an easy task as the Mansour imposter debacle illustrates. Most Afghan experts argue that a broad-based inclusive arrangement is necessary for reconciliation to be successful. This policy, therefore, also requires identifying critical members of civil society. It is fairly easy to envisage a clumsy process of inclusion exacerbating intertribal tensions, as those who are left out of the negotiating table reject any deals resulting from reconciliation.
4. The challenge of neutralizing potential spoilers
One such spoiler, of course, is Pakistan. Elements with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Pakistani Security Forces continue to back Islamic groups in the hopes of ensuring that Afghanistan remains a buffer against India. When Taliban leadership signaled an interest in making a deal with Afghan leadership, Pakistani security promptly arrested Mullah Baradar, the Quetta Shura’s second in command. According to Andrew Exum, this move was viewed by the Taliban leadership not to engage in diplomacy with the Karzai government.
Pakistan is far from the only potential spoiler the U.S. should be concerned about. Thanks to our policy of providing material support to various warlords, there are several powerbrokers on our side that have a large incentive to continue the conflict. For this reason, turning off the money spigot is perhaps the first step in the reconciliation process.
5. The challenge of managing the international element
Reconciliation and power-sharing is likely to drastically affect regional politics. According to Ivan Savchuk, a professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Afghanistan’s regional neighbors are at a cross roads between cooperation and competition. A power-sharing agreement which gives greater regional control to various ethnic groups will also create the ideal environment for renewed competition between India, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics. This “international” aspect of the political reforms needs to be taken into account by proponents of the reconciliation approach.
6. The challenge of a lack of trust
Matt Hoh, the Director of the Afghanistan Study Group likes to point out that until last Fall, Taliban leadership were not given safe passage to talk to the Karzai administration. “Nothing diminishes the prospects of diplomacy like a cruise hellfire missile coming through your windshield”. Trust remains a crucial stumbling block. Even if the Taliban were to promise not to invite al Qaeda back to Afghanistan, which will almost certainly be a U.S. demand, what mechanism will be put into place to ensure that the Taliban follow through with their promises? The presence of neutral third parties could help enforce an agreement, but is any potential third party acceptable to both sides?
7. The challenge of a lack of experience
No one should underestimate the potential for incompetence being arguably the greatest hurdle in achieving a sustainable settlement. The Taliban have an excellent track record fighting battles, but almost no history of compromising and deal-making. David Rohde, the New York Times reporter who was captured by the Haqqanis described the absurd demands made by his captors which were far removed from reality. Ambassador Mitchell Reiss, who has written books on negotiating with insurgent groups, says that a great deal of patience is required by all parties, especially while the insurgent group learns how to negotiate effectively.
As this far from complete list illustrates, the reconciliation process is not without its obstacles. The Afghanistan Study Group supports reconciliation because it remains the least costly way to wind down the war. Some may be left with the impression that reconciliation is impossible. This is an incorrect conclusion. Some sort of peace settlement is still by far the most likely scenario to end the war. How else will the war end? To the rest of us, the pertinent question is, “how much money and blood will be spent before both sides realize that a settlement is in their interest and decide to work past these obstacles?
