Wikileaks Part III: Karzi as a Leader
The cable leaked from Wikileaks have shown us how frayed the relationship between our top diplomat and the president of Afghanistan really is. Eikenberry’s portrayal of Karzai is brutal. In one cable from last July he describes Karzai as insecure and incompetent:
“His inability to grasp the most rudimentary principles of state-building and his deep seated insecurity as a leader combine to make any admission of fault unlikely, in turn confounding our best efforts to find in Karzai a responsible partner.”
Other cables describe the Karzai’s release of drug runners and the his paranoia. The ambassador clearly views Karzai as an obstacle to the success of the surge, and he is not alone. Even ministers close to Karzai have voiced concern. As Karen DeYoung reports in the Washington Post[1]:
When Eikenberry visited the next day with Finance Minister Umar Zakhilwal, the minister, “apparently echoing Daudzai . . . went on to speak candidly about Karzai, saying that he was an ‘extremely weak man’ who did not listen to facts but was instead easily swayed by anyone who came to him to report even the most bizarre stories of plots against him. Whenever this happened, Karzai would immediately judge the person to be loyal and would reward him.[i]“
As much praise as Eikenberry deserves, it’s hard to see how these revelations have not irreparably harmed the relationship between the two men. These comments come after the ambassador was quoted by Bob Woodward as saying manic-depressant Karzai is “on his meds, off his meds”.
More troubling than the U.S. Afghan connection is the increasingly frayed relationship that Karzai shares with his ministers. Being called “extremely weak” by your Finance Minister is bad news. Afghan Study Group Member Juan Cole asks,
“How likely is it that Afghanistan National Army officers and troops are going to risk their lives for someone who is paranoid, erratic and corrupt?”
Let’s take that a step further. The probability that Karzai could be removed from power in some sort of coup has significantly increased. It needs to be stated that this would be a terrible development for the United States—no matter what your opinion is of the current strategy. Karzai remains the most popular politician in Afghanistan. A replacement president would therefore almost certainly be less popular and illegitimate, thus making the necessary institutional reforms all the more difficult. If the new government is viewed as fragile or weak, this would undercut the Taliban’s incentives to negotiate. Why make a deal with a government that will be out of power in a few months and therefore unable to keep their end of the deal? If Karzai’s hold on power is weaker than previously thought, this dynamic could already be at work. It is all the more imperative that the U.S. aggressively pursues reconciliation before Karzai’s position erodes any further. Time is running out.
[1] See Feb 26, 2010 Cable Kabul Embassy
