Opium Eradication and the Cost of Success

Today’s article in the Washington Post discussing the failures of our anti-drug policies brought me back to my days studying drug policy in Latin America.  As in the case of Colombia, drug eradication policies in Afghanistan ignore the power of the market and the laws of supply and demand.  If a drug eradication program is successful, the price of that drug rises, which in turn encourages potential cultivators to re-enter the market.  In Afghanistan, drug eradication programs have evidently been very successful[1].  The price of opium has more than doubled between 2009 and 2010.  As expected these price signals have incentivized opium production elsewhere.

The eradication program hasn’t led to increased production just anywhere, however.  The increased production is predominantly in areas under Taliban control.  This makes perfect sense since these areas lie outside the eradication zones.  Basically, by eradicating poppies in the secure East or North, NATO forces are in essence subsidizing production in Taliban controlled areas.  Given that the drug trade is one important source of income for the insurgency, this policy is clearly counter-productive.

What can be done?  Policymakers might be inclined to abandon efforts at eradication in the North and East.  This would be a mistake since transitioning away from a drug economy is a key towards developing the region and improving governance in the relatively secure areas of the country.  Instead, the rise in opium prices should underscore the imperative of finding a resolution to the Afghan conflict.  Once there is modicum of peace and security in Afghanistan, policymakers can pivot to dealing with the drug trade without worrying that they are indirectly fueling the insurgency.

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[1] The article suggests that a fungus which has killed poppy plants may have also played a role.

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