How to Get Enemies to the Negotiating Table
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
On Thursday, the Center for American Progress and the National Security Network put on a series of panels to discuss policy options on Iran. The highlight of the event was a debate between Afghanistan Study Group Member Paul Pillar and Brookings’ Kenneth Pollack. Both retired intelligence analysts agreed on the broad contours of American foreign policy: War with Iran would be foolish; and although nuclear Iran would be dangerous, the U.S. could live with this scenario. There was one sharp disagreement however, and it bears directly on a question central to the Afghan War debate. Pollack believed that Iran would only approach the negotiating table if the U.S. put the regime under immense pressure. Pillar worried that too much stick without the necessary carrot would only serve to further alienate the two sides.
How does this Discussion Relates to Afghanistan?
This debate bears a striking resemblance to discussions on how best to drive the Afghan insurgency to the negotiating table. Pro-surge advocates have long taken the Pollack position—the U.S. needs to aggressively pressure the insurgency and only once it’s marginalized will it seek a settlement. Pillar and others have suggested that aggressive counter-insurgency is counterproductive. The weaker the Taliban’s position, the less is the incentive to bargain.
Matt Waldman and Thomas Ruttig recently weighed in on this question with a paper examining the prospects for negotiation in Afghanistan: Citing “ripeness theory” , Waldman and Ruttig argued that the best environment for deal making is one in which neither side can achieve their stated goals through military (or other) means. A “mutually hurting stalemate” is therefore the likeliest environment for negotiations to take place. Waldman and Ruttig write,
The [Ripeness] Theory does not suggest what some Western officials believe: that negotiations can only be attempted after a successful military surge to achieve a position of strength. In fact a “position of strength”’ implies conditions of asymmetry that are not consistent with the theory’s central proposition.”
In other words, getting adversaries to the negotiating table requires balance. Too much pressure on the insurgents in Afghanistan and they will not trust our willingness to negotiate in good faith. Too little pressure and the insurgents have every incentive to avoid deal making. In Afghanistan, where both the Taliban and U.S. forces seem to be operating under the illusion that victory is possible, negotiations at present seem unlikely to take place.
If there is one lesson that Afghanistan should teach, it is that aggressive action often leads policymakers to conclude their enemies are “irreconcilable”. This term is often used to describe the various Afghan insurgent groups; unfortunately, policymakers seldom assume that their own aggressive policies will be interpreted this way by the enemy. U.S. counter-insurgency policies—particularly night raids and special-ops—have widened the gulf between insurgents, ISAF and the Afghan government. Similarly aggressive policies targeted at Iran, which are likely to be interpreted in Tehran as “regime change”, will not be greeted with calls for negotiation.
The most telling moment in the Pollock-Pillar debate came when Pollack was challenged to name one country which responded to severe military and economic pressure by entering negotiations; his only answer—Libya—was immediately challenged by Professor Pillar as an example which in point-of-fact illustrated the importance of dialogue and diplomacy. In the end engagement not pressure, was the real key to a lasting settlement.
