Cautious optimism for productive negotiations in Afghanistan
Today’s reports by the New York Times and the Associated Press provide a few reasons for cautious optimism that US policy may be shifting towards a more sensible and productive direction in Afghanistan*. Reports that the US is no longer targeting for killing or capture insurgent leaders who are trying to negotiate prove that it is only now that the US has become serious in advancing the reconciliation process. Despite previous disingenuous statements about the need for a political settlement the US appears to be abandoning mistaken rhetoric about the need to drive the enemy to the negotiating table (nothing dampens the mood for negotiations more than a hellfire missile through a windshield as negotiators return from talks). Additionally, General Petreaus’ request this past summer that the Haqqani Network be placed on the US government’s global terrorist group black list, thereby disallowing any possibilities for negotiations, have been disregarded. This is a positive step that keeps open the possibility for a settlement between the Afghan government and a major part of the Afghan insurgency.
Starting in September, there were indications that the Obama Administration might be amending its previous commitment to a security and development focused approach to the insurgency. Since President Obama took office 21 months ago, US policy in Afghanistan has reflected a mistaken premise that the insurgency is a monolithic organization capable of being defeated by a mixture of massive security and development efforts thus driving a wedge between the Afghan population and the insurgents. The reality is much more complex. The insurgency is composed of multiple groups with many disparate and local political grievances. Often, security and development efforts enacted by civilians, and foreign and occupying soldiers, are meant to distance the population from the insurgency. Instead these efforts inadvertently exacerbate existing local grievances and drive the population to the insurgency for support and protection.
This is very similar to US actions in Iraq from 2003-2006. In Iraq the US’ actions to protect the population from the Sunni insurgency failed to address the nature of the insurgent movement (again portraying the insurgency as monolithic), and ignored the legitimate grievances of local communities and the political exclusion of the Sunni leadership at both local and national levels. In 2006, prior to General Petreaus’ “Surge”, at a time when Marine Corps Intelligence proclaimed the province to be lost, the US adjusted its policy towards talks and reconciliation with the Sunni insurgency that resulted in the Anbar Awakening. The Awakening brought formerly excluded Sunni leadership into the governing process, distanced the Sunni population from al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, and delivered an extremely significant reduction in violence that, tenuously, still holds. (Please see Mark Perry’s book, “Talking to Terrorists”, to understand how obstinacy and a commitment to rhetoric at senior levels in the US government delayed this process for two years, a delay that cost thousands of lives.)
There are many, many differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, so, it is difficult, and dangerous, to draw direct parallels. However, in this case, understanding the complex nature of the insurgency and its objectives in Iraq led to stabilization. The same holds true for Afghanistan. Reports of US involvement with efforts to reconcile elements of the insurgency with the Karzai government provide hope, albeit cautious hope, that a more sensible and rational US policy is taking hold.
*Talks leading to a settlement of the conflict are a primary focus of the Afghanistan Study Group’s recommendations.
Matthew Hoh, Director
Afghanistan Study Group
One Response to Cautious optimism for productive negotiations in Afghanistan
Much conjecture has been made of the situation in Afghanistan—it’s an ungovernable, fragmented country, an unwinnable war with no concept of a decisive victory, a graveyard of empires set to add another tombstone to its collection. A very expensive tombstone at that. This year’s tab alone is estimated at over $50 billion.
The solutions to this conundrum thus far proposed: ride Kharzai’s coattails to a perceptual victory and then get out, train Afghans to police their own country with a united police and army, or simply search and destroy until all the Taliban are gone,–all are based on false premises.
Afghanistan is not a country. It is, like Iraq a loose confederation of tribal cultures whose suspicion and lack of cooperation among themselves is exceeded only by their distrust of invading foreign entities. Add to this a savage combativeness:a friend once worked in pre-Soviet Afghanistan as a Peace Corps medic whose chief duty was to repair bullet wounds to the buttocks of the endlessly quarreling locals who, enjoined by Islam from killing, resorted to such gunplay knowing the victim would likely die of infection, for which they could not accept blame. When asked, upon the Soviets invading, if they stood a chance of prevailing he said no. He was referring to the Soviets.They have
a willingness to die seeking revenge for any perceived insult to their tribe or religion, and by invading one has initiated an open-ended, expensive, endless conflict with an enemy united only in its hatred of outside meddling.
But meddle we must. The collapse of the Twin Towers set us on a collision course with destiny in this forbidding place, and the investment in lives and treasure seems a bit much to simply cut our losses and bug out without first trying a few simple strategems that may well produce the desired result. By this I mean a reasonably united political structure with its citizens engaged in a cooperative effort at building their nation. “Nation building.” There, I’ve said it. And like it or not, it’s what we should be doing there if we ever hope to make this longest war in our history redeemable.
