Afghanistan Update 11-29-10: Department of Defense Releases Eye-Opening Report on “Progress” in Afghanistan
Edward Kenney
Afghanistan Study Group Blogger
Part of me dreaded reading the Pentagon’s latest progress report on Afghanistan. After all, wouldn’t the DoD just play up the some of the security gains that have been reported over the last month while ignoring the seemingly insurmountable challenges that remain? The report, which—perhaps not coincidentally—was released the day before Thanksgiving, was surprisingly realistic about the problems facing coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Is the DoD Overly Optimistic about Afghan Security Forces?
In terms of progress, the report is mostly optimistic about building the Afghan Security Forces, which reportedly will be ready to take over security for Afghanistan by 2014. The report notes that the Afghan National Army is on pace to reach its goal of 171,600 personnel by next autumn and describes several policies in place to improve quality from literacy campaigns to mentoring programs between Afghan and U.S. commanders. While no one can doubt the progress that has been made, DoD may be a trifle optimistic about touting the development of Afghan Security Forces. Until the army proves itself competent in the field of battle, the metrics reported in this report are meaningless. Indeed, if the campaign in Marjah taught us anything, it is that Afghan capacity building is a long way off.
DoD admits the Security Situation is not Improving
If the Department of Defense is somewhat optimistic about the Afghan Army, they are decidedly more realistic in describing the deteriorating security condition in Afghanistan. According to the report “the insurgency retains momentum in certain areas” and “the regional and domestic factors which impede effective COIN operations remain unchanged…” On Pakistani sanctuaries the report writes:
“The porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan continues to allow insurgent groups in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province to conduct cross-border operations in the Pashtun-dominated areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. Pakistan’s domestic extremist threat and the recent flood reduce the potential for more aggressive or effective COIN efforts over the next three months”
What’s surprising here, is both that the DoD is acknowledging that COIN will not be as effective with groups operating with impunity from Pakistan, but also that the report offers no solutions to deal with this problem. They hope that as the waters from the summer’s flood recede, Pakistan will undergo a change of heart. This outcome does not seem likely.
The report is also candid about the insurgency’s strengths:
“The insurgency has a number of strengths, the most significant strength and main effort being the speed and decisiveness of their information operations and media campaign. Organizationally, the insurgency’s capabilities and operational reach have been qualitatively and geographically expanding, as evidenced by a greater frequency and wider dispersion of insurgent-initiated attacks…the insurgent’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) continue to evolve in sophistication. In addition, the insurgency continues to inhibit the expansion of a legitimate Afghan Government through effective shadow governance process that provides dispute resolution, rule of law, and other traditional services in a number of areas”
For months, the Afghanistan Study Group has argued that the war is going badly by virtually every possible metric. This passage—from the Department of Defense no less—seems to strongly support this view. This passage is remarkably comprehensive covering the insurgency’s popular support, military tactics and ability to provide governance. In all three areas the insurgency is gaining strength.
The report also lists the insurgency’s weakness, in a passage which is again instructive.
“The insurgency also has a number of weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The insurgency is comprised of multiple, locally-based tribal networks which at times can make execution difficult…the Taliban is not a popular movement. It is dependent on marginalized and threatened segments of the Pashtun population and is over-reliant on external support. Despite the presence of shadow governors, the insurgency still cannot deliver sustainable development or administer governance beyond the crudest dispensation of justice.”
The first thing that struck me reading this paragraph is that many of the so-called “weaknesses” of the insurgency apply equally (if not more so) to the Afghan government. Does Karzai’s government utilize “locally-based tribal networks”? Check. Is Karzai “over-reliant on external support”? Check. Has the Afghan government proven itself incapable of administering governance? Check. The fact that the insurgency has capitalized on the “marginalized and threatened” segments of the population is, if anything, a strength of the insurgency. These are people who have been fundamentally excluded from the political process leaving them little recourse to seek redress other than by taking up arms—they are the exact profile of the proto-typical guerilla. Anyone comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the insurgency presented in this DoD paper should be very concerned about the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan.
Governance is Abysmal in Afghanistan
If the security picture in Afghanistan looks bleak, the governance report is downright horrifying. The Afghan public’s confidence that the government can deliver “reliable formal governance” fell by seven percent in the latest public opinion poll and less than half of all Afghanis said they could “trust the Afghan Government to settle a legal dispute.” Furthermore, the Afghan government has “abandoned plans to develop the promised national policy on relations between the formal justice system and dispute resolution councils…” This is a critical step to establishing rule of law in the provinces, where the majority of the fighting is taking place.
Efforts to combat corruption have also faltered, as Karzai has intervened at times to release political supporters accused of corruption. Even the much-lauded anti-corruption law was watered down considerably prior to passage.
Here its useful to remind readers that establishing governance is a key component of the Counter-Insurgency Doctrine. In General McChrystal’s April, 2009 strategic review, governance comprises almost as much attention as military tactics. Petraeus himself has said that re-establishing governance in the Pashtun South is a critical part of the COIN doctrine. The fact that almost one year after the president began the “surge”, governance remains as bad as ever is a strong indication that the strategy is not working.
Missing Graphs
Some analysts have questioned whether this progress report measures up to previous ones, including a progress report issued in April. Yes, this report is shorter by about 50 pages, but this discrepancy comes from a fifty-page appendix on training the Afghan National Army. Many of the complaints are not justified.
If there is one area where this report disappoints, it is the dearth of quality maps and graphs. The previous April report had an entire section on local perceptions of government, including maps depicting government support by district. The report also illustrated how the public’s views towards government had changed. The latest progress report eliminates some of the best graphs, and the data that is presented is done so on an ad-hoc base. One likely interpretation is that the data presented an overly negative picture of conditions on the ground, and so the Pentagon ordered aspects removed. If this is the case, the Defense Department has failed its mission to keep the President and Congress informed on the progress in the war.
