The Military Industrial Complex and the Future of COIN
January 17th marks the fiftieth anniversary of Dwight D Eisenhower’s farewell speech in which he coined the phrase “military industrial complex” to describe the nexus of arms manufacturers, the congressional and federal branches of government, and the military. On Tuesday, the New America Foundation hosted a discussion to commemorate the occasion, which was moderated by Bill Hartung and included panelists, David Berteau, Danielle Brian, and Gordon Adams. Adams, a professor at American University and former director of the Office of Management and Budget, is also a member of the Afghanistan Study Group. He has long advocated curtailing the defense budget so that we can efficiently address our core national interests.
After the conference Adams explained the implications of the military’s embrace of “nation building” practices in Afghanistan. He suggested that if the Pentagon’s budget were curtailed, development and reconstruction would be among the first two areas to be cut back. I am not so sure. The counter-insurgency doctrine, which depends on reconstruction and development, has been accepted by many in the military as practically a sacred text. Funding for the Defense Department depends on its ability to sell the importance of intervening in failed states—and in persuading congress that once we have intervened we must see the job through. Adams acknowledges as much in his co-authored article in Foreign Affairs, when he writes:
“Gates’ effort to nonetheless tailor U.S. military capabilities to [counter-insurgency] suggests that there is still significant support for them in the Pentagon.”
Further along in the same article, General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army is says, “the United States is in an era of persistent conflict”, a comment which sounds strikingly similar to an infamous General Petraeus statement.
There are two factors that lend support to Adams view, however. First, there is disagreement among the branches of the military as to the utility of COIN. Because the strategy is more ground focused, the Army and Marines tend to support it, whereas the Navy and Air Force remain more skeptical. Second, the future of COIN may well depend on how Afghanistan turns out. If the war ends badly, COIN may well end up being a short-lived fad. Indeed this doctrine was in “vogue” during the 1960s, but following the Vietnam War the military abandoned these ideas and adopted a more conventional focus with the support of traditional military thinkers and, of course, the defense industry.
Will history repeat itself? We should keep an eye on the extent to which traditional defense firms such as DynCorp continue to expand into the development sector. If this trend continues, there may be significant resistance from the military industry to changing our strategic posture. On the other hand if Adams is correct, tightening budgets combined with fallout from Afghanistan will push policymakers away from nation-building quagmires like Afghanistan. Let’s hope Professor Adams is right.