For this there are several fairly compelling reasons: the previous regime nourished terrorism and exported the product, Afghanistan lies in a stratgic position hard by Iran, the oil rich republics of what was once the USSR, and Pakistan—our erstwhile ally possessing the only current Islamic bomb and fundamentalist factions within its military and intelligence organs. It’s sitting on a motherlode of mineral wealth—some of it the strategic, rare earth kind, and (to my thinking) most of all, the ongoing threat and plight of half its population—its women.
The women of Afghanistan have historically been little more than chattel, and their status sunk to new lows under the woman-fearing Taliban. Women were not allowed out of their homes even to shop for groceries without a male escort, and were required to cover themselves head to toe lest a passing imam see any portion of their flesh and succumb to a frenzy of lust for which she—not he—would be held accountable. The mullahs exerted more effort policing women(read: keeping them in their place) than in otherwise conducting the duties of government. As to women acquiring educations and/or holding down jobs and positions of power? Fuggetabboudit.
Something about the condition of women in Afghanistan is redolent of the condition of blacks in the pre-civil rights American South. Movement was constricted, dress and comportment were specified and horrendous penalties exacted for any deviation from this norm. As bad as that was, even the Old South pales beside the penalties—stoning, beheading—exacted on errant women under the Taliban. Do we really want this system to return? What is “fighting for freedom” all about if not this?
One wonders at the relative silence of western feminists on this issue. It would seem that, in proper outrage, women would be demonstrating before the embassies of all fundamentalist Islamic countries, and in front of the fundamentalist mosques in their own countries in massive, noisy rallies, proclaiming solidarity with their oppressed sisters and roundly booing any of their representatives in public forums.
Nonetheless, achieving our aims in Afghanistan is a daunting task, and clarity must be the watchword if we are to carry the day. Options must be thoroughly examined and even gamed out to deduce results. Goals and the means of achieving them should be proclaimed with as little dissembling as possible.
It is at this point that I would like to propose a course that I believe has both merit and the promise of eventually succeeding:
Our stated goal should be to build Afghanistan as a viable, peaceful and prosperous nation with all the freedoms and responsibilities that Americans enjoy—although not necessarily in the same way. Women should be free, the population literate and invested in legal means to settle disputes,and engaged in building an infrastructure to eventually usher it into the first world.
Freedom of religion must be absolutely respected, with Buddhists, Christians, Jews and others under the vigilant protection of authorities.
There are no doubt Afgans who share this vision—probably academics and others who have been to the West. These should be sought out and nourished like hothouse flowers to establish an intellectual base for nationbuilding. They should not, however be given initial positions of power. Afganistan is not ready for them.
The borders of the country contain multiple power centers, i.e., the warlord territories. The current dominant personalities,General Rashid Dostum,Mohammed Quasim Fahim, Hamid Kharzai, Daoud Khan, Atta Muhammad, Karim Khalili, Gul Agha Shirzai,Ismail Khan,and major tribal entities, the Hazara, Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks form a nucleus with which to constuct a federation of ethnic states or ‘ethnofederation’ as the concept is popularly expressed.
Each of these entities has their own agenda—some sell opium, some exact tribute from wayfarers through their terrain, some are weapons brokers, others are clients of Iranian and Pakistani interests. The point is, none of them is or will be star struck by democracy. However, their status holds the keys to power in Afganistan, and if democracy is ever to prevail, they must participate, however unwillingly.
This begs the question: what is common ground in Afganistan? Weapons? Opium? Islam? General treachery aggravated by blood feuds? The motivating factor in each group varies.
But one common element ties them together. And that is Afghan currency. Despite the notorious hospitality of the tribes, which keeps them from cashing in on the multi million dollar bounty on Al Quaeda and Taliban members in their midst, they still do value currency as the means to conduct their affairs. Currency buys and sells weapons, drugs, livestock, and loyalty among the tribes, and without it their mobility, armed bodyguards, and general well being are severely limited. This fact affords a leverage not otherwise possible in this barren land. Using a carrot and stick approach, manipulation of the currency can influence the warlords into getting with the program which, in the end, is to establish an evolving republic structure that will one day afford the average citizen full rights, freedoms and responsibilities.
This is not pie in the sky. It is simply a goal, unreachable at the moment but definitely attainable if the right moves are made at the right time.
Herewith, a proposal to bring this about:
a) Partition Afganistan into a federation of states, each based on either the domain of a local warlord, or the tribal boundaries, in the case of large areas such as those the Pashtuns control. This process must be negotiated among the entities involved, and a blueprint for initial negotiations must be created by experts on Afghan culture, savvy politicians who do not favor a particular player in this game(if there are such animals—usually there are one or two), Afghan bankers, and representatives of the Allied and Afghan militaries. British military officials are probably the best Allied members to recruit for this venture as they come from a tradition of empire and have historically viewed local conflicts with cold-eyed realism, but other allies should be kept in the loop during negotiations.
b) Name each of the states after the current warlord in charge if they are determined to be vigorous and not soon to retire or die and—this is most important—issue separate currencies in their name. There is a precedent for this in our own history: the colonies initially conceived of their union as one of convenience for opposing the crown—even issuing their own currencies in the form of colonial scrip individual to each colony before the revolution and apparently conducting successful trade amongst themselves using these different currencies. And the ensuing states had far more power than currently.
c) Each currency is to be issued with the name and visage of the local honcho running the territory prominently displayed on all coins and bills. Although separate, each will denominate the same way—pennies, nickels, dimes, quarters, dollars in a decimal configuration—to foster trade between the states.
d) Despite this ego boost, each state governor/warlord is to accept this arrangemenwith the understanding that members of his immediate family cannot succeed him. He can transfer power, but not to one of his own, and not to one of the neighboring states. Furthermore—and this is most important—each governor will spend one month out of each year rotating into a governorship of a neighboring state as remote as possible from his own, so that in a period of,say, ten years, he will have participated in the running of all the other states. During this one month period, he will have all the power and responsibilities the man he is succeeding had, as will the man who assumes his own mantle. This will nurture a sense of union that is essential if this is to work. Any individual who would abuse this rotation system runs the risk of having his own satrapy equally abused.
(It is possible this rotation system could also be used to determine succession. When one satrap dies, a leader is chosen by lottery from non-leadership positions in one of the other states. This idea has bugs, but is worth exploring.)
e) A central government in Kabul is formed with few responsibilities other than overseeing interstate infrastructure such as roads, power distribution, etc. and fielding an army drawn from each of the states. A president/prime minister handles all foreign affairs, appointing ambassadors, etc. The army is essentially funded and controlled by a yearly loya jirga of warlords, with the jirga also having final approval of all treaties. Army generalships rotates yearly between tribes with the underlying corps of lieutenants and field officers retaining their positions without rotation. This will foster continuity of competence while avoiding abuse from the upper echelons.
f) A separate legislative body corresponding roughly to our house of representatives is chosen by state wide lotteries every three years from the population of anyone not related to a warlord. This body has the responsibility to enforce a simple constitution, detailed in the next paragraph, and includes women and people of all creeds and backgrounds. At some point a couple of decades hence, this body will be elected.
g) The constitution mandates equal treatment for women and minorities and all creeds in all states and empowers the HR body to enforce it by giving them ultimate control over currency approvals for each state. In other words, any state that transgresses this mandate can have its currency devalued or substituted with another state’s currency.
h)The HR body appoints an official to oversee the state lotteries and set minimum standards for schools,police and fire departments, which is funded and run by the individual states. Most of these will be initially very primitive.
i)The HR body can also direct the president to use the army to put down a rogue state, or one that is either ignoring the constitution or threatening its neighbor states. This will have to be done with the consent of the other warlords in the loya jirga, but shouldn’t be a problem if they themselves feel threatened.
j) To get the general population into voting mode, referendums are held yearly on interstate issues such as food safety, and road placement. A separate HR appointed official oversees referendums.
k) A supreme court nominated by the warlord body has its edicts enforced in the HR body, which directs the President to act. Each state has its own separate court system, which will try individuals arrested in neighboring states but not in its own boundaries. This cuts down on the human rights abuses of which the warlords are so fond. They are themselves be above the law except that the loya jirga can discipline one of its members if a 2/3 majority agrees.
l) Much has been made of the concept of Sharia law, which is basically a bunch of mullahs deciding what everyone else should do with their lives. I do not include this in the proposed government structure, as I believe it to be subject to extreme abuse. However, it is an idea that has gained traction in the Islamic world, and I think after four years of establishing the proposed government, a referendum could be held on adopting certain aspects of Sharia. Every four years this referendum can be offered, and if Sharia is, Allah forbid, approved then it itself would be subject to an affirming referendum every four years hence.
Funding this government is not cheap—probably around a billion dollars a year to set up and keep it operating. However, it offers a means for the allies to leave and be assured a relatively intact new nation is underway. And compared to the present expense of this open-ended war, it’s a drop in the bucket. Probably an allied military presence will be required at least until Al Quaeda is neutralized and the Taliban insurgencies quieted. This will probably take years, but an effective federation with its own unique set of checks and balances will bring it to fruition much sooner than the current dysfunctional system. A generous infusion of economic aid aimed at developing the country’s mineral resources,–which have been estimated at over $6 trillion,–with strong provisions that the general populace share in the wealth(not the case in most resource rich countries subject to foreign investment) will give a restive populace something to do besides hang out in madrassas learning how to practice mayhem on unbelievers.
This proposal is intended to be a template for a much more comprehensive effort to set this troubled nation on a course to stability and prosperity. It will take a certain amount of commitment from the allies to make it happen, but it can be done.
Afganistan is a starkly beautiful country with tough, resourceful people who’ve been dealt a rough hand for too many centuries. There is no better opportunity than the current conflict to effect a remedy.